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Some Issues on the Relationship between a Co-operative Support 
Organisation and its Client Co-operatives
Tony Emerson
Abstract
The distinction between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to co-operative 
development is critically examined. In the context of evaluating the effectiveness of co­
operative support organisations (CSOs), the problems associated with both approaches 
are analysed, and are found to be very similar. The key problem identified is the 
management of the relationship between the CSO and its client co-operatives.
The problems of the management of this relationship are elaborated in a detailed case 
study of the management problems encountered in the development of a textile co­
operative.
It is argued that ‘top-down’ is a misleading label because it fails to distinguish between 
initiating and controlling, and that the term ‘pro-action’ is more useful, as it implies 
initiation by the CSO, but that the CSO can then involve the client co-operative in 
decisions about objectives.
As CSOs strive to be more pro-active, more selective in whom they work with, and more 
resource-conscious and effective, it is argued that effective development work requires 
clearly set objectives, responsible resourcing in relation to these objectives and an 
implementation strategy.
Related to the issue of pro-action, the ‘contracting’ approach is advocated as a basis for 
understanding and managing CSO-client relations. Its advantages and implications are 
discussed, particularly in relation to the skill needs of development workers.
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Introduction and Aims
This thesis is the final phase of a Master of Philosophy project undertaken at the Open 
University Co-operatives Research Unit.
Chronologically, the steps in the research project were as follows:
1978-80: My involvement in a Steering Committee of a community group setting up a 
workers’ co-operative - one of the first of the ‘new wave’ co-operative projects in the
U.K.
1981-83: Following the commercial failure of the co-operative, research into the causes 
of this failure (including interviews with some of the main participants - workers, 
managers and development workers) leading to publication of the case study "The Study 
of Neighbourhood Textiles".
1983-85: Preparation of the Study Guide to the Story of Neighbourhood Textiles - an 
attempt to use the experience of Neighbourhood Textiles for education and training in co­
operative management, and draw out detailed learning points from it.
1984-87: A study of the co-operative development and support process in the U.K. and 
abroad, based mainly on written publications though referring also to my experience in 
training and development in this area; the study included a comparison of the 
development process adopted by the Steering Committee developing Neighbourhood 
Textiles with other thinking and experience on the development process; and lastly it 
attempted to derive some principles concerning the relationship between a development 
or support organisation and its client co-operatives.
A unique feature of this research was that it virtually spanned the life of the area being 
researched - i.e. the development of worker co-operatives and of co-operative support 
organisations, which only commenced in the late 1970s and proceeded at a very rapid rate 
in the early 1980s (see Chapter 1). So too did my research aims change and evolve over 
this period - particularly because as an external student I was only able to devote time to 
the research intermittently. Furthermore, the fact that I was actually working in a related 
field (in management training for co-operative and community development) and 
involved politically in this field (as chair of a local authority employment subcommittee
1979-82) meant that my ideas on research priorities were constantly changing. These
ideas were further modified and developed in discussion with my research supervisor and 
his colleagues at the Co-operatives Research Unit.
The net result was less of a focus on the detail of co-operative management practice, as 
was originally intended and as is reflected in the Case Study and Study Guide. It was felt 
that the learning from this could be fairly directly applied in various types of management 
training and distance learning programmes.
The focus moved more to the process of co-operative development and support - in 
interaction with various concepts of co-operative management decision-making 
structures; research being published in the mid-1980s (and my own experience) suggested 
that this area was a matter of great controversy and practical difficulty.
Hence the research emphasis during the latter period, 1984-87; this led to the following 
research aims:
1) To analyse the development of co-operative support organisations (CSOs)*, the 
practices they have adopted and their underlying assumptions and philosophy.
2) To evaluate the performance of such CSOs.
3) To analyse the development process undertaken in Neighbourhood Textiles in the 
context of what has been learnt elsewhere and of current (1987) thinking on the 
development process (as well as in the context of the outcomes in the enterprise itself).
4) To derive some principles about good practice in the relationship between a CSO 
and its client co-operatives.
Lastly, while research from other countries is used and referred to, the geographical 
emphasis of the research is on the U.K. - with a particular emphasis on London and the 
South East where certain particular economic and social factors are important (see 
Chapter 3).
Similarly, while I use and refer to research on the development of other types of 
enterprise, the essential focus is on the worker co-operative development process.
I intend to use the phrase Co-operative Support Organisation (CSO) to denote all types 
of co-operative and development agencies. iSe term Co-operative Development 
Agency (CDA) will only be used in quotation.
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CHAPTER JL
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CO-OPERATIVE SUPPORT ORGANISATIONS
IN THE UK
1 . 1  Worker Co-operatives
Mellor, Stirling and Hannah (1986) provide a simple definition, 
'Worker Co-operatives are businesses that are owned and contr­
olled by their members. Most of them are registered as 
Friendly Societies under model rules of the Industrial Common 
Ownership Movement (ICOM) which limits individual shareholding 
to one pound sterling and restricts membership to those who 
work in the co-operative. Decisions are to be taken on the 
basis of one person, one vote; although decision-making may be 
delegated to a management committee with a minimum of five 
members.'
Macfarlane (1 9 8 6) using figures from the worker co-operative 
data base, estimates that there were 676 co-operatives in Britain 
in 1985 (in 1975 there were only about 20), employing about 5000 
people full-time and 4000 people part-time, but roughly half of 
this employment is accounted for by five large co-operatives 
'some dating from the last century and some being endowed to 
their workforce by philanthropic owners'. 226 co-operatives 
were in London and the South East of England.
The Co-operative Advisory Group (CAG) (1986) estimates that 
450 co-operatives were trading in London between 1981 and
— 6 —
1986 at some stage. Numbers have grown from about 50 in 
1981 to about 300 in 1986 - but there was little growth in 
the last two years (mid 1984 to mid 1 9 8 6) of this period.
Most co-operatives (according to Macfarlane) are in trade 
sectors that require relatively low levels of capital invest­
ment. Cornforth and Lewis (1985) estimate that 90% of co­
operatives being formed start from scratch as new businesses 
- the majority of these are very small with less than five 
workers. The remainder are either 'rescue' or 'phoenix' 
co-operatives (formed out of failing conventional businesses) 
or conversions from active businesses.
But 'statistics about co-operatives are of doubtful quality', 
according to Macfarlane. Information about numbers of co­
operatives are largely based on registrations. Some registered 
co-operatives may be 'idle' or not trading. Many are engaged 
only in marginal trading^ To illustrate^ one of my students 
is in a mobile catering co-operative, officially registered 
but only doing occasional functions. Take home income is about
1 , 0 0 0  pounds per member per annum. Information about economic 
performance of co-operatives (eg. income per member) is 
difficult to obtain, as is referred to in Chapter 3-
The great majority of co-operatives (but not of co-operative 
employment) probably owe their origin to the 'New Wave' co­
operative movement which started in the l9?0s in the UK. This
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movement was a response to concern both about the quality of 
working life and about growing unemployment.
1.2 Co-operative Support Organisations (CSOs)
The first local CSOs were set up in Scotland in 1976 and in 
West Glamorgan in 1978 (Thornley 1981). The first in London 
was in Lambeth in 1 9 7 9. All were set up by local activists 
and organisations - voluntary organisations, individual acti­
vists, representatives of trade unions, retail co-operative 
societies, worker co-operatives, housing co-operatives etc.
They first existed as voluntary groups before obtaining public 
funds to employ full-time development workers (Cornforth &
Lewis^1985). They usually cover the geographical area of a 
sponsoring or a funding local authority - eg. boroughs in 
London (Lord, 1986).
The campaign to form local CSOs was initiated and assisted by 
activists such as Taylor of the Socialist Environmental and 
Resources Association, by the newly formed National Co-operative 
Development Agency and by the Co-operative Union. By 1984 there 
were 80 local CSOs of which 50 had full-time staff. 36 of these 
were independent local CSOs; 4 were regional bodies ; 10 were 
local authorities that employed co-operative development workers 
directly (Cornforth and Lewis).
CAG (1986) estimated that there were at least 26 local co­
operative support agencies in London by 1 9 8 6, employing 9 0+ 
full-time equivalent workers.
- 8 -
Politically (according to Cornforth and Lewis) 'the majority 
of support has come from Labour controlled authorities, who, 
concerned with high levels of unemployment, have been developing 
strategies to stimulate their local economies' (though since the 
abolition of the GLC at least two non-Labour outer London 
boroughs have taken over funding of local CDAs).
Macfarlane (1 9 8 6) identified a number of areas where the init­
iative for co-operative support organisations comes from within 
the local authority rather than from voluntary organisations - 
eg. Haringey (London), Sheffield, West Midlands.
1.3 Objectives of CSOs
CAG have found that CSO's overt objectives were governed by 
the funding bodies - eg. the GLC specified work with women, 
ethnic minorities, disabled people. Informally, they found, 
objectives were influenced by client groups, and by skills, 
interests and backgrounds of staff. They found little evidence 
of Management Committee influence on objectives, except during 
initial stages.
Macfarlane also found that most CSOs targeted disadvantaged 
groups (unemployed people, women, ethnic minorities). He also 
found that authorities such as Sheffield, and West Midlands, 
which directly initiated co-operative support work themselves, 
put greater emphasis on commercial viability.
- 9 -
CAG, Lord, and Macfarlane all pointed to weaknesses in the 
process of setting clear objectives and maintaining performance, 
in co-operative support organisations of all types (see Chapter 
3 ). Lord related this problem to the informal management styles 
generally adopted by independent CSOs.
1 . 4  Summary
In summary, CSOs have grown very rapidly in the first half of 
the 1980s. They are largely (but not exclusively) independent 
voluntary organisations, funded mainly by Labour local author­
ities concerned about unemployment, economic decline and equal 
opportunities, and generally adopting fairly informal manage­
ment styles.
- 10 -
CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING ON THE CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
2 . 1  Introduction
In this section the development of thinking on the co-operative . 
support process in the early I980s is critically examined and 
comments and comparisons from other countries, and from other 
types of development agencies, are made.
This is a largely historical commentary, drawing on observations 
made during that time, rather than on the systematic analysis 
made by the major evaluation studies (see Chapter 3), save 
where these studies provided factual background or descriptive 
commentary.
During this period discussions of co-operative development often 
utilised a distinction between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' 
philosophies. The perceived advantages and disadvantages of 
these contrasting approaches are a starting point for discussion, 
Thereafter a number of issues which cut across this distinction 
are considered.
2 . 2  The 'top-down' Approach
This approach was generally not favoured by the first generation 
of co-operative development workers and agencies. An exception
- 11 -
was the Wandsworth Enterprise Development Agency ('WEDA'), 
set up in 198O with a brief to develop common ownership 
industrial co-ops. It adopted the following strategy 
according to its publicity brochure. First it was to 
establish gaps in local markets and second,develop feasibility 
studies for new products or services to fill these gaps; then 
it was to 'find suitable people for these new jobs' and 'ensure 
the necessary training' was provided ; from then on, it was to 
'assume an on-going advisory and monitoring role throughout the 
enterprises' association with WEDA'. Such an approach is called 
'top-down' since the agency initiates the project and then seeks 
a group to carry it out. The enterprise starts not with would- 
be co-operators coming forward from the community as initiators 
themselves but with the agency; and its role is virtually 
managerial, or, at least, it starts on that basis and works 
'down' from there.
It was questioned whether WEDA's approach worked in practice. 
Pollard has claimed that the only co-ops actually set up 
through WEDA were by people who had their oim ideas for a 
business in the first place.
It is difficult to find other examples of agencies or commen­
tators advocating the 'top-down' approach so openly during 
this period. (Some more recent, unpublished, reports suggest 
that the Scottish Co-operative Development Committee and the
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Greater London Enterprise Board may be adopting elements of 
this approach.) But the early thinking towards 'top-down' 
was well expressed at a co-op development conference in 198I1 
where reservations were expressed about not operating 'bottom- 
up ' (in a discussion led by Berry and Mahoney). Having 
feasibility studies on the shelf ready to 'dole out' to new 
co-ops was not thought a good idea, and the fear was expressed 
that if development workers became fully involved in the co-ops 
as managers, problems of dependency would result.
In essence, the limitations of the 'top-down' approach can be 
expressed as the following:
1. People will not come forward readily to fit themselves into 
ready made plans.
2 . A problem of dependency arises in co-ops where development 
workers take a very directive, interventionalist role 
rather than a re-active, non-directive role.
3. A problem of psychological ownership can arise - the 
members not really feeling it is their project.
2.3 The 'bottom—up' Philosophy
The 'bottom—up' philosophy denotes an approach whereby the 
agency should work with actual or potential co-operators only; 
the initiative and responsibility of forming and running a co­
operative lies entirely with its manbers. The development 
workers should respond to the needs of the client group as 
stated by the client group ; and the development workers should 
help the client group with advice and technical support (to
- 13 -
help themselves) and generally help them to do things for 
themselves.
Oakshott (1978) argues that 'the main thrust to get the 
enterprise off the ground must come from the potential 
workers themselves' and that no new enterprise should be 
set up without this being the case. He cites the Mondragon 
Caja Laboral Popular and the Polish Co-op Development Agency 
as insisting/on this being the case and insisting that the 
potential workers must be fully involved in the development 
process (as we discuss later, though, both the Mondragon and 
Polish agencies go far beyond responding to presenting needs).
Linehan and Tucker (1983)1 in the Irish context, argue 
similarly that 'workers' co-ops are self-help organisations 
and the initiatives for setting them up ideally should come 
from those who will be themselves worker members ... They 
will probably need advice and support from various professional 
people and agencies, but the primary effort must come from 
themselves'. I have emphasized the word 'ideally' since their 
use of it might suggest that they believe that in reality 
something more might be required than advice and support for 
'bottom-up' initiatives.
Lord (1986) and Cornforth and Lewis (1988) found that the great 
majority of UK CSOs adopt a facilitative, non-directive,
'bottom—up* approach. Lord quotes Islington CDA: 'The principle
- l4 -
under which we operate is that we mobilise people to develop 
their own skills, and provide a framework to develop their 
proposals'.
In Pollard's (1983) words, 'most CDAs have chosen the "from 
the 'bottom-up' approach working with members of each co­
operative to develop their own ideas, rather than doing the 
work for them.' Milford (1983)» in a survey of CDA workers, 
found that the younger and more radical workers had a definite 
view that they would only assist groups who came to them. We 
see in these quotations a strong hint of the libertarian, 
anti-authoritarian philosophy to which Lord refers.
These comments can be summarised into a model of interaction 
between the potential co-operators and development worker in 
'bottom—up' initiatives where the roles of the respective parties 
are as follows :
Potential Co-operators 
to initiate
to take full responsibility for the development
to share fully the ownership of the development between themselves 
to be in control of the interaction with the development worker
Development Worker 
to inform 
to advise
to respond to the expressed needs of the co-operators
to work with the groups 
to be supportive to them
- 15 -
2 . 4  Limitations of the 'bottom—up' philosophy
The problems of this approach can be illustrated by a case 
from a development worker in a London agency (the source is 
an unpublished action plan report from a student). There 
were seven people involved in a particular client group, two 
of whom came to her for help. All seven were never actually 
together for a meeting. They were not clear whether their 
proposal - a leisure activity - would be commercially viable, 
or whether it should be a community service with a subsidy from 
a public authority. Different people from the group communicated 
with the development worker at different times. There was quite 
a lot of conflict in the group. Some members, she felt, were 
scapegoating her for failure to get any grant money for them so 
far. Yet, she had arranged a meeting with a funding body 
representative and only two members had turned up on time - two 
others arrived thirty minutes late. She felt that no progress 
was being made and she did not know where she stood as their 
development worker.
I use this example to illustrate the limitations of relying on 
the approach of supportive response to a client group's needs, 
especially where the client group is sizeable, disorganized and 
suffering from internal conflict. Had this development worker 
merely worked by the'bottom-up' philosophy, there would have 
been little hope of achieving much; had she demonstrated a 
supportive response towards one or two members who approached 
her, her reaction may well have been misinterpreted by other 
members and she may well have found herself drawn into the
- 16 -
internal conflict of the group.
(On the other hand, had she taken the ‘top-down' approach, and 
procured funding for the group, the group would probably have 
remained un-self-organized and unsuccessful. This would have 
been bad for the agency's credibility. If the group had 
achieved nothing for itself, by its own efforts, it would 
have become increasingly, rather than decreasingly, dependent 
upon the agency.)
Neither approach, therefore, seems suitable in this kind of 
situation. Yet it is probably not a rare situation for a 
client group and development worker to find themselves in; 
it is difficult for a client group, at the outset, to be so 
informed, so well organized and so cohesive as to know what 
it wants from the agency and to be in control of the inter­
action, and even more difficult if a sizeable client group is 
involved. For a 'bottom-up' approach to have a chance of success, 
the client group would need all these qualities.
Another inherent problem in the 'bottom-up' philosophy is that it 
relies on the motivation of the initial workers. But there 
will, almost invariably, be later recruits. It is very 
difficult for a large enough group with the right mix of skills 
etc., to get together and form a co-op. The best that Can 
usually be hoped for is that the co-op be the brainchild of 
two or three people. Either before they commence trading or
— 17 "
later new people will have to be recruited: people who by
definition will not share in the psychological ownership of 
the project. For these latter workers - probably to become 
a majority in time - it may make little difference whether 
the co-op was initiated by colleague workers or 'from above'; 
they are still going to have to adopt someone else's baby.
And yet, skills, motivation, psychological ownership will have 
to be fully shared with them if the enterprise is to succeed.
The problem appeared in Wajcman's (1983) study of Fakenham:
the later recruits did not seem to share the motivation of
Ithe initial members. Oakshott's discussion of his own bottom- 
up* philosophy also illustrates this dilemma. Referring to the 
Sunderlandia Builders co-op (which eventually folded) he 
argues: 'as the person mainly responsible for initiating the
experiement, clearly I, rather than the building tradesmen, 
must take the main responsibility for the poor results that 
followed.' The tradesmen were later recruits in an enterprise 
which Oakshott initiated. They voted Oakshott off the board 
and voted themselves higher wages than they could economically 
justify. Yet Oakshott appears to be denying their full 
responsibility, which is a form of paternalism and inconsistent 
with the ‘bottom-up* philosophy. It seems that acknowledging the 
responsibility of later recruits, and preparing them to take 
that responsibility, seems to demand a form of intervention 
beyond what would be acceptable to the 'bottom-up* philosophy 
as described so far.
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Thirdly, it is difficult for the CSO or agency to hold back 
from more active intervention. It is not surprising (for a 
reason argued later) that there are instances where a devel­
opment agency, whilst espousing the ‘bottom-up* approach, have 
found themselves going beyond it. Brent CDA (annual report 
1981), for instance, espousing the‘bottom-up* approach, sets 
out as its objectives to 'act as a source of assistance and 
advice ... and a means of access to specialist skills' and 
generally to help people do things for themselves; Yet in 
relation to one co-op project, the report elaborates: '...the
document supporting the Urban Aid application (which was written 
by Brent CDA)...'. Clearly, Brent CDA had found itself, in 
writing the report, going beyond the objectives stated above. 
This is surely because new groups very often cannot be organized 
to the required level, and furthermore the agency is under pres­
sure at all times to achieve results. It had to do things for 
the co-op itself.
A good reason for the development agency not to 'hold back', 
but to intervene, is that the interests of the development 
agency are at stake. Returning to Mondragon Caja Laboral 
Popular ('CLP'), Oakshott (1 9 7 8) and Burridge (1 9 8 4) both 
describe the systematic, detailed involvement of the CLP 
in the affairs of the co-operatives it supports. It does a 
feasibility study, involves itself in the choice of managers, 
location, premises etc., appoints a 'godfather' to monitor 
progress. Burridge remarks that 'as the CLP can only invest 
in co-ops, it is obliged to take other measures to protect
- 19 -
its loans' (other than spreading its risks as other banks do). 
This necessitates a very firm contract between the CLP and the 
co-op : an annual agreement between the co-op and the CLP on
targets and objectives; regular reports on progress made by the 
co-operative to the CLP which are audited; reviews of progress 
by both parties with the CLP maintaining the ultimate right to 
replace existing management in cases of impending disaster.
Lord found that other European CSOs — in Italy, for example — 
adopted a similar approach.
Thus, the CLP, once satisfied that a group of initiating 
workers are taking the initial responsibility, then goes far 
beyond 'reacting' or 'being supportive'. It has a very clear 
idea of the processes an embryonic co-operative has to go 
through; it takes steps to ensure that it goes through these 
processes; and it will put in its own management if it is not 
satisfied with the results.
Arguably, a development agency is in a similar position. Though 
it does not give grants or loans directly, it still needs to 
protect its 'investment': the limited time of its staff; its
reputation and the reputation of co-ops generally (failure 
leads to lack of confidence in future co-operatives); public 
or institutional money invested in the co-operative which the 
agency may have helped to negotiate (either for specific client 
groups or for co-operatives generally). However, development 
agencies in the UK are less well placed when it comes to
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protecting their investment - their power is more limited.
In the UK most co-operative development agencies are 
independent of funding agencies and want to maintain that 
independence. This independence means that they can 
encourage clients to be more open and trusting with them 
by offering them a bond of confidentiality. They cannot, 
therefore, protect their investment of time, energy and 
reputation by threatening a withdrawal of funds or even of 
a recommendation for funding. All they can do is threaten to 
withdraw their services - but this is hard to combine with an 
ostensibly 'supportive' relationship.
In summary, it is difficult(a) for the potential co-operators 
to be in control of what they want ;(b) for all the co-operators 
to share that responsibility equally; and (^ c) for the development 
workers to 'hold back' from more active intervention.
2.5 The Support Relationship and the 'Drama Triangle'
Given these difficulties, the relationship (between CSO and 
client) is prone to conflicting expectations, anxiety,
'undiscussible' problems and confusion. Such problems of the 
rather nebulous 'support' relationship can be seen in the 
theoretical framework of the Drama Triangle, derived from 
Transactional Analysis. To illustrate first, using the 
London Agency example:
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Figure 1
RESCUER
(Development - 
worker/
PERSECUTOR
(eg former employer 
banks/ local 
authority)
VICTIM
(Client)
Initially, as in Figure 1, the Development Worker takes the 
role of the 'Rescuer* looking for a 'Victim': what can s/he
do to help this worthy group (for whom an unsupportive bank 
or local authority, or a former employer who made them 
redundant may play the role of the 'Persecutor')? In this 
framework, 'rescuing' is characterised by paternal elitism, 
the 'victim' by childlike dependency and 'persecution' by a 
negative, unsupportive or even hypercritical attitude.
This transaction readily crosses over to the following 
arrangement.
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Figure 2 
VICTIM RESCUER
(bank/ local 
authority etc)
(Development
worker)
PERSECUTOR
(Client)
The development worker becomes the 'Victim', as in the London 
Agency example described earlier: she feels manipulated by
the client group, whom she now sees as demanding/dishonest/ 
unreliable/ungrateful or whatever - the 'Persecutor'. The 
development worker may even use the bank or local authority 
to 'rescue' her from the group, by either leaving the client
to approach the funding body on its own hoping that it will
■_ !
not succeed in procuring funds or even manipulating the f nding 
body into refusing the group funds.
Or the transaction may cross over to Figure 3 :
Figure 3
PERSECUTOR
(Development
worker)
RESCUER 
(eg committee
VICTIM
(Client)
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Here the client group, as 'victim', sees the development 
worker as promising the earth, delivering nothing concrete, 
while being paid a lot for it. They may turn to various allies 
(eg. the CDA committee members) for support to 'rescue' them.
In theoretical terms (see Klein, 19 8 3), the tendency is to 
end up in a role which is congruent with one's negative 
script decision - i.e., one's negative, usually unconscious, 
set of beliefs about self and/or others. In the 'game' of the 
Drama Triangle the participants may change roles many times. 
These cross-overs are usually quick and unconscious or out of 
awareness, but end up reaffirming negative script decisions.
In summary: if a 'bottom-up' agency-client relationship
implies that the former's interventions are limited to 
responsive support to the letter's needs - without the agency 
making clear its own needs - then this is an unequal and 
unclear relationship which is vulnerable to the type of 
manipulatory processes described in the Drama Triangle. I 
regard this as a fourth limitation, added to the three suggested 
in 2.4 .
2 . 6  Some Other Issues in Enterprise Development: Their
Implications for the Development Agency - Client 
Relationship.
Gregory (1983) interpreted the Mondragon GLP a/s 'not waiting 
for people to come to it' but going 'out to groups of workers
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who are forming co-ops' and helping them to 'make things 
go'. Writing from the perspective of the Welsh trade union 
movement, he proposed that the Welsh TUC initiate a similar 
body to go out and work with the workers 'rather than expect 
them to come in with ready-prepared business development 
plans and ... cash flow projections.'
To the extent that the problems are seen as mass unemployment 
and community resignation, such writers believe that 'responsive 
support' is insufficient. Gregory sees the trade union move­
ment in Wales as the natural support body for workers co-oper­
atives - because of its history and traditions, political weight, 
trust and standing in the community, and its skills in organising 
people and setting up procedures. He sees the support body as 
catalysts in co-operative development for groups of workers it 
could identify as possible co-operators. Other commentators 
will argue for pro-active intervention to target development 
support to priority groups or priority projects. Such inter­
ventions are not at all unusual.
Finnegan (1983) categorised co-operatives in Ireland into (a) 
those initiated by voluntary promoters - eg. social or community 
workers, trade unionists, professionals, clergy - for others to 
work in; and (b) those set up by potential workers to create 
jobs for themselves. In practice, he observed, 'most 
co-operatives will be initiated by a combination of both 
voluntary and worker promoters' and he saw the need to develop
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a model for the gradual transfer of control from voluntary 
promoters to worker members.
Returning to the UK, Milford (1 9 8 3) in his survey found that 
more experienced CDA workers - those with backgrounds in 
business, the labour movement, social services, voluntary 
organisations - whilst they expressed a preference for a 
'bottom-up' approach, were also, given the time, willing to 
attempt to initiate co-operatives and recruit co-operators once 
it was a viable idea.
It has also been argued that the problems involved in setting 
up new enterprises, particularly amongst disadvantaged groups 
seem to demand the provision of substantial concrete business 
and management support services.
Thus, Macfarlane (1986 p25/6 ) argues that 'where co-operative 
development is targeted at disadvantaged groups, high levels 
of development support and financial support are likely to be 
necessary if commercially viable co-operatives are going to 
emerge'. Co-operative development thus 'is essentially a 
training provision in the field of learning where "doing" is 
the greatest tutor and formal education is only an introduction 
to the language. ...Training and support may take several years 
This needs to be resourced if disadvantaged groups are to be 
(effectively) prioritised.'
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Likewise Boddington(1 9 8 4) in advocating the concept of 
'venture centres' argues: 'all the advice in the world
cannot assist the person with the idea in taking that step 
(of setting up in business) because nothing can paint 
sufficiently the picture of what has to be done and what it 
is like running one's own business'. Hence, advice and 
support are not enough; in addition, he advocated that the 
development agency should analyse the would-be entrepreneurs' 
ideas, motivations and objectives; and also that the proposed 
Venture Centres, as well as providing suitably serviced 
premises, should provide legal, accounting, marketing and 
other management services - in essence, the whole management 
infrastructure for the new entrepreneur to fit into.
The need for very active intervention has been recognised 
elsewhere as well. Cobbald, in a study of community 
co-operatives set up by the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board, Scotland ('HIDB') noted that the HIDB recognised that 
initiating management committees had neither the time nor the 
expertise for managing a project fully in the setting up 
phase, and paid the cost of employing a manager for the first 
few years.
The following two approaches also seem to see pro-active inter­
vention and the provision of substantial concrete support
services as going together: Pierce (1981), discussing the
development of the US National Consumer Co-operative Bank,
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noted that the experiment with co-operatives under the I960's 
poverty programme ended in almost universal failure 'through 
lack of follow-up technical counsel, and because community 
organisation is often weak anyway.' To quote A.J. McKnight, 
a bank vice-chairman and a black Catholic priest organising 
Southern agricultural co-operatives in the USA 'this time 
there has to be a very strong outreach effort - it has to be 
more than just informational, it has to be organising' (my 
emphasis).
The Scottish Co-operative Development Committee, as well as 
responding to queries and requests for assistance, had (by 
1980) set up two projects of its own; a co-operatively run 
workspace and a 'co-operative formation package' for 'people 
who ordinarily would never have thought of setting up their 
own co-operative enterprise', offering 'to form the co-oper­
ative with the workers, and, as needed, to provide office and 
administrative facilities, book-keeping and financial control, 
management and marketing' as long as they were needed.
However, if substantial support services are to be offered, it 
is not surprising if the bodies concerned wish to reduce the 
probability of failure, in the interests of both the development 
agency and the initiators. Hence, some sort of 'vetting' of 
groups and their proposals is likely to follow and, indeed, 
such a trend has been apparent for a number of years. For
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example, many of the local enterprise trusts surveyed by 
Initiatives (1982) see the need for being more systematic 
and probing in their interventions. Some 'vet the business 
plans of their enquirers and pass critical comments on them' 
but 'some trusts place greater emphasis on assessing 
individuals, their motivations, temperament and skills, 
as much as the specific idea they wish to implement'.
2.7 Summary and Conclusion
The distinction between 'top-down' and 'bottom—up' has been 
an important, even central, feature of thinking about co­
operative development in the UK. The characteristics of both 
approaches were described.
'Top-down' has been little tried. It has been assumed this 
approach would be unattractive to potential workers, and that 
it would lead to problems of dependency and lack of psycho­
logical ownership. It has not been fashionable.
The 'bottom—up' approach is widely espoused. But this approach 
requires the embryonic co-operative group to be fully - and 
equally between its members - in control of the relationship 
with the CSO - an unrealistic requirement given the organis­
ation, expertise and other problems of a new group; and given 
the 'investment' of the CSO in creating successful co-ops, 
it is difficult for it to hold back and take a purely responsive.
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supportive role. Not surprisingly, this approach is not 
always followed faithfully by the agencies which espouse 
it.
We also argued that if the agency limits itself to responsive 
support to the client’s needs, without making clear its own, 
then this is an unequal and unclear relationship vulnerable 
to the manipulatory processes described in the Drama Triangle.
An analysis of trends in enterprise development work generally, 
in the UK and abroad, suggests further reasons to query the 
effectiveness of the 'bottom—up' approach: in particular
* the perceived need to be 'pro-active' in targeting devel­
opment to specific disadvantaged groups
* the need to invest heavily in training, infrastructure 
support, etc., if enterprises are to be successful - 
particularly if the participants start from a position 
of disadvantage
* the need felt by development agencies to vet initial 
applicants, carefully monitor progress, etc., in order to 
protect investments and reduce probability of failures.
Obviously, if an agency intervenes in such ways with its clients 
its approach can no longer be described as 'bottom—up'. But 
does that therefore render its approach 'top-down'? Or is it.
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as we shall argue further, that the 'top-down' vs 'bottom—up' 
distinction is an over simplification, that does not provide 
an adequate framework for understanding the issues and choices 
involved in the (usually) complex and varied agency-client 
relationship?
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATION CRITERIA AND EVALUATION STUDIES OF THE UK 
CO-OPERATIVE SUPPORT ORGANISATIONS
3. 1  Introduction
This chapter reviews the principal evaluation studies of the 
UK CSOs. These studies have commonly attempted to evaluate 
CSOs in two different respects: first as regards the output
of their work - the number and type of co-operatives formed, 
the number of jobs created, etc; second as regards their 
working practices — whether the services they provide and the 
manner in which they provide them are appropriate to their 
objectives. These two different bases for evaluation are con- 
sidered in turn. It should be noted, however, that although 
the studies consider both sets of success criteria, it is the 
latter that have attracted most attention.
3.2 Effectiveness of CSOs
Cornforth & Lewis (1985) estimated that each CDA worker can 
be expected to help establish about 2 co-operatives per year, 
each employing about 5 people. Macfarlane (1986) derives the 
following figures from the work of Taylor (1983):
No. of Co-operatives
1980 1982
A r e a s  without CDAs 201 250
Areas with CDAs 99
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CAG (1986) in the London context, found that about 250 of 
the 300 co-operatives (83%) were located in the 22 boroughs 
(69% of London boroughs) enjoying the services of CDAs.
'This confirms the correlation discovered in most other 
research studies between development agency existence and 
the growth of co-operatives' (CAG p.2?).
However, such statistics are difficult to interpret. CAG
points out possible causes of statistical unreliability:
* all directories have problems being up-to-date, with new 
starts and closures;
* not all registered co-operatives are trading
* (re job creation statistics): there is confusion in 
directory counts between full-time equivalent jobs and
part-time plus full-time jobs.
Add to this the suspicion already referred to - in 1 .1 above 
and voiced by Macfarlane, and Lord (1986) that these trading 
co-operatives are often very marginal indeed and it is clear 
that some questions have to be asked about the meaning of 
these figures. For example:
Do they measure the activity rate of CSOs rather than the 
success rate of CSOs? i.e. CSOs work with client groups, 
(including registration, some test marketing, pilot trading 
activity etc), as against a final outcome of this work, the
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setting up of a viable, sustainable enterprise ( - however 
viable and sustainable are defined)?
Are successful co-operatives developed without assistance or 
influence from CSO as likely to appear in the statistics as 
those developed with such assistance?
CAG also point to another reason for caution with the Taylor 
figures: growth in co-operative formation seems to have ceased
over the period of 1984 to 1986 despite the continued growth 
in CSOs over the same period. They also estimate a 'disap­
pearance rate' of 35% over the 3 years prior to their report 
(in early 1986). Thus CAGs' figures would be consistent with 
a hypothesis that marginal trading activities initiated in 
the early 1980s started to die off in the mid-eighties, to be 
replaced by another set of marginal co-operatives.
Further research is needed to answer these questions. However, 
it is clear that evaluations of CSO must go beyond simply 
counting the numbers of (registered) co-operatives. The 
evaluation needs to be based on explicit criteria ,- which 
derive from and include criteria for successful co-operatives.
The thinking of one major authority on this question was:
'The ultimate test of GLC and the Greater London Enterprise 
Board ... policies would not simply be the number of co­
operatives or jobs in co-operatives, but the extent to which
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they relate with the Labour movement, offered good conditions 
of employment, offered socially useful products, were them­
selves able to create a co-operative movement and economy, 
and could provide evidence of commercial success and survival 
••• co-operatives were identified (by the GLC) as having a 
role as the key channel for ethnic minorities, women and people 
with disabilities to create their own businesses'. (CAG 1986 
p. i and ii). The problem is converting such aspirations into 
measurable success criteria that can be explicit to all, 
including client groups, to enable evaluation of co-operative 
performance, CSO performance, and ultimately to paraphrase 
Macfarlane, of the local authorities performance in pursuing 
its co-operative development policy.
The evaluation studies of CSOs, though they may acknowledge 
the desirability of more searching performance indicators, 
have not attempted seriously to develop them. This raises the 
question whether it is realistic to suppose that the sorts of 
objectives quoted above can ever generate measurable evaluation 
criteria. The question is addressed by considering the objectives 
(or variants of them) in turn.
Job Creation;
Measures of job creation in employment development work are 
difficult. Unemployment Bulletin No.2 2 1^ 9 8 6) conducted an 
analysis of the job creation impact of the Government Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme (EAS). They used concepts such as:
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Deadweight; those firms which would have gone ahead anyway, and 
therefore created jobs, despite EAS;
Displacement : those jobs 'created' that mainly displaced jobs
elsewhere in the economy; this factor is highest in low-cost 
entry existing markets.
The Bulletin quoted MSC estimates of both factors of about 50% 
with some overlap between them.
Although it is uncertain whether 'new-start' co-operatives are 
the same as EAS businesses in those respects, it is clear that 
to assess the job creation impact of co-operative development, 
you have to reduce the figure for numbers employed quite 
considerably, perhaps even by more than 50%.
Job Creation in Co-operatives:
The obvious indicator is the number of jobs created in the co­
operative economy. If jobs created in a co-operative displace 
jobs elsewhere in the non-co-operative economy they are still 
measured as a plus using this indicator (whereas they would 
not be by the 'job creation' indicator). But one would still 
have to subtract for deadweight if the co-operative jobs would 
have been created anyway without CSO intervention. However, a 
question remains, from discussion above, concerning the level 
of income and hours worked at which one can say a 'job' has 
been created, bearing in mind variations in income levels in 
different trade and market sectors.
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Job Creation for Disadvantaged Groups
Similarly there is a need to subtract for deadweight (for co­
operative members who .might have got jobs anyway) but not fpr 
displacement: if non-disadvantaged group members are displaced
elsewhere in the economy, the enterprise would still be seen as 
a positive gain, using this indicator.
Commercial Success and Survival
Macfarlane in particular calls for an indicator of the strength 
and survival rates of co-operatives as businesses. Certain 
measures of economic performance are called for - eg. income 
per worker, capital invested (including surpluses re-invested) 
as well as commercial survival over time.
The latter can only be assessed through a longitudinal study 
over a period of years - and all the evaluation studies noted
the difficulty of this given the recent growth of co-operative
development.
But more precise information on income per worker and investment 
could be collected. This information needs to relate to trade,
market and geographical region. To explore this point three
experienced development workers in the London region were asked
to identify a co-operative with an average member income of
£7,000 p.a. or greater. Between them they identified seven
co-operatives - but only one of these was in an area with a
CSO and not pre-dating CSO formation. This 'straw poll' research
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is used only to show the need for such financial indicators, 
not to 'prove' anything about the level of commercial success 
in co-operatives. Apart from the sample being small, it could 
be that the post-CSO co-operatives have just not reached this 
income level as yet.
Nevertheless an income of less than £7,000 is unlikely to 
attract skilled workers in London's economy in 1987 (or to 
retain them for a period of time) where the cost of living
is high and there is strong competition for workers with both
trade skills and managerial skills (which develop from exper­
ience of self-management).
Clearly, therefore 'hard' indicators of commercial success and 
survival are required for evaluation to be meaningful, and the 
absence of such was noted, and notable in the valuation studies. 
Using such indicators, the success rate of co-operatives might 
be small - as it is for most small businesses (see Unemployment 
Bulletin, 2 2 , 1 9 8 6).
Socially Useful Production;
Newman (1986) criticised the vagueness of the use of this term 
in an appraisal of GLEBs own activities and offered a definition
in terms of 'those products which would not be produced under a
capitalist market system because they require state involvement 
in research and development and in distribution and purchase'.
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This definition is interesting in that it implies a public 
funding subsidy to allow for the fact that the product or 
service in question could not be expected to fully recover 
its cost in the market place. Its limitation is that it 
could be applied to nuclear weapons!
In essence, it implies somebody making a subjective social 
appraisal that a certain product or service is socially worth­
while; and allocating resources to compensate the producers 
for the lack of market value of their product. Only in such 
contexts can these criteria be meaningfully used in the 
evaluation of production enterprises (such as co-operatives).
Good Conditions of Employment;
This factor can most readily be operationalized using a range 
of indicators, eg. according to the Department of Employment 
Code of Practice for the Employment Protection Act, supplemented 
by any other criteria a co-operative and/or a CSO may choose.
Objectives such as 'relating to the Labour Movement*
'Creation of a Co-operative Economy':
I know of no attempts to operationalize such criteria in a 
measurable form.
Other possible Co-operative Success Criteria:
Members of co-operatives have expectation about democracy in 
organisational structure, about the quality of working
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relationships, about access to decision-making. Such issues 
were dealt with by Paton (1 9 7 8) who saw the need to make such 
expectations and objectives explicit and to convert them into 
effective criteria which could be evaluated subjectively at 
the nominal level of measurement, ie. for members to say whether 
they felt their expectations were being met or not.
Macfarlane suggests 'personal and community development' as 
evaluation criteria. Again, although it would not be easy, 
specific indicators could be developed.
This brief review of possible objectives and performance 
measures for the development of co-operatives points to the 
following conclusions: first, the development of a fully
comprehensive, operational and reliable set of performance 
measures can only be a long term goal at this stage — much 
work needs to be done; second, nevertheless there is already 
considerable scope for more searching performance and evalu­
ation criteria in relation to a number of commonly mentioned 
objectives. Evaluation studies, however insightful they may 
be, appear simplistic and uncritical without the development 
of such indicators.
3 •3 Evaluation of the Process of CSO Work
Evaluation studies have tended to concentrate on the process 
of CSO work rather than on the outcome, (in the absence of
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developed co-operative success indicators)# I will sub­
divide this work into(a) an evaluation of the work of local 
authorities, playing a strategic and a funding role in co­
operative development (as well as sometimes employing officers 
to support and develop individual projects) and(b) evaluation 
of independent or specifically set up co-operative support 
organisations (including regional specialist organisations).
3.3*1 Local Authority Strategic and Funding Bodies
Macfarlane (1986 p.19-2 0) expressed the need for such bodies 
to prioritise their objectives (in terms of target groups), 
thus to enable prioritisation of resource use (staff and cash) 
and for such prioritisation to be reflected in project 
appraisal criteria, explicit to all including client groups.
He cites the case of one London borough which made financial 
assistance available to co-operatives before development staff 
were appointed and before appraisal criteria were worked out. 
This was exacerbated by its policy of supporting projects from 
disadvantaged groups and led to the setting up of a number of 
vulnerable businesses, many of which have ceased trading.
He found a similar problem with a Yorkshire authority who 
supported 'phoenix' co-operatives, before working out their 
appraisal criteria. He contrasted these authorities with a 
Midlands authority that had a clear (if limited) appraisal
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procedure and that had planned its staffing and resource 
availability: 'business performance figures are produced
regularly (by co-operatives) and analysed with the local 
officers' 'a useful form of on-going training' (p.2?).
CAG (1986) criticised the lack of 'strategic monitoring and 
overview of CDA work by the GLC, which funded many London
CDA's up to 1986 (p.65). CAG also criticised the relationship
between GLC and its offshoot GLEB, on the one hand and the
borough level CDA's on the other, resulting in a confusion
of expectation in the latter - eg: Whether to optimise the
number of co-operatives they help start, or to work with
disadvantaged groups which would involve more developmental
time per group; whether to work with representatives of the
existing movement versus working with groups in the population
who were under-represented in the original movement; whether
to monitor the progress of funded co-operatives (as agents
of GLC/GLEB) possibly against the interests of their client
groups, as they (local CDAs) saw it.
CAG and Macfarlane both decided that there was a need for a 
greater clarity in objective setting and appraisal criteria 
at all levels; for resource allocation in relation to object­
ives set - specifically for specialist assistance of varying 
types to co-operatives, eg. through budgeting for consultancy 
grants.
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CAG also noted that the most successful local CDAs tended 
to be located in local authorities which had active employment 
promotion policies; which offered more help with premises, 
rent and rate rebates, and loan funds; which funded higher 
CDA staff levels - and (in two cases) had built low cost 
starter premises for co-operatives.
3.3.2 Evaluation of Local CSOs
This can be considered under three headings: 1. services
offered, 2 . processes of working with client groups,
3. internal organisation.
3.3*2 . 1 Services Offered
Firstly, what services are needed? Views obviously will vary.
Lord (1986) quoted research (by Wilson, Chaplain and Cowe) to 
suggest that co-operatives face the same problems as most small 
businesses - 
viz:
* Obtaining finance
* Managing finance
* Marketing
but they have certain additional problems - particularly in 
their formative years in such areas as
* Major innovations in organisational structure
* Internal relationships
* Internal decision-making processes (Lord quoting Cornforth).
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Lord, on a study of 4 London CDAs found:
* Co-operatives were generally satisfied with advice and 
assistance given to them by their CDAs, relative to the 
support given to them by other agencies
* These co-operatives were particularly satisfied with 
advice on obtaining funds and help with registration and 
related matters.
* They were least satisfied with advice and assistance on 
premises and marketing.
* Co-operatives found the CDAs accessible, open, friendly, 
offering moral support, and encouragement, which developed 
their confidence.
* He quoted the CREW study to query the quality and extent of 
training provided by CDAs 'in house'.
* Co-operatives did not feel the advice/assistance was parti­
cularly tailored to their trading needs, (CREW) - they 
particularly felt this as they developed trading.
* Lord also quoted CAG (1 9 8 4) Study that the majority of CDA 
staff lacked specific marketing training and experience.
* Co-operatives could not rely on their CDAs to provide them 
with contacts for specialist advice, which they wanted.
* Lord found that CDAs lacked contact with and influence on 
the local business environment.
“ After starting trading, particularly, co-operatives realised 
the limitations of the marketing, financial planning and
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book-keeping advice they received - that it was not 
detailed, sophisticated or trade-specific enough. CAG 
also reported that co-operatives in London tended to find 
the London-wide specialist agencies and consultancies 
more useful as they developed trading.
It should be emphasized that the above observations are largely 
based on the presenting needs of co-operatives running or 
attempting to run a business. It is not surprising that they 
tend to be expressed in terms of the 'hard' business areas.
Nevertheless, it may be valid for a development worker to see 
his/her role in terms of helping a client group to learn to 
solve problems themselves rather than to offer specific advice 
on their problems. But this is a very skilled consultancy 
process, which I will discuss again in Chapter 5 .
3.3.2.2 Process of Working with Groups
In the discussion of 'bottom—up' approaches in Ch. 2 . 3  we 
described the typical way a CSO worked with clients - and as 
stated above, most co-operative groups found this approach 
supportive and confidence-building.
However, 'the other side of this coin is that most co­
operatives suggested that the CDA had generally accepted 
their business ideas as potentially viable. None seemed to 
have their propositions questioned' (Lord p.19-2 0 ). Lord 
queried whether the CDA workers were skilled enough in
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identifying weaknesses.
This non-directive approach, according to Lord, seems to have 
led to a number of very vulnerable businesses, with little 
sign of long-term viability, being set up: and CDA staff
concerned about the volume of abortive work they do.
He also quoted a detailed study of one London CDA which noted 
that few enquiries were discouraged. Such unselective 
encouragement, he noted, is a particular problem as they invest 
so much time per co-operative in intense development work.
Lord noted that more experienced CDAs were becoming more 
selective. Some agencies (eg. Coventry, Croydon) are now
moving to a system whereby clients are expected to undertake
a basic training programme before a development worker does
specific work with their group.
CAG also noted this tendency to avoid direct discouragement 
of any group, despite a move to more systematic processing 
of enquiries and working with selected target groups.
Lord noted that the process of working with groups was not 
very systematic. Three out of four CDAs had a written 
checklist only of topics which they should explore with each 
group - the fourth did not even have this. When asked whether 
they had individual programmes drawn up for each co-operative.
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to be agreed with colleagues in the CDA - the answer was 
'sometimes, on an informal ad hoc basis'.
3.3»2 . 3 Internal CSO Organisation
Lord concluded (p.7 4 ) that there was 'minimal (or none at all) 
monitoring of efficiency and effectiveness, virtually no 
planning and very little selection of targets'and (p.7 9 ) 
'informal (decision-making) processes which diminish the 
possibility of holding people to account for particular tasks'.
Quoting Landry et al (1985) 'organisations can be effectively 
paralysed by their lack of procedure for resolving differences'. 
He relates such problems to:
* weaknesses of Managerial Committees
* lack of clearly defined managerial roles
* the libertarian ethic and its preference for lack of 
structure and consensus decision-making.
Some specific consequences of this form of organisation Lord 
noted were:
* little evidence of CDA staff learning from each other, within 
or across agencies
* no methods of evaluating the work of individual staff despite 
the desire expressed by staff for both this and the above.
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CAG came up with similar observations: most CSOs had no
enterprise plan for themselves, undertook no systematic 
evaluation of work against stated objectives and some set 
themselves non-measurable objectives.
3 . 4 Summary
There seems little doubt that local CSOs work very hard, in a 
very supportive manner, with their client groups, attempting 
to set up co-operatives - but there is very little evidence 
that they succeed. This partly because there seems to be a 
striking lack of realistic, measurable success criteria for 
evaluating co-operative development (despite the fact that 
developing such criteria is the responsibility of the overall 
strategic and funding bodies (eg. local authorities) and the 
support bodies at every level.) But in addition doubts have 
also been cast on the comprehensiveness of the skills and 
services CSOs have to offer, on the appropriateness of their 
non—directive approach and of their rather informal internal 
organisation procedures.
Regarding these last points, it is important to note that the 
studies considered in this section have all concerned CSOs 
that were attempting to pursue a ’bottom—up' approach to devel­
opment work. As such, the studies tend to reinforce the 
arguments in Chapter 2 concerning the inadequacy of a simple 
•bottonv-up' philosphy as a basis for agency-client relation­
ships.
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The key problems appear to be:
* a mismatch between the objectives of agencies (as regards 
concentrating on disadvantaged groups, promoting healthy 
enterprises, etc) and the methods used (prone to result in 
weak co-operatives, unless members already skilled and 
confident)
* the need on occasions for agencies, both for their clients' 
sakes, to relate to clients in ways that would not normally
be considered as 'supportive', 'non-directive' etc eg. thorough 
assessment of client groups' business proposals before commit­
ting costly amounts of development staff time.
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CHAPTER 4
NEIGHBOURHOOD TEXTILES: A CASE OF 'TOP-DOWN' DEVELOPMENT?
4 . 1  Introduction
It was pointed out in the last chapter that the evaluation 
studies of CSOs have all effectively been studies of 'bottom- 
u p ' approaches to co-operative development. 'Top-down' approaches 
have been unfashionable and so the real problems and possibilities 
of such approaches have not been documented in the same way. This 
makes the case of Neighbourhood Textiles particularly significant, 
for although NT was promoted by a Steering Group set up by a 
voluntary organisation rather than by an agency specifically 
oriented to co-operative support, we are regarding the Steering 
Group as the CSO or development agency. The Steering Group was 
clearly pursuing an approach which could not possibly be 
considered 'bottom—up'. Indeed, it is automatically labelled 
as 'top-^down' by many of those who read the case study (included 
as Appendix l). We assume, at this point, the reader has read 
this case study. If not, chapters 1 . 2 (Background) and 1 . 3  
(Summary History) are the minimal necessary reading.
The aims of the chapter are:
* to summarise the key aspects of the NT case
* To assess the strengths, weaknesses and difficulties of the 
Steering Group in performing its role as a CSO
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* to develop an explanatory framework for viewing the
commercial failure of the co-operative and the role of the
Steering Group in the failure: particularly in terms of
the interaction between -
the inherent difficulties in attitudes, relationships 
and decision-making in a co-operative business
and
the lack of clarity over the role of the Steering 
Group, especially regarding its relationship with its 
client, the co-operative
* to consider whether it is indeed a case of 'top-down'
development, and to assess the extent that the criticisms
of the 'top-down' approach mentioned in Chaper 2 explain 
the problems that arose (in comparison to the other 
explanatory concepts discussed).
4 . 2  The Steering Groups' Role in Founding the Co-operative
We can summarise the record of the Steering Group as follows: 
they obtained funds from the Borough Council to commission a 
feasibility study and formally constituted a Steering Committee 
with public body and community organisation representatives and 
with co-opted specialists. They obtained funding through the 
Urban Programme. They obtained premises and persuaded the 
Borough Council to take on a lease on the premises when 
difficulties arose (Story of Neighbourhood Textiles 1.2 ).
They obtained advice and support from firms in the industry 
on setting up and recruitment. As discussed further in 
Topic 2 of the Study Guide to Story of Neighbourhood Textiles
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(Emerson 1983) they set about publicising the project locally 
(through leafleting and local newspaper publicity) in order 
to attract staff, workshop tenants and general community 
support.
They advertised and recruited staff in the open market to fill 
the posts they had identified as necessary (although they 
specifically wanted to attract local textile trade workers who
were having difficulty finding suitable employment). In
response to this, people came forward to start the workshops 
and to apply for jobs in the textile co-operative.
They planned a careful process of selection, involvement in
activity and induction training so that new co-operative
members would feel involved in decision making and share respon­
sibility for the projects development. Eg. "the production 
manager was appointed six months before the factory opened ... 
to contribute to, shape and identify with the project as it 
came into being ... A full weeks training programme was 
designed to prepare (freshly appointed members) for working in 
a co-operative and for participating in decisions." (Case 
Study 1.3)" Worker members were at all stages encouraged by 
the Steering Committee to attend its meetings (as well as the 
co-op meetings).
We can evaluate the Steering Group's performance in terms of 
providing for the basic requirements of co-operative business
-  52 -
as discussed in Chapter 3» viz,
* Obtaining finance
* Managing finance
* Marketing
Obtaining Finance (see Case Study 1.2)
The Steering Group was successful in this respect, obtaining 
a capital grant of £l60,000 and a subsidy of £4 0 , 0 0 0 for the 
first year; this compared well with the finances of other firms 
in this industry, which, if they are not under-capitalized, 
would have large loans to repay.
Managing Finance (Case Study 3*2 .1)
Minutes of the meeting of the Co-operative, February 25 'The 
Treasurer/Book-keeper was not chosen for his ability to 
communicate financial information and although an excellent 
accountant, he would probably not have been selected if that 
criterion was used'.
'Managing finance' needs a particular emphasis on a co-operative 
decision-making context, which was not adequately foreseen by 
the Steering Group (the Co-operative Management). Failings in 
this area led to the crucial problems discussed in 4 .4 .
Marketing (Case Study 2.3*1)
The Management Consultant to the Steering Group is quoted as
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criticising the Production Manager for failing to carry out 
the marketing plan envisaged in the feasibility study. But 
assuming this marketing plan designed in the feasibility 
study was adequate, what could the Steering Group have done 
to ensure it was followed up? This leads us to question the 
relationship between the Steering Group and the Co-operative, 
an issue emphasised throughout this chapter.
4.3 The Failure to Take Remedial Action
If we conclude from the above discussion that the business plan 
was soundly based and that the basic infrastructure, resources 
and business advice were adequately provided by the Steering 
Group, the issue then becomes one of why commercial failings 
went uncorrected. In other words; the 'system' may have been 
designed adequately for start up - but was it designed to cope 
with on-going operational difficulties? A first level explan­
ation was offered in 3*3.2, last paragraph of the Case Study.
'Neither the members nor the Steering Committee appreciated the 
seriousness of the problems because basic and essential inform­
ation was not provided or not provided accurately; they did not 
insist on having that information; and in meetings, the manage­
ment of the co-operative consistently put a positive gloss on the 
state of the business, allowing, perhaps even encouraging, the 
discussion of peripheral and emotive issues. At least three 
members of the Steering Committee - the Management Consultant, 
the Council Officer, and one other - tried to insist on detailed
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figures. But they came up against the problem of the role of 
the Steering Committee ; it was not clear whether it had the 
power to demand information. Without such clarification, the 
Production Manager was going to reveal as little as possible, 
keeping to the businessman's norm of always telling 'outsiders' 
that'things were going well.'
To rephrase: the people who had the right to information (co-op
members) did not have the information, or the skill to ask 
effectively for the information.
Steering Group members did not have information either; at least 
some of them may have had the skill to ask the right questions -
but they had not an acknowledged right to ask for it because of
ambiguity over their role: the relationship between the
Steering Group and the Co-operative was not explicit. So, in
summary we have three issues:
♦ lack of information
♦ lack of skill in asking for information
♦ lack of clear right to ask for information
The first - lack of information - brings us back to the failure
to specify a communication role in the job description of the 
treasurer. More generally, as chapter 3 of the Case Study 
elaborates, the system was not designed adequately to ensure 
a flow of information to enable members to take part in 
decision—making.
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'Lack of skill in asking for information' is a consequence of 
the Steering Group's failure to insist on the relevant member 
training - see 4.5 pt (i). Like its lack of clear right to 
ask for information, this relates to the lack of clear role 
of the Steering Group. The next part of this discussion will 
elaborate on this 'design flaw' - the ambiguity of the 
Steering Group's role (viz a viz the co-operative).
However, the Steering Group was relating not to a single 
cohesive entity but to a set of people organised in a co­
operative decision-making structure. In such a complex 
structure there may be inherent weaknesses and potential 
strengths. The intervention of an 'outside' body may 
influence how the weaknesses are tackled, the potential 
strengths realised. (The quotation marks refer to the lack of 
clarity over role boundaries for the Steering Group, as we 
shall show).
As we analyse the functioning of the co-operative structure 
and the extent to which inherent weaknesses and latent 
strengths manifest themselves, we also analyse the role of 
the Steering Group and the effect of its interventions.
4.4 The "Co-operative Structure" and the problems that arose
The Case Study (Ch.4) discussed explanations (of the failure 
of NT) in terms of the co-op structure being:
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a) a liability and/or
b) an unused asset
4.4.1 Co-operative Structure - A Liability?
In Case Study 4.1.1, it was argued that managers in a co­
operative - in this case, people on fixed salaries initially - 
did not have the same direct, economic incentive to take 
urgent action, as would be the case in a conventional small 
business.
In Case Study 4.1.2, it was said: »A rather more substantial
connection between poor management and the co-operative 
structure is suggested in the claim that the participative 
nature of co-operative decision-making undermined the authority 
of management.' A review of the relevant incidents and conflicts 
follows:
The record was clearer concerning relations with the Steering 
Group than with the workforce (on which there was little 
evidence relevant to this question, except some minor alleg­
ations of workers challenging management authority /Case Study
4.1.2 p . 4o, 41 7).
(i) The management's unwillingness to continue with training 
in co-operative decision-making was mentioned in Case Study 
3.1. The Steering Committee member concerned persisted in her 
efforts despite the lack of co-operation and in order (in her
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words) 'to force the Production Manager's hand' she brought 
a paper to the May meeting of the co-operative; it was 
discussed and accepted, but implementation was overtaken by 
the worsening financial situation. (This is elaborated in 
Study Guide for NT, Topic 3).
.<ii) Case Study 4.1.2; 'When the bullet proof vest order was 
first mentioned at the Steering Committee in February, reser­
vations about such an order were expressed by some members of 
the Steering Committee - not by any of the workers present. A 
rather confused discussion took place, with the Production 
Manager asserting that he had to assess what orders to take 
and that the co-op could not afford to be choosy, and Steering 
Committee members asserted the need to consider social and 
moral questions and also to involve the co-op as a whole in 
such a decision. The next meeting of the co-operative discussed 
the question again, at length'. ...'In the end the Production 
Manager got permission to pursue the order. Clearly, the 
Steering Committee did not handle this issue well and by 
bringing it up in the way they did, appeared impractical and 
self-righteous'.
(iii) The site management issues discussed in 3*3.1*"
(iv) 'The Office Manager cited two allegations - 'first the 
secretary to the Steering Committee influencing members, against 
management's advice, on arrangements for the site opening party
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(so that among other things guests including potential 
customers were expected to pay); second, she claimed to 
have overheard another Steering Committee member advising 
workers to be on their guard - that if they did not have more 
people on a particular committee, management would outvote 
them'.
Overall though,the 'undermining of managerial authority' did 
not seem to provide an explanation of the poor management and 
business failure.
'Item (i) can just as well be seen as the management under­
mining a legitimate and longstanding policy of the Steering 
Committee (to which the Production Manager had been party) 
and item (iii) was an attempt to extend this authority of the 
management beyond that required to run the business so cannot 
be seen as an encroachment on their authority. But more 
significantly. Steering Committee members did not interfere 
at all in the areas of production and financial management 
that were identified as direct and major causes of failure 
in Chapter 2. Not just on a day-to-day basis, but from one 
month to the next the management was simply left to get on 
with it, in line with their job descriptions which were 
unambiguous'. But, 'It is clear from these points that 
relations between the Steering Committee and the management 
were strained, and that the formal relationship between the 
two was never very clear. Although the Steering Committee's
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policy was to phase itself out, it never gave itself a 
definite transition period, and even after deciding in 
April that its role was simply to monitor the spending of the 
Urban Programme money it still found itself intervening on a 
social question - training - in May'.
'Hence, as regards management's authority being undermined by 
the Steering Committee, it appears that relations were strained, 
roles were unclear; that the presence and contributions of 
Steering Committee members as independent, influential people 
at meetings were resented on occasions; but that such problems, 
though real, can hardly be seen as a significant erosion of 
management's authority in actually running the factory'. (Case 
Study 4.1.2).
The discussion concluded that the problems were the product of 
an interaction of the following factors, as presented diagram- 
matically;
Co-operative 
structure
Inability of 
Management 
to accept" 
criticism
Case Study Figure 1
Willingness 
of workers 
to criticise 
management
V
111 feeling and 
demoralisation _
Management
failings
progressive
collapse
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*In this sense one can argue that the co-operative structure
contributed to the failure'.
4.4.1 Conclusions from this Subsection
To answer the question as to whether the 'co-operative structure'
(as defined above) was a liability, I will integrate some of the
above arguments and observations.
a. worker members in a co-operative are entitled to question 
and challenge those undertaking management responsibility.*
b. Steering Group/CSO representatives are also entitled to 
question and challenge management.
c. The above factors become a liability if managers are unable 
to respond constructively to criticism.
d. If roles and relationships are unclear - particularly if 
the role of a powerful initiating body such as a Steering 
Group is unclear - then problems are liable to arise, no 
matter how open to challenge managers may be. The management 
will need to know who has a right to what information, to a 
say in what decisions - what its relationship with a 
steering or development body is, and how this will change 
over time.
e. Factors c. and d. are likely to interact: i.e. a defensive 
management is likely to be particularly threatened by having 
to operate in a structure where roles and relationships are 
unclear.
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f. When problems arise, managers have less direct personal
economic incentives to take remedial action (as against in 
a conventional firm).
* I use the term 'managers' to indicate those undertaking 
management responsibility - whether specialist managers, or 
worker members sharing or rotating management responsibility.
4.4.2 The Co-operative as an Unused Asset
Chapter 4 of the Case Study examined the view 'that Neighbourhood 
Textiles failed not because it was a co-operative, but because 
it was not enough of a co-operative.... The project failed to 
ensure some of the elementary preconditions for effective co­
operation.... The creation of a viable co-operative structure 
requires associated organisational changes.... If such associated 
changes are overlooked the structure is so likely to be ineffectiv 
that it cannot be said to have been seriously tried. On the other 
hand, the argument that 'co-operation did not fail, it was not 
really tried' must not be over-used by setting such strict 
conditions for a 'real' test that success is pretty well 
guaranteed. The argument in this case is that certain basic 
requirements were lacking and that as a result the potential 
advantages of co-operation were not realised. The requirements 
I suggest are:
(i) a fair measure of psychological ownership by members;
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(ii) an appropriate decision-making structure;
(iii) a suitable information system;
(iv) some programme to develop the decision-making 
and related skills of members;
(v) sufficient trust and respect to ensure conflicts 
are not immediately destructive.
'An examination of Neighbourhood Textiles in relation to these 
five points suggest the extent to which the practice of co­
operation was still-born' (Case Study 4.2).
Taking these five points in turn:
(i) By 'psychological ownership' I mean a feeling that
something belongs to a person or group, irrespective of whether 
or not they have a legal title deed - (a similar usage occurs 
with the idea of problem ownership - a problem cannot of course 
be legally owned, but a person/group can still feel it is his/ 
hers/theirs). 'With one or two exceptions the worker-members 
never psychologically "owned" the enterprise: the Steering
Committee set it up, the managers took over some of the respon­
sibilities from the Steering Committee, and the Steering Committee 
held on to others. They (the workers) were not asked to put 
money in - just to turn up at meetings which other people seemed 
to control.'
Reference was made in the Case Study (4.2) to various workers 
thinking that their wages were paid by the Borough Council. Even
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'the Supervisor who was one of the most involved and informed 
did not realise that 'the Council' (i.e. DoE) was only paying 
an initial capital grant and revenue subsidy. So notwith­
standing the good start that was made in the first week it 
seems that only to a very limited extent did members understand 
and identify with the project. Towards the end the crisis 
seems to have affected attitudes - as, indeed, it affected 
productivity - and some members worked unpaid overtime. But 
for the most part, and when it really mattered, it was not 
experienced as 'their' project'.
As for point (ii):
'The second requirement was an appropriate decision-making 
structure, ... 'appropriate' can be judged in terms of:
(i) involvement of members in decisions, especially 
where members' perceived interests were involved, 
and where urgency, technical complexity or other 
factors did not make it impractical or undesirable,
(ii) Clarity in the decision-making system, so that 
everyone knew who was involved and to what degree in 
what type of decision, (eg. whether people were 
making joint decisions, being consulted or just being 
informed). (Case Study 4.2).
The Case Study (4.2 p.45-6) cited three issues - viz.
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* recruitment of additional machinists
* holiday pay
* disciplinary procedure -
to call in question the appropriateness of the decision-making 
structure, 'which seems to have been arbitrary, inconsistent 
and unclear' (Case Study 4.2).
Points (iii) and (iv) have already been dealt with. 'The 
information failures discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrate the 
spectacular inadequacy of the information system of the co­
operative; and the failure to continue, beyond the first week, 
a programme to develop understanding and skills relevant to 
member involvement has also been mentioned (3*1 and 4.1.2 of 
the Case Study). Indeed, one can argue that subsequent events 
demonstrated the scope and importance of such a programme in 
relation to
* running and taking part in meetings 
asking probing questions of management
confronting difficult issues without generating a lot of 
bad feeling
presenting financial information
analysing (and changing) their own decision-making structure' 
(Case Study 4.2).
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Point (v):
'The final requirement was a degree of mutual respect and trust 
among those involved such that disagreement need not be 
threatening or automatically turn into confrontation. The 
point here is that some measure of conflict is inevitable and 
how such conflict is handled will be important, not just for 
the cohesion and commitment of the participants, but also 
(especially in a new enterprise) in terms of improved organisation 
and working methods. Dealing with criticism is seldom easy and 
the process need not always be smooth, swift, painless and
productive. But if the atmosphere is frosty and defensive 
that nothing productive is likely to emerge, this is as 
effective a block to co-operation as structural inadequacies.' 
(Case Study 4.2).
The study concluded that the attitudinal requirements for 
constructively resolving conflicts were not present in 
Neighbourhood Textiles: rather that criticism was reacted
to with hostility and defensiveness, and did not lead to a 
constructive resolution of difficulties. The following set of 
variables were seen to be instrumental in creating the defensive 
climate:
- 66 -
Behaviour 
of key staff
^  f ,  . IDefensive j 
Climate
Structural confusion 
in relation to 
Steering Committee
No 'reservoir' of 
shared experience
Insufficient 
training or 
preparation
Tensions arising 
from production 
problems
(Figure 2 of Case Study p. 47)
4.5 Co-operative Structural Problems - and the Issue of 
'top-down' Intervention
How does the explanatory framework just elaborated relate 
to the question of 'top-down' intervention by a CSO (with 
which we started off this chapter)? Apparently the Steering 
Group interventions did not help overcome the structural 
weaknesses nor did they effectively bring about the pre­
conditions for a successful co-operative structure. In 
particular, ambiguity over the role of the Steering Committee 
exacerbated the atmosphere of distrust and defensiveness that 
developed.
But would the outcome have been any different if it was not 
'top-down' intervention? Firstly we must clarify the meaning 
of the term 'top-down'. Then, we must look at the problems
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associated with particular form of 'top-down' approach 
adopted by the NT Steering Group.
4.5.1 Clarification of the term 'top-down'
In Chapter 2, a 'top-down' approach was described in terms of 
the agency taking the initiative, setting objectives, and 
effectively controlling the course of the development. The 
NT Steering Group took the initiative, certainly: but it
made considerable efforts to involve those who would work in 
the project in the preliminary work, and to share control with 
them (see 4.2). Can it be described as a 'top-down' approach in 
accord with the above definition?
The problem is that the term 'top-down' is both simplistic and 
emotive. In particular it conflates the question of initiation 
with that of control. To overcome this problem it is helpful 
to distinguish between being pro-active and being 'top-down'
(i.e. controlling). This allows the possibility that an agency 
can take initiatives in relation to particular target groups or 
commercial possibilities, but do so in a way which shares control 
and is empowering of those who become involved.
To elaborate on the meaning of the term 'pro—active' in the co­
operative development context: most CSOs see the need to be
pro-active in a general sense by (a) publicising the co-operative 
ideal by education, propaganda 'seed sowing'; and (b) creating 
infrastructure support: getting public authorities and financial
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institutions to make funds available to co-operatives, or 
to make low-cost premises available, or to agree in principle 
to give favourable consideration to purchasing from co-operatives,
But as Milford found (see Chapter 2.6) only the more experienced 
development workers felt it was valid to be pro-active in the 
sense of seeking out clients to initiate specific projects with: 
Gregory and Pierce, however, have both argued for the need for 
development agents to seek out new client groups among unemployed 
people in deprived communities (see 2.6).
Here is a definition of pro-active offered by another development 
worker: 'by pro-active 1 mean finding means in which we might
like to stimulate the development of co-ops by offering our 
services to particular groups of people, for particular purposes'. 
(Andrew Green, Hammersmith CEDA). By particular purposes, he 
means particular industries or services the agency might like 
to promote for social, economic, environmental or other reasons.
The dangers of this approach, are, firstly, that it can become in 
effect synonomous with 'top-down' and therefore be liable to the 
same limitations - lack of appeal, dependency, lack of psycho­
logical ownership - if the initiatives are too clearly generated 
by the agency alone; secondly, such initiatives can be seen by 
members of the prioritised disadvantaged groups, as 'rescuing' 
and can lead to the 'Drama Triangle' problems as discussed in 
2.5.
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One crucial feature of the pro-active approach is that the 
recipient of the initiative is involved in decisions about 
objectives. In this way the above pitfalls associated with 
the 'top-down' approach are less likely to occur. Arguably, 
also, pro-action, if it starts with the open and clear 
expression by the agency of its objectives, and follows it 
through with a systematic negotiation process with client 
groups (starting from the latters*needs and expectations), 
continually clarifying mutual expectations and reviewing 
progress, then it can be the basis of effective, goal- 
directed, adult to adult relationships. (This argument will 
be developed further in Chaper 5).
How then do the Steering Group's activities appear when viewed 
in these terms?
The Resources Group made a decision that they would initiate 
a community industrial complex, consisting of a clothing 
factory and some small independent workshops (Case Study 1.2, 
para 2). They decided that they would directly initiate the 
former themselves: there was a high level of local unemployment
(particularly in the textile trade); firms were moving out rather 
than in; there was little sign of any spontaneous initiatives 
coming forward. They carried out a feasibility study which 
came to fairly positive conclusions. With the workshops, 
though, they felt it was sufficient to advertise their existence
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if they obtained capital to set them up (the workshops have 
always been well occupied). Given their overall aims - 
creating employment with good working conditions - I would 
argue that their decision to initiate, to be pro-active, 
was a legitimate follow through of their chosen objectives.
The development process, also, was 'pro-active' rather than 
'top-down' in that efforts were made to involve potential 
workers in all decisions from the start. (See 4.2).
In summary:
(i) Just as the reality of 'bottom-up' approaches often 
differed sharply from the espoused theory - as discussed 
in Chapter 2 - so it turns out that 'top-down' is a 
very inadequate label for what was actually attempted
in the case of NT.
(ii) For the sake of clarity it is helpful to distinguish 
between 'pro-active' and 'top-down'.
(iii) On this basis, the NT Steering Group approach was more 
accurately described as pro-active - and it had valid 
reasons for adopting this approach.
4.5.2 Problems with the approach of the NT Steering Group
Although we have now relabelled the approach as 'pro—active' 
rather than 'top-down', obviously it faced many problems and was 
ultimately unsuccessful. To what extent were these the problems
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attributed to the 'top-down' approach in Chapter 2.2 - viz
* people not corning forward
* dependence
* lack of psychological ownership?
While there were some problems with the recruitment of the 
manager (see Case Study Ch.5), there was little difficulty 
finding people to fill the other posts. People come forward 
to apply for jobs in firms or services that are in effect 
other people's initiatives, all the time - including in 
established co-operatives which are recruiting new members.
(The difficulty experienced by WEDA (see 2.2) was in getting 
groups of people to come forward to take up business proposals 
developed by the agency: but that difficulty can be seen in
probabilistic terms: how many pre-formed groups are there likely
to be in any area, interested in forming a co-op, and with 
interest and skill in a particular business line?)
Dependence : there was no indication that this was an issue -
if anything the reverse is that management made clear their 
resentment of the Steering Group and their desire to sever 
links as soon as possible. (See Chapter 4.4 above; also 
personal note of quote from Production Manager: "the sooner
I have that lot off my back the better"). A more gradual 
transition to an autonomous co-operative would have been 
preferable (as Finnegan argued in Chapter 2.6) and therefore
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a measure of dependence should be expected. In any development 
process, dependence is healthy to the extent it gives the 
developee the security to gain the skill and confidence that will 
ultimately enable him/her to become safely independent. Using 
a child development analogy, the NT co-operative management 
adopted a 'rebel child' position taking their bikes onto the 
main road before they had learned the hand signals.
Psychological Ownership; this was clearly a problem - see 4 . 4 .  
But (a) the first group of workers had a quite different 
attitude to later workers; it is reasonable to assume that psycho 
logical ownership would have developed if training had continued, 
problems with meetings and information systems had been overcome 
- see 4 . 4 .  The psychology of commitment is well understood.
(b) The production manager very much took over psychological 
ownership — to the exclusion of other members. (c) It is very 
commqn for people to be recruited to projects and gradually to 
come to 'own' them. Again, it is not clear that the problem is 
insuperable.
4 . 6  Conclusion
The 'standard' criticisms of 'top-down' do point to some 
difficulties that occured in NT (or that might well occur in 
a similar situation). However, these weaknesses do not 
pTovide an adequate explanation of the reasons for failure 
of NT. The underlying problems in this case lay in the fraught
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and ambiguous relationship between the Steering Group and 
the Co-operative - in interaction with problems within 
the co-operative's decision-making system _ and the failure 
to manage that relationship appropriately. In other words, 
this case of a (supposedly) 'top-down' approach reveals exactly 
the same sort of difficulties in agency-client relationships 
as have characterised (supposedly) 'bottom—up' approaches, 
(discussed in Chapters 2 & l).
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARDS MORE APPROPRIATE APPROACHES TO AGENCY-CLIENT 
RELATIONS IN CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Introduction; The Argument so far and the Aims of the Chapter
The distinction between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' has been an 
important, even central, feature of thinking about co-operative 
development in the UK.
'Top-down' has been little tried. It has been assumed this 
approach would be unattractive to potential workers, and that 
it would lead to problems of dependency and lack of psychological 
ownership. It has not been fashionable.
The 'bottom—up' approach is widely espoused. But this approach 
requires the embryonic co-operative group to be fully - and 
equally between its members - in control of the relationship 
with the CSO - an unrealistic requirement given the organisation, 
expertise and other problems of a new group; and given the 
'investment' of the CSO in creating successful co-ops, it is 
difficult for it to hold back and take a purely responsive 
supportive role. Not surprisingly, this approach is not always 
followed faithfully by the agencies which espouse it.
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We also argued that if the agency limits itself to responsive 
support to the client's needs, without making clear its own, 
then this is an unequal and unclear relationship vulnerable 
to the manipulatory processes described in the Drama Triangle.
An analysis of trends in enterprise development work generally, 
in the UK and abroad, suggests further reasons to query the 
effectiveness of the 'bottom—up' approach: in particular
* the perceived need to be 'pro-active' in targeting development 
to specific disadvantaged groups
* the need to invest heavily in training, infrastructure support, 
etc., if enterprises are to be successful — particularly if 
the participants start from a position of disadvantage
* the need felt by development agencies to vet initial appli­
cants, carefully monitor progress, etc., in order to protect 
investments and reduce probability of failures.
Evaluation studies of UK CSOs are notable for the absence of 
credible performance measures concerning 'co-operative success' 
and the outputs of co-operative development work, and have 
concentrated instead on evaluating the process (working methods, 
etc). The evidence of successful co-operative development in 
the UK is fairly limited.
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There seems to be a mismatch between the objectives of agencies 
- e.g. to concentrate on disadvantaged groups, to promote 
viable enterprises - and the methods used - which are still 
heavily influenced by the idea of a 'bottom-up' approach, and 
are prone to result in weak co-operatives unless members are 
already skilled and confident.
While the evaluation studies of UK CSOs point to a range of 
other problems as well, they clearly reinforce the doubts 
about the adequacy of the 'bottom—up' philosphy as a basis 
for agency-client relations.
But these studies were all of (supposedly) 'bottom—up' agencies 
Since 'top-down' approaches have not been documented and 
evaluated in the same way, the case of Neighbourhood Textiles, 
widely considered to be 'top-down', is pertinent.
When NT is considered as a case of co-operative development 
with the Steering Group as an agency it turns out that;
* 'top-down' is a misleading label because it fails to 
distinguish between initiating and controlling; pro-action 
on the other hand involves initiation by the agency but 
involving the client group in decisions about objectives
* NT is more usefully understood as exemplifying a pro-active 
approach
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* the major problems in NT were not those predicted by the 
critics of 'top-down' - they concerned the ambiguity in 
relations between the Steering Group and the co-operative.
It appears, therefore, that (a) both 'top-down' and 'bottom- 
up' are inadequate and confusing labels for what is actually 
done; (b) far from having different problems, suggested cases 
of both approaches have essentially the same basic problem: 
that of managing complex agency-client relations.
Instead the problems of co-operative development will be more 
fruitfully addressed by recognising that (a) it may well be 
appropriate for agencies to be pro—active, or to be so to 
certain degrees, depending on their policy objectives and their 
circumstances ;(b) whether the agency is more or less pro-active, 
its relationship with its client group is likely to be complex 
and problematic and to require a range of different behaviours 
at different times.
In the light of these points this chapter aims: firstly, to 
suggest some requirements for effective co-operative development 
work, particularly when (given the objectives of many CSOs) a pro­
active approach is accepted as legitimate and necessary. These 
requirements are basically for a (responsible and visible) 
objective-setting process; and for a strategic planning frame­
work to relate action to objectives.
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Secondly, to introduce the concept of contract negotiation as 
a basic framework for the understanding and management of agency- 
client relationship. Apart from helping to prevent some of the 
specific agency-client problems encountered in NT and other 
cases, this approach is also likely to help ensure that the 
above-mentioned requirements for an effective and open pro­
active co-operative development strategy are met. It should 
also induce CSOs to adopt less informal management decision­
making procedures.
Thirdly, some of the implications of adopting the contract 
negotiation approach are explored as regards: how a client
group might play a role in the CSO evaluation process; how 
contracts might be formed with an embryonic, not-yet-fully- 
formed client group; the skills and competences required of 
CSO staff. '
5,2 Requirements for Effective Co-operative Development Work
Clear objective setting is necessary for any organisation to 
be effective - and in Chapter 3» it was found that this process 
was often absent in CSO management. This process also implies 
the CSO being responsible in that it obtains the resources or 
funds necessary to implement its chosen objectives. But in the 
context of a pro-active development strategy, in which the CSO 
and the client co-operative group are engaged in joint 
decision-making about objectives it is also necessary that
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these CSO objectives are explicit - are clearly visible to the 
client group. Otherwise, there is the danger of manipulatory 
relationships, hidden agendas, etc. In general, therefore, a 
CSO needs to:
i) set itself objectives that are or have a reasonable
chance of being achievable, that are not mutually 
inconsistent or not too vague to be measurable, as 
discussed in Chapter 3;
ii) ensure the pursuit of such objectives is costed,
funded and planned - which in turn implies that these 
objectives are prioritised (e.g. in terms of target
groups, or types of co-operatives), that the CSO's
resources (development staff time, investment grants 
etc) are prioritised accordingly, and that the resources 
are deployed in a coherent manner. For example, Macfarlane 
(1986) points out that finance for development work should 
be made available in advance of an investment budget.
Once the latter is made available, there will be pressure 
(political, administrative and from the community) to 
spend it even if the necessary groundwork has not been 
done.
iii) ensure these objectives are explicit, generate appraisal
criteria that can be made publicly available (MacFarlane) 
so that a client group knows where it stands.
— 80 —
A further requirement is for a planning process for the imple­
mentation of chosen objectives. We suggest here a strategic 
planning framework that would help identify options for action, 
and help to prioritise these various options by reference to 
success criteria generated by the CSO objectives. This process 
would help to identify the type of group/project the CSO would 
wish to initiate work with; and if the above process and frame­
work are explicit and visible, to clarify to the embryonic 
client group where it stands, thus creating a clear and open 
agency-client relationship. Such an approach might start by 
distinguishing different types of co-operative and the devel­
opment work associated with them, e.g:
* new start (Disadvantaged Groups)
* new start (High Fliers - new technology specialists,
professionals etc)
* conversion of existing successful business (into co­
operative)
* rescuing of failing or collapsed businesses.
Then a comprehensive set of co-operative success criteria such 
as those suggested by the GLC/GLEB and elaborated on in 3.2 
would be devised and might be used:
a) to check if success under each of these criteria is in line
with the CSO's priorities and
b) to analyse the potential for achieving such success if the 
different types of co-operatives are developed
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For example, for conversion of an existing successful business 
into a co-operative: this would be a positive outcome on 'jobs
created in co-operatives', 'creating a co-operative economy' 
and 'commercial success and survival'. Additionally, if 
appropriate conditions were negotiated and agreed in return 
for grant support, it might have a positive outcome on 
'employment of disadvantaged groups', 'good conditions of 
employment' 'socially useful production' - as GLEB has 
attempted to do throughout many of the enterprises it supports 
-(conditions as to equal opportunity employment policy etc).
But it would have no impact on 'Job Creation' (see 3.J.1).
As the business is already set up, the development costs would 
be low.
This form of co-operative development might therefore appeal 
to a CSO/local authority in a relatively affluent area with a 
low level of unemployment (Croydon, Kingston, Richmond,
Brighton and Southampton, for example).
With new start (disadvantaged groups) the development categories 
would need to be further subdivided into:
a) enterprises which would/would not displace existing 
employment ;
b) disadvantage of group members who have/have not commercially 
relevant expertise and experience.
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Likely outcomes might be expressed in chart form:
Enterprise which would Enterprise! which
displace would not displace
Disadvantaged Groups
with without with without
expertise expertise expertise expertise
Job Creation: little/none little/none positive positive
Job Creation
in Co-ops: positive positive positive positive
Job Creation
for disadvan^
taged groups: little/none * positive little/non expositive
Commercial medium low high low
Success/ probab­ probab­ probab­ probab­
Survival: ility ility ility ility
Good Cond­
itions of 
Employment 
and Socially 
Useful prod­
uction:
Development 
Costs (in 
relation to 
size of unit)
as per negotiated agreement with CSO - but far 
more difficult to attain if the probability of 
Commercial Success is low.
high very high high very high
* higher if the reason of unemployment is pure, unfair 
discrimination.
This form of development might appeal to inner city authorities. 
But even there it raises the question of the cost/effectiveness 
of using co-operative development as a strategy of tackling the 
unemployment problem faced particularly by disadvantaged members 
of* the community: development costs are high, a prolonged
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training/development period is required, and the probability 
of commercial survival is low (as Macfarlane elaborated).
The preceding discussion is simply meant to be indicative of 
the considerations that a strategic planning framework might 
include, and the potential benefits of systematically exploring 
and clarifying the range of possible objectives, and options 
and their resource implications, under different circumstances. 
Such benefits, it is suggested, will arise both from the 
improved management of co-operative development resources, and 
from greater clarity over the basic agency-client relationships.
5-3 Contract Negotion
This concept is introduced here as a basis for understanding 
arid managing agency-client relationships, within the require­
ments that emerge from the pro-active approach.
5* 3*1 What Contract Negotiation Involves
In 2.4 we saw how a contract operated between Spanish and 
Italian CSOs and their client enterprises, incorporating;
* agreements on targets
* action steps and resource allocation 
X monitoring of performance
* right to intervene by CSO if performance failing drastically 
to reach targets.
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Oakshott also described the rights of the client co-operative
in Mondragon to withdraw from this process.
In a contract
* both parties make explicit their expectations and check 
out the others expectations
* parties negotiate and reach agreement as to objectives, 
action steps, resources used and method of monitoring 
progress
* parties regularly review progress
* fulfilment of agreed commitments is a condition for 
continuing relationship-
* both parties are held responsible for their actions: 
penalties are set for non-performance
Woolams et al (1974) define four basic requirements of a
contract in the context of client-counsellor relationships
(in the psycho-therapy context).
1. Mutual Consent: both parties are in agreement as to
goals, means and predictable outcome.
2. Valid Consideration: an exchange takes place of goods
or services between the parties so that the 'professional' 
is'paid' in some way by the client (thus avoiding an 
unnecessary hidden 'parent-child' relationship in 
transactional analysis terms).
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3. Legal Object; the contract is pursued by legal and 
ethical means towards legal and ethical ends (illegal 
contracts cannot be enforced in law).
4. Competency; the professional is adequately trained 
to perform what s/he purports to do, the clients are 
competent to enter the contract.
Contracting is used widely by other helping professions.
5•3•2 Why Contracting?
Some specific benefits may include
* a clear right to information for the development agency 
(hence overcoming the problems encountered in NT - see 
4.3)
a means by which the CSO can protect its investment of 
money, time or reputation
also a clear limit to the CSOs power to intervene - thereby 
reducing such problems as the defensiveness of the NT 
management towards the Steering Group ( - the former may 
not have seen any boundary on the latter's power and 
influence)
as the client group is asked to make adult choices and 
take responsibility right through, relationships are less 
likely to degenerate into those described by the Drama 
Triangle (see 2.6)
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* a way of ensuring that the distinctive feature of pro- 
action (vs 'top-down'), viz client group involvement in 
decisions re objectives, is maintained, and thus avoiding 
the CSO slipping into the 'top-down' approach with its 
associated problems (see 4.5).
At a second level, the requirements for a contract elaborated 
above help to ensure that the requirements for the pursuance 
of an effective and open pro-active development strategy by a 
CSO (see 5.2) are met. Mutual consent implies that agency 
objectives are explicit, project appraisal criteria are public 
knowledge, etc. Macfarlane argued above thus and also that 
the process for decision-making in application for support by 
co-operatives should be:
* clear
* consistent
* adhered to
Funding priorities, types of support and appraisal criteria can 
be published and reiterated at initial meetings with groups, as 
should financial repayment conditions, monitoring rights and 
obligations be made clear. (Like Mondragon 2.4, unlike 
Neighbourhood Textiles 4.4). Contractual consent implies full 
knowledge.
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The contractual requirement of competency implies that the 
agency sets achievable objectives, which are prioritised, 
costed and funded, and which are followed through with 
detailed implementation plans. This has implications for 
staffing (see next section) and for the need for provision 
of concrete support services (as argued in 2.6): Lord (1986) 
lists some such services - eg.
a) promotion/provision of suitable cheap premises for co­
operatives;
b) professionally managed in-depth training services;
c) development of a network of professional/specialist 
advisors who can be called upon to compliment the efforts 
of the CSO.
d) development of effective relationship with the local 
business community.
A further advantage of the contracting approach in agency- 
client relationships is that it would be incompatible with 
the type of informal and indecisive CSO internal organisational 
structure that CAG Lord found so prevalent (see 3.3). The CSO 
would have to adjust to clear objective setting, sharp decisions 
on priorities and resource use, monitoring its own performance 
(individually and collectively) etc if it is to enter into and 
fulfil contractual commitments with client groups.
-
5•3•3 Possible Problems and Further Implications of Contracting
The requirement of valid consideration might pose some diffi­
culty for the UK CSO. Clients are offered a free service, and 
it would probably be unrealistic to expect most client groups 
to be able to pay a significant contribution to the development 
service costs,even if a CSO found it politically acceptable to 
charge for its services.
A possible way around this dilemma is to give the client the 
opportunity to evaluate the 'professionals' - explicitly and 
openly - on their performance, and to use the results of the 
evaluation to 'pay' the professional - thus empowering the 
clients.
At its simplest, this might mean that on each occasion a CSO 
monitors the progress of a client co-operative, the converse 
also occurs: the client might use a simple rating scale to
assess the performance of the CSO - and the particular CSO
worker who is assigned to them - on the time, quality of
expertise, etc that the CSO committed as their part of the 
contract.
These ratings would then be used in the performance reviews of 
CSOs (and particular development workers) in the context of an 
objective setting - planning - performance review process, which 
both Lord, CAG and Macfarlane all argue are so necessary for CSO
effectiveness. In this way, the client has the power to 'pay'
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or 'not pay' the 'professional', just as the 'professional' 
has the power to withdraw their/his/her services, if commit­
ments of contract are not met.
The requirement of mutual consent also poses a particular 
difficulty for negotiating with a collective party such an 
an embryonic co-op group. 'Mutual consent' implies that 
the various subentities of individuals within each party share 
in the contractual commitment. These subentities and individuals, 
therefore, have to be defined - a contract cannot be between 
unbounded, amorphous entities. But the nature of an embryonic 
co-op group usually means that all members are not involved at 
the development stage (see 2.4).
Hence the need to build into a contract a programme of change for 
the composition of the client group, and the roles of its 
constituent members - which in turn can be built into the con­
tracts between the embryonic enterprise and its new members.
This programme of change would need to include the clarification 
and agreement of the degree of ultimate full member involvement 
in decision-making - in what decisions what members will be 
involved in, and what degree of shared decision-making (joint 
decision-making, major consultation, minor consultation, etc) 
as elaborated by Paton (197®) - the co-op initiators wish to 
attain. It would also need to ensure that the other basic
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preconditions of effective co-operation - a fair measure of 
psychological ownership, etc., as outlined in 4.4.2 - are 
met; that systems are set up in advance of trading, that 
relevant training is planned in advance for new members.
The principle here is pro-active planning for and preparation 
of new members. New members' scope to re-negotiate will 
inevitably be limited by their initial contracts of membership 
and employment.
A third and vital implication of adopting a contracting approach 
is the requirement for staff with the skills and competence for 
entering into and carrying out contractual commitments. Some of 
these skill areas are as follows:
i ) Business Advice Skills
The first clear requirement for the development worker in 
face-to-face contact with the client groups (e.g. in the 
local level CSO) is to have the financial, marketing and 
other business skills necessary to appraise a business plan 
and monitor progress in implementing a plan. (CAG, Lord and 
Macfarlane all emphasized the need for such skills). Such 
skills are required by the face-to-face worker if the 
business side of the contract negotiation process - appraisal 
of proposition, agreement on aims, agreement on information 
required for review, monitoring of progress, etc - is to be 
effective.
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But (I argue) nu other business skills are essential for 
all face-to-face workers. (Otherwise, one risks writing 
unrealistic job specifications). However, three other 
categories of business skills and information which it is 
important for the local CSO to have access to are:
a) Training for co-operators in financial, marketing and 
other business skills.
b) Advice on sources of funding, on availability of 
premises and negotiation of leases; on legal structures, 
employment law, trading law and loan agreements (Lord 
and Macfarlane emphasize the importance of all these 
factors).
c) Detailed, sophisticated and trade-specific advice on 
marketing, financial planning, and production methods 
available either in a regional CSO or by the local CSO 
having a network of specialist consultants available, 
and a consultancy budget to hire such expertise (as 
CAG and Macfarlane recommend).
ii) Intervention Skills
Development workers need to have a wide repertoire of 
intervention skills. They work in a very complex environ­
ment: they relate to a range of individuals, with varying
skills, experience and confidence levels; they work with 
various types and sizes of enterprises, at various stages
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of development; they relate to a variety of officials 
from funding agencies and statutory bodies.
In Appendix 2, I suggest one categorisation of intervention 
skills (John Heron) and a categorisation of possible needs 
of a client group and then attempt to relate the former to 
the latter. Heron's approach suggests both authoritative 
or directive intervention (e.g. informing, confronting), and 
facilitative intervention (responding supportively or empath- 
etically to the client).
In any event, it is clear that the intervention skills 
required by co-operative development workers go far beyond 
those needed by, say, a small business consultant whose 
concern with the internal decision-making processes and 
relationships of a client enterprise will usually be quite 
limited.
The crucial nature of psychological ownership and the other 
pre-conditions for a successful co-operative suggest extra 
dimensions to the intervention skill of the development worker. 
(See Chapter 4.5 where the failure of the Steering Group to 
intervene effectively in relation to the psychological ownership 
problems of Neighbourhood Textiles was emphasized). In particular 
the CSO and the client co-op need to explore, clarify and agree 
the degree of ultimate full member involvement that the client
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group wishes to achieve.
In addition, the development worker will need to be able to 
recommend (or help the client group to work out themselves) 
systems for decision-making, information flow, member 
recruitment, member (and manager) training, conflict handling 
etc, consistent with the level of psychological ownership/ 
member involvement agreed. She/he will also need to be able 
fo incorporate these factors fully in the on—going contract 
negotiation, development and monitoring process.
In summary, the face—to—face development worker needs a high 
level of skill in intervention in order to be able to inform, 
facilitate and negotiate (among other processes mentioned in 
Appendix 2) with a range of groups, on a range of issues at 
different levels (abstract and practical, impersonal and 
personal) etc. In Appendix 3 I suggest a model for this 
complex of processes, based on the work of Burgoyne and 
Cunningham in the field of management consultancy.
A fipal implication, of th.e development worker skill require­
ments for the contracting approach is that it suggests a quite 
different view of the CSO worker career structure to that 
proposed by CAG. CAG suggested a career progression from local- 
level, generalist CSO work to more specialised work in regional 
or specialist CSO agencies. But the Burgoyne and Cunningham
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argument is that specialist advice work is at the simplest 
or lowest level of intervention: that face-to-face process
consultancy - specifically in the context of contract 
negotiation with a dynamically developing co-operative group 
- is the highest level of skill and that it should be 
remunerated as such - and that the whole co-operative support 
framework should be geared to delivering this service ( - a 
sophisticated version of the 'Godfather' advisor role played 
by Mondragon CLP development workers with client groups, as 
described in Oakshott, 1978).
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
Effective development work requires clearly set objectives, 
responsible resourcing in relation to these objectives and an 
implementation strategy. Such requirements are particularly 
important if a pro-active approach is accepted as legitimate 
and necessary. Additionally, when a pro-active approach is 
adopted, it is important that objectives, success criteria 
and performance evaluation criteria are visible to client 
groups; and that the CSO has a planned strategy for relating 
options for action to objectives and success criteria.
The 'contracting' approach appears to provide a promising 
basis for understanding and managing agency-client relations. 
Although a comprehensive discussion of this approach is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, the basic idea, the main reasons for
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expecting it to help, some difficulties that will have to be 
overcome and some other implications of this approach for co­
operative development work - particularly in terms of develop­
ment worker skills - were outlined.
The use of more explicitly pro-active approaches and 'contracting' 
are related since both require much clearer thinking about 
objectives, resources, time scales, etc. To this extent they 
may also help address some of the other weaknesses identified 
in the CSO evaluation studies - absence of clear decision—making 
procedures etc - but without expecting the adopting of a 
different approach, per se, to be a panacea for all problems.
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APPENDIX 1 
THE STORY OF NEIGHBOURHOOD TEXTILES 
by Tony Emerson
PART I - CASE HISTORY
This Appendix is a reproduction of material previously published by the Open University Co­
operatives Research Unit as No.6 in its Case Study series. Part II of the case study (Study 
Guide to the Story of Neighbourhood Textiles - also published by the Open University Co­
operatives Research Unit) is not reproduced in this Appendix. It is referenced in the text 
where necessary.
THE STORY OF 'NEIGHBOURHOOD TEXTILES' 
by
Tony Emerson
PART I - CASE HISTORY
Abstract
The story of Neighbourhood Textiles is in two parts :. this document is part I
and provides the basic case study. Chapter One describes the
aims of the study, the way the information was gathered, and
gives a summary overview of the project - an unsuccessful
attempt to promote 'from above' a small, co-operatively owned
textile business engaged in 'Cut Make and Trim' textile work.
Chapter Two describes the direct causes of the project's 
collapse - principally those contributing to low productivity. .
Chapter Three examines the information failures that allowed
these management inadequacies to continue uncorrected. Chapter
Four then examines two contrasting interpretations of the
failure of Neighbourhood Textiles (e.g. in terms of inherent weaknesses in
co-operative structures; in terms of insufficient employee
participation) and a brief final chapter emphasises the problems
associated with the management of co-operatives, and the
implications these have for those trying to promote co-operatives.
Part II of the Story of Neighbourhood Textiles is a.separate document containing
a study guide and additional case material. It provides
questions, exercises, discussion topics and source documents
relevant to the case and the causes of business failure. It may
be -read as it stands, or perhaps more suitably, used as a
source of educational material, activities and ideas either for
those planning to form and work in a co-operative of for those
engaged, professionally or otherwise, in the promotion of such
enterprises. In general, the study guide aims 'to direct
attention to specific oversights or mistakes and to highlight
some of the inevitable difficulties. The reader is asked how
else the difficulties could have been tackled or avoided. For
example, documents relevant to the selection procedure for the
Production Manager are presented (e.g. proposed job description,
letter of application etc) for critical analysis; as are details
of the original feasibility study, the financial record, and
so on.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION; AIMS, OVERVIEW, METHODS
1.1 Aims
This report covers the development of Neighbourhood Textiles and 
Workshops Co-operative over the period Summer 1978 to Autumn 
1980 - when the textile co-operative went into liquidation.
It aims:
(i) to record what happened, the main events that took place;
(ii) to identify the likely causes of failure (1*);
(iii) with the aid of the accompanying Study Guide, to
extract learning points for the benefit of future projects -
with particular emphasis on
- the selection of staff/members
the training and development of members
I.2 Background to the Project
Neighbourhood Textiles began trading in January 1980. The 
following paragraphs are an edited version taken from a history 
of the project up until that time - written by members of the 
Steering Committee for an 'inquest' meeting shortly after the 
closure of the factory:
"In 1977 the Neighbourhood Council Executive established a 
Resources Group....
'An Industrial Community Resource' was the outcome of thinking 
regarding employment - a complex which would be related to the 
local area, provide employment in an attractive way and with 
good facilities such as a creche and canteen. It would provide 
basic employment for 30 increasing to 50 people in a clothing 
factory, and facilities for five small independent workshops. 
These workshops would give a 'start' to the person starting up 
a business with some help the workshops would take on unemployed 
school leavers.
A grant was provided by the Council for the Resources Group to 
commission a feasibility study into the clothing factory....
-...A report was produced after 5 weeks work which "examines the 
feasibility of setting up a new clothing factory combining this 
with a substantial training programme, and renting off spare 
space to small workshops. The report concludes that the 
project stands a very good chance of success providing that the 
basic recommendatipns are followed."
^references are given at the end of the report
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"This study identified, after a survey of the clothing industry 
in London, an opportunity for a cut make and trim (cmt) firm in 
ladies medium to high quality fashion outerwear, subcontracting 
machining work from designers and manufacturers. A machining 
firm entering this area of considerable unmet demand had every 
chance of success provided it met standards of:-
quality 
delivery 
price levels
It identified key factors for success as being:-
a nucleus of good machinists
reliable deliveries
effective quality control
honesty in dealing with customers
sympathetic customers in the early stages.
"The study was presented to a meeting of the Council and local 
voluntary organisations which approved the project and recommended 
it for Urban Aid funding."
The scheme was passed to a constituted Steering 
Committee to see through the establishment. This committee has 
representatives of the Borough Council, the Neighbourhood 
Council, the Resources Group, future workers and workshop
personnel...........Its role was to create a framework within
which the project could operate. It had to act as facilitator to; 
develop the business feasibility, to raise finance to set up 
the scheme, to find premises and bring them to suitable state 
for the envisaged uses, to equip the co-operative, workshops 
and creche, to deal withlegal questions such as registering the 
co-operative and taking the lease on the premises, to set up a 
site management committee, to appoint the first staff in the 
co-op creche, and canteen and to let the workshops to small 
businesses. Once the ingredients of the project had been put 
together in this way the steering committee would dissolve itself 
and hand over all responsibility to the users of the site.
"... the steering committee decided to apply to the Urban Programme
for capital and to the Manpower Services Committee (MSG) (under
the STEP Enterprise Workshop scheme) for wages and some running
costs until breakeven point. The Urban Programme application
was fairly straightforward and in November 1978 was accepted
for funding for the financial year March 1979-80. However, a
major problem with this application was the was the difficulty
in altering the costings of the project to account for inflation
and other increases - resulting from the long delay in
negotiating the lease on the premises. The project took over
a year to implement after funding was agreed and the costs
increased dramatically in this time - mostly due to revised
architects estimates for the building repair and renovation
work necessary on the premises. Total captial costs increased
much more than inflation over the 14 months. The Department of
the Environment (DoE) - which administers the Urban Programme -
allow a 5% increase in the costs of projects during the course of a financial
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year to account for inflation  The MSC application was
fraught with problems. MSC were unclear about their criteria 
for funding workshops and referred the application to various 
different sectors of the MSC over a period of 6 months. Various 
points had to be cleared up before the application finally 
went before the Area Board on May 18 1979. It was then given 
approval in principle on condition that several minor financial 
details were revised and a copy of the signed lease for the 
premises was sent to the MSC. Negotiation over the lease were 
prolonged and as a result formal contracts had not been signed 
between Neighbourhood Textiles and the MSC by the time of the 
cuts in STEP in July. MSC decided to cut all projects awaiting 
formal approval so Neighbourhood Textiles funding was'lost. In 
order that the project could be saved thé DoE agreed on a ' . '
revised scheme funded entirely from Urban Programme 
money. . The project now demanded a more rapid build up
of business and acceptance of a higher risk. The Steering Group 
agreed that the number of trainees should be reduced and the 
recruitment of experienced hgihly skilled staff should be 
speeded up. ;
"In late December 1979, the MSC informed the steering committee 
that money was in fact still available within the STEP budget, 
that Neighbourhood Textiles could still be funded. The majority 
opinion on the steering committee was that the acceptance of 
MSC funding would require further major changes with consequent 
and unacceptable delays and that the project should go ahead on 
the basis of the revised plan.
 Premises were found with the help of the Council Valuers
Department. These were 3 small factories on a site to be sublet 
by the lease holders. A company,Neighbourhood Workshops Ltd., 
was set up to take the lease and the steering committee's 
solicitor began negotiations with the leaseholders. Negotiations 
were long drawn out due to the need to refer back to the 
freeholders solicitors for re-negotiationsof certain clauses of 
the main lease. After several months the freeholders insisted 
on a 10 year guarantee of rent before agreeing to the sub-lease 
to Neighbourhood Workshops. The steering committee asked the 
Council to provide the guarantee, but this was not legally 
possible. The Council then agreed to take on the lease in 
order to save the project, as by this time a considerable 
amount of money had been invested in architectural work on 
these premises _
Soon after the feasibility study was finished a decision was 
made by the steering committee that the textiles factory should 
be organised as a co-operative. The steering committee had 
itself investigated the co-operative form. It was felt that 
ownership and control by (mostly) local workers could help 
bring a measure of stability to the factory and the jobs, in an 
area which had suffered from job loss through firms moving, or 
being taken over and closed down etc. No firm decision was i 
taken until a meeting of the council and voluntary organisations 
...recommended that if the factory was ..to be set up with ' ■ 
public money, it should be organiséd.as.a co-operative 
rather than private company.
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"Towards the end of 1979 the conversion of the premises for 
Neighbourhood Textiles were well advanced, the grant arrangements 
agreed by : d qE so a start date for the factory was agreed
for early January 1980.
"Neighbourhood Textiles Co-operative" came into being in 
December 1979 and took over from the steering committee some of 
the remaining setting up work. Orders were obtained, the first 
workers were sent their letters of appointment and a co-operative 
induction week was organised for the first week in January, 
before production began.
As the workshops were completed from May onwards, they were 
occupied by four small businesses who remain in operation. The 
canteen opened in June and began to attract a growing custom 
from workers in the site around Neighbourhood Workshops. The 
creche was finished in July...."
1.3 Summary History
The steering committee had been well aware that setting up a 
co-operative 'from above' was a difficult, even contradictory, 
undertaking. So apart from the formidable amount of work 
summarised in the previous section and that was aimed at the 
basic essentials of setting up the project, the steering committee 
had taken considerable care over a number of other points. In 
the first place, it attempted td:involve future members in the 
planning of the project and tried to attract residents of the 
area who were likely to be suitable. Perhaps understandably 
this was not very successful - apart from the delays, the 
intricacies of DoE _ funding conditions, for example, were 
a poor topic on which to introduce worker-members to the practice 
of co-operative decision-making. But the Production Manager - 
who, according to the feasibility study, was to be the senior 
member of the management team - was appointed six months before 
the factory opened feo that he would have ample time, not just to 
help with the work, but also to contribute to, shape and identify 
with the project as it came into being.
In addition, the steering committee recognised the importance of 
Key staff and devoted considerable time and effort to their 
recruitment, setting up a separate 'Personal Working Party' who 
prepared a detailed plan. For example, in relation to the 
Production Manager's job they worked out Job Description, hence 
a Person Specification', hence selection criteria, and then how 
the necessary information might be obtained. They sought a advic e 
on technical aspects from suitably qualified people. And they 
arranged both formal and informal interviews of the candidates. 
In fact, the plan was not carried through in some rather 
important respects, but the steering committee had good reasons 
for wanting to get someone in post as soon as possible.
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Finally, the steering committee recognised that the freshly 
appointed members would need a chance to absorb and consider 
the implications of being in a co-operative. So a full week's 
training programme was designed to prepare them for working in 
a co-operative and for participating in decisions. This was the 
irst week after the factory opened, and as well as discussions, 
talks on the financial plan, employee rights and the idea of a 
co-operative, the programme included" a visit to a co-operative
Cleese film on meetings, and practice at running meetings. 
Although some bad feeling was created at.this time over the 
appointment of a supervisor, there is little doubt that the 
programme was a success and the worker-members enthusiasm and 
confidence increased markedly. Indeed, this group of workers 
ecame an 'inner core' with a lower turnover than that among 
subsequent recruits.
Once production started (in January 1980) the Production Manager
day-to-day decision making supported by 
an Office Manager, a Treasurer/book-keeper (so called because 
he serviced the steering committee as well) and a supervisor.
He and the other senior staff, were accountable both to the 
monthly meetings of the members of the co-operative, and to 
the monthly steering committee meetings (the latter being 
responsible for administering the Urban Programme grant).
In addition, informal 'production meetings' were held on 
Friday afternoons, and later on a 'Co-operative Management 
Committee' was formed.
The project started with twelve staff and built up to a 
rban Programme. Table 1 summarises the financial recordeemmrnf
never came anywhere near projected or antlclp;Sg5-Tn..n.e.
5a
The July figures did not show sufficient improvement and 
evidence about orders was not forthcoming. The Council gave 
the co-op a small loan to 'tide them over' but called in a firm 
of management consultants to appraise the co-op (this firm 
specialised in the textile industry, and were different to 
the firm involved in the Feasibility Study and the Steering 
Committee). The consultants produced a rather damning assessment 
of the co-op. The Council gave the Co-operative an opportunity 
to put forward a rescue plan themselves. This plan, which 
involved accepting the Production Manager's resignation, 
piecework and drastic reductions in earnings, was not accepted 
by the Council, and, at a meeting of committee chairmen in 
early September, it was decided to give no more assistance.
THis decision was conveyed to a meeting of all co-op vforkers.
The co-op then formally went into liquidation. '
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Table 1 
PAYMENTS
1. Staff Costs 
actual 
budget
la Direct labour 
actual 
budget
lb Indirect staff 
actual 
budget
2 Other costs 
actual 
budget
3 Cumulative expenditure 
actual 
budget
RECEIPTS
1 Sales income 
actual 
budget
> Other income 
actual 
budget
Cumulative income
actual
budget
URPLUS/DEFICIT
Cumulative deficit
actual
budget
JAN
7,011
2,862
4,149
2,400
9,411
1,179
1,179
FEB
7,965
3,816
4,149
1,665
19,041
4,715
5,894
. MARCH
21,876
8,919
4,770
4,149
17,675'
5,350
39,551
33,310
4,514'
5,895
.APRIL
10,797
8,921
4,772
4,149
1,292
3,164
51,640
46,690^
MAY ..JUNE uJULY * ,AUG
2,549
7,795
4,514
11,789
35,037
21,521
75
7,063
19,659
44,577
.27,031
9,835
8,921
4,772
4,149
978
2,308
62,453
59,214'
2,847
8,910
275
9,810
28,844
52,543 
30,370
7,077
10,781
6,632
4,149
2,040
1,533
71,570.
74,556'
1,151
14,410
275
11,061
43,529
60,509
31,027
12,719
10,781
9 ,841
6,632
2,878
4,149
2,905
3,158
87,376
91,523
5010
14,410
146
350
16,217
58,289
61,059
32,234
5,623
12,102
4,765
7,953
858
4*149
5,128
1,533
98,127
108,186'
760'
7,685
1,138
' 350
18,115
66,324
80,012
41,662
3tes ;
. Only cumulative figure available 
Five-week month
Includes £182 payment for work sub-contracted
. Inculdes payments to trainees (£861 per month) and creche staff (£434 per month -o May then 
£2167 per month)
. L o w  due to late payments - c£7000 received in early September
)urce: figures supplied by the Borough Council Officer representative on steering committee
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1.4. Scope and Method of the Study
As a member of the Borough Council, I first became involved in 
the project in the summer of 1978, and when the steering 
committee was established a few months later, I was nominated 
to represent Council Members on it. Although the idea of this 
study did not crystallise until some time later, I.considered the 
Neighbourhood Workshops project as providing me with important 
first-hand experience relevant to my work (management training
for people setting up co-operative and community enterprises, at SW London College)
I therefore made written notes of many of the events that took
place and so as far as this study is concerned the research
strategy is essentially participant-observation. Thus my role
in the project gave me access to all the relevant documents and
records (minutes, accounts, etc) and I attended numerous
meetings, my recollections of which are supported by ny own -
and other people's - notes. In addition, after writing a first
rough draft of this study early in 1981, I identified a number
of points that:needed to be explored further, and which I used
in preparing a series of loosely structured interview with
some of those involved. I interviewed
the secretary to the steering committee
- the Management Consultant who carried out the feasibility 
study and stayed on to work voluntarily with the 
steering committee
- the Supervisor 
the Office Manager
- a machinist
The Production Manager was not available (he had left the 
country) and four other machinists did not respond to the 
invitation. These interviews took place betwe-en February and 
June 1981. I also interviewed another member of the steering 
committee in May 1982, specifically regarding the training 
programme. My efforts to get the Production Manger, Office Manager 
and Treasurer to comment on this draft were in vain. All three 
had left the country by then.
Given my involvement as a protagonist in the events, and given 
the limited number of people interviewed, it is clear that 
another person conducting such a study might have produced a 
somewhat different account and that this study cannot claime to 
be comprehensive and definitive. So what credibility does it 
have, and to what extent can the analysis be trusted? In 
answering this question it is important to remember that the 
primary purpose has been to identify causes of commercial 
failure with a view to 'learning the lessons' for any future 
projects. This immediately limits the scope of the study - 
and in a sense it also biases it. By looking primarily at 
the commercial failure, I do not emphasise other outcomes 
( though they are mentioned briefly in Chapter 5); and 
inevitably I concentrate more on the role of the co-op 
management rather than the Steering Committee, as the latter
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had rightly or wrongly delegated commercial decision making 
to the former and there, is little evidence (see 4.1.2) that 
the Steering Committee interfered with commercial management.
But in reading the report it should be remembered that in 
the last analysis the Steering Committee bears overall 
responsibility for the outcome. However, the direct causes 
of commercial failure are not particularly controversial.
As we shall see ther are certain fairly 'brute' facts - 
concerning productivity and sales for example - where the 
record speaks pretty much for itself and about which the 
opinions of those involved would not .ffer significantly.
These major factors, in one way or another, would loom large 
in any serious account of the collapse. In addition, there 
were a number of contributory factors - for example, 
lay-out and owrking methods in the factroy - the significance 
of which is less easily assessed: another researcher might
describe them in slightly different terms, might give them 
rather more or less emphasis, and might even exclude some while 
including some others. But even so, such differences would 
probably not be very significant in the overall picture.
The difficulties become much more severe as one moves further 
up the chain of inference, from the more or less direct and 
unambiguous factors, to the conditions that produced them, to 
the conditions that produced those conditions, and so on. The 
point is that the 'facts' (of poor quality, low productivity etc) 
are capable of supporting several quite different explanations 
of the demise of the co-operative - indeed, those involved 
disagreed sharply among themselves about what had gone wrong.
Such disagreements may concern the 'facts', which may be 
disputed or given quite different emphases, but they derive 
more fundamentally from different frames of reference.
1.4.1 Bias and Frames of Reference
Frames of reference may be coloured by the desire to justify ones 
actions or by ones personal values and social outlook (in 
particular, concerning the feasibility and desirability of 
worker co-operatives as an organisational form). An account 
of why the project failed must acknowledge suchconflicting 
frameworks within which the events can be reconstructed.
In Chapter 4 of this study I have attempted to try out' the 
different explanations against the available information. Not 
in order to prove or disprove particular hypotheses about 
co-operatives in general - for such general frameworks cannot 
be tested in so clear-cut a way - but to see if some of the 
explanations might fit the facts more easily and convincingly 
than others. Taken together, these better supported explanations 
(even if they derive from very different frames of reference 
about co-operatives) can be taken as the causes of the failure, 
from which lessons can be learned.
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In short, the primary defence against 'bias' is to take very 
seriously the competing explanations forthe events in question. 
Conscientiously undertaken, and subject to the scrutiny of 
others, such an approach may limit the effects of personal 
preoccupations and values and the selectivity of information 
associated with a particular role. But it would be naive to 
claim that good intentions in these respects are enough to 
insure against distortions and oversights. Hence, it may help 
e reader to know more about my concerns and activities as a 
participant in the project. Whether these point to axes that 
grind or issues I have leant over backwards to avoid over­
emphasising, in either case they must have influenced the 
terms in which I thought about the events. This more detailed 
discussion of my involvement in relation to the analysis is 
in the Appendix.
In summary, therefore, this study does not pretend to provide 
an all-encompassing 'God's-eye view' of Neighbourhood Textiles 
if such is implied by the notion of 'objective social research'. 
But it does aim at an orderly and dispassionate examination of 
the reasons why the project failed, using the methods associated 
with participant observation supported by the examination of 
documents and records and some additional interviewing. Given 
that the primary purpose concerns 'learning the lessons', it 
should be judged primarily in terms of the detailed 'learning 
points I it suggests - the specific pitfalls identified and the 
propositions about how they might be overcome or avoided in 
future (these form an important part of the Study Guide in Part 2)
^ 1#
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CHAPTER 2
THE DIRECT CAUSES OF COMMERCIAL FAI LURE
This chapter considers the direct causes of commercial failure 
- low productivity, poor cost control and questionable 
marketing. Why these problems were allowed to persist in 
such degree is dealt with as a separate question in chapter three
2.1 Low Productivity
There can be little doubt that low productivity was a basic 
cause of the collapse. The feasibility study report, amended 
by the Production Manager to allow for inflation^ projected 
£5 production value per machinist hour. Productivity per 
machinist hour in practice, however, always remained between 
£1 and £3 per hour. This sub-section considers the factors 
that contributed to low productivity.
2.1.1 Recruitment
The feasibility study specified that it was essential to recruit 
a core of highly trained machinists. The Personnel Working 
Group of the steering committee were aware of this - and also 
of the need to carefully select people with the right approach 
for working in a co-op.
But the evidence suggests that unskilled - and/or poorly motiv- 
motivated - workers were taken on. The Consultant's Report 
(August 1980) referred to many machinists being slow, producing 
poor quality work which needed lots of repair; to clients 
refusing to pay because of bad workmanship and to Neighbourhood 
Textiles being required to pay for spoilt materials. Additionally 
the minutes of various Co-op meetings referred to: 'time
lost in bags for (firm B) and costs for (firm S) due to poor 
quality' (15.4.80); 'our last order for (firm D) dresses took 
3 weeks owing to poor workmanship and slow work' (9.5.80);
'one order lost, one order ruined' (9.5.80). But what grounds 
are there for believing that such poor work arose from an 
initial lack of skill and motivation, rather than as a result 
of de-motivation, later on? In the first place, the Consultant's 
Report had concluded that 'recruiting procedures had been non­
existent or poor', and told Council officers (verbally) that 
Neighbourhood Textiles did not use the standard machining 
tests used in the industry. Further evidence comes from the 
people interviewed.
According to the secretary to the steering committee, from 
late 1978 on, steering committee members leafleted local estates 
and collected names of potential machinists (as well as creche, 
canteen and other ancillary workers), and they kept in touch 
with them by letters and invitations to meetings, during the 
period up to the opening of the factory. But he felt that
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they implied (during this recruitment phase) that there would 
be work for anyone interested and wanting to work irrespective 
of h3W skilled they were.
On a Saturday in March 1979, applicant machinists were asked to 
come in to be tested on machines, while applicant production 
managers were being interviewed informally. The aim was for 
applicant managers to observe the machinists, and vice versa 
- and for both to comment to steering committee members about 
the other, as well as steering committee members observing 
both! The resulting assessment, according to the Supervisor, 
was haphazard and confused, with so many people milling around. 
She thought she was the only one recording comments on each 
person - these were passed to the secretary of the steering 
committee, but she doubted that they were taken into account 
when the formal interviews took place in July. The panel for 
these interviews consisted of the Production Manager and 
two steering committee members, one of whom was herself a 
machinist in a leather goods firm. The secretary to the 
steering committee recalled people being selected for interviews 
on the basis of experience and he understood that the panel had 
looked for 'good solid machining ability' and 'co-operative 
interest' - as indicated by, for example, experience of tenants 
associations, being used to talking things out. But he did not 
recall those applicants who had not been present in March being 
given machining tests - nor did the Supervisor. And according 
to the secretary, only 3 of those interviewed had attended the 
machining tests in March.
The machinist interviewed for this study was one of those who 
attended both in March, when (she said) she was not sure who 
judged whether or not her work was competent; and in July, when 
she was asked such questions as 'why would you like to work in 
a co-op', and 'how many years experience have you'. She was 
given a form to fill in - but was not asked for a reference.
The form was a brief questionnaire and although it probed actual 
experience reasonably well, it contained leading questions 
about willingness to work hard and to be further trained; that 
is, anyone wanting a job would have said 'yes' to them. This 
machinist felt that some unskilled workers got through the 
selection process - indeed, she said that one (not a trainee) 
admitted to her privately that she never worked as a machinist 
before - so, presumably lied at the interview. And in fact the 
Supervisor gave two examples of people appointed without the 
required degree of machining skill. One was a lady ,who had not 
worked in a factory for 20 years. She was given a job, but 
left after two weeks with the worry of not .being able to do the 
work. The Production Manager persuaded her to come back as 
quality controller, with the agreement of other workers, who 
felt she was a very positive co-operative member and did not 
want her to go. The mother was the Supervisor herself. She 
had only done homeworking for the last eight, although she 
had four years experience of factory work before that. She 
said the Production Manager told her not to worry - "it's 
like riding a bicycle".
— 12 —
In due course, and rather ahead of plan (see 2.2.3) "the 
co-operative recruited a 'second batch' of machinists. A 
number of these people were 'ear marked' during the earlier 
recruitment phases and told that they would be asked back for 
a test and interview later; according to the secretary to the 
steering committee these did not take place. This is confirmed 
by the then acting office manager and a steeing committee member 
actively involved in the selection process. According to them, 
the acting office manager passed on to the new office manager 
(on her taking up post) a list of people to be interviewed for 
machinists posts. But, they claim, the new office manager sent 
out letters offering them jobs, despite their efforts to 
clarify the matter to her. The new office manager claimed 
that she had been told by the Production Manager that these 
people were ready to start; she was not sure whether they were 
interviewed or not - some had remarks written beside their names. 
So it seems that the office manager- acting primarily on the 
instructions of the Production Manager, did not i'hear' what 
others had to say: such a communication breakdown could,
plausibly, have led to mistaken appointments. '
As regards other recruits, both the office manager and the 
Supervisor wire involved. The former said she would give 
applicants -a briefing talk on what a co-op involved, as she 
was asked to do. She then reported to the Production Manager 
and/or the Supervisor - that the person 'seems quite nice, 
or whatever'. (Apparently they did not attempt to probe 
attitudes or co-operative working skills.) The latter arranged 
machining tests - though there was a particular problem in 
the first few weeks in that they only had one type of sample 
(bags) to test people on - difficult, and not typical of most 
of their work. For the first few applicants, the Production 
Manager and the Supervisor both came to a judgement 'whether 
she could handle a machine', based on simple observations such 
as 'whether stitching straight', whether tidy, fast, etc.
Later on, the Supervisor made a judgement on her own. She 
recalled one particular incident: she felt an applicant to be
untidy and slow. The Production Manager and the Office Manager 
asked the Supervisor to report her findings to them in front of 
the applicant. The Supervisor did so - but the Production 
Manager still decided to take her on. Her work turned out to 
be very unsatisfactory, and they eventually persuaded her to 
leave.
In conclusion, these recollections seem to endorse the Consultants 
comment, quoted above, that recruitment procedures were'non­
existent or poor'.
2.1.2 Training in Machining
Even if all machinists had been selected for their skill as was 
planned for the initial stages, some on-going on-the-job training 
would have been advisable. Given that people with little skill 
'slipped through the net', training was that much more vital. 
However, the Supervisor confirmed that there was no retraining 
period for people who might be out of practice for a number 
of years (by contrast, she herself received two weeks training
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when.appointed as a skilled machinist with another firm the 
following year). Neither did she receive any training in her 
role as Supervisor - although she said she was promised 
such training before she took on the role. She recalled that 
training was provided for people classified as trainees ; the 
Production Manager drew up a programme, consisting of practice 
work using six designs (ranging from straight lines to squares, 
zigaags and squiggles) on squares of material. However she 
had judged this was too long - the trainees got bored. So 
she said she changed it to practice on actual garments, and 
later she passed responsibility for training over to the second 
Supervisor.
2.1.3 Target Setting and Monitoring of (Individual Machinists') Work
The Consultant in his report pointed out that targets were 
not set for individual workers. In his opinion the manager or 
supervisor should-have a precise knowledge of the capability 
of each machinist and set production targets for each individual 
that would stretch her to the limit. The absence of target 
setting is borne out by the members I interviewed: according
to the Supervisor only in the last few weeks (end of July, 
August) was work closely monitored - but still without a 
breakdown of who did how much work.
The machinist recalled that at first, the Production Manager 
said that it did not matter how many garments they did, as 
long as they did them properly; later on, as problems arose 
he did say how many garments on average a worker should be 
producing a day - but never expressed it in the form of a 
target for each individual. Hence the main feedback people 
received was when the Supervisor took faulty work back to them 
- i.e. negative feedback on quality of work only. The office 
Manager recalled an occasion when, after three machinists 
were not accepted for co-op membership, the Production Manager 
admitted their poor work standard had not been pointed out to 
them, nor had training been offered.
My own notes of a Co-op meeting (9.5.80) may help to highlight 
this problem:
"Worker A blamed quality of material in relation to machinery 
being used. Production Manager blamed people for not notifying 
Supervisor immediately (when such technical problems arose) . 
Worker B said some machinists were not working hard enough.
B then argued that people should be paid according to the work 
they did. Production Manager and Supervisor supported this idea. 
B then queried why the second batch.ofmachinists were taken on. 
Worker C said Production Manager should: be seen on the shop floor 
more often - he would pick up who was working who was not. 
Proposals were then made to
a. have a selection sub-committee to hire/fire non-members*
*i.e. whether or not to accept new workers into membership 
after a probation period. Note there is a strong feeling that 
the newer recruits were responsible for the poor work: if
true, this may be evidence of slipshod selection; if not, it 
may have just been scapegoating.
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b. have a bonus scheme based on individual work done 
Production Manager: 'basic problem is that some people are
not pulling their weight'."
From this discussion (which became quite heated) a number of
points seemed to me to emerge:
- some machinists got bogged down with problems with their 
equipment and/or 'blamed their tools' for their inefficiency;
- some worked more conscientiously or more competently than 
others;
- without any recognition or acknowledgement for their work;
- thus demoralising the more competent or diligent and creating 
tensions between workers
- Production Manager was only able to respond in a generalised 
"some (unidentified).... not pulling their weight";
- with nobody knowing precisely who he was getting at: those 
who felt they were competent would have felt annoyed, those 
unsure of themselves would probably have felt uneasy.
The problem behind all this was that no-one was systematically
monitoring the work of individual machinists - neither the
Supervisor nor the Production Manager.
As regards the proposal to pay individual bonuses, this was 
implemented by the Production Manager (according to the Supervisor 
borne out by the Office Manager) by'giving the odd person the 
extra fiver in their pay packet on the quiet' - based presumably 
on his subjective evaluation of their work. Unfortunately, no 
real solution resulted from this meeting. The Co-op 
Management Committee (1.7.80) concluded, after monitoring the 
progress of an order through the factory that 'individual 
machinists targets not specified' and'Supervisor and machinists 
felt Production Manager not on the shop floor enough.... or 
giving Supervisor enough backing'.
2.1.4 Quality Control
The Consultant in his report concluded that quality control was 
'non-existent' despite (in his view& the employment of too 
many managerial/supervisory/checking staff relative to the number 
of machinists. The management consultant member of the steering 
committee claimed he discovered at the end that there was a 
50% rejection rate for garments - and that they had three 
people on quality control at one stage. It seemed to him that 
they tried to solve the quality problem by using more people to 
detect faulty garments rather than tackling the problem of faulty 
production at source.
Tracing this historically, it was reported to the steering
committee in February that one of the machinists was now on 
quality control and that the 'quality of work is now acceptable.' 
(But see section 2.1.1 above as to why that person was on quality 
control!) But the Co-op meetings on 16 April and 9 May referred 
to continuing quality problems. And the minutes of the June 9 
meeting record: 'A quality control system will begin next week'
implying that no system had been in operation up till then.
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So what had been happening? The interviews offer some clues: 
the machinist felt that quality control workers were scared to 
bring back defective garments to workers themselves, as they 
should have done, but left it to the Supervisor to do. The 
Office Manager claimed that by May she had realised that a lot 
of defective work was being done, that one order had been 
ruined; but she was told by the Production Manager not to 
interfere, not to say anything to the machinists or the Supervisor 
The Supervisor candidly admitted to the quality problems -
"Vfe paid for so many materials because we bodged them up,"
- and she said of the quality control system before June 
it used to get mixed up. We would look at dresses compared 
with samples. If I felt they were untidy, I might say 'give 
it back to her' - but the Production Manager might say 'let 
it go'. The checkers were confused as towhat to letgo or not 
let go (as well as to the deadline dates for orders.)"
2.1.5 Disciplinary Procedure
Adequate selection, training, target setting, etc would have 
reduced the need for disciplinary action. But, in the situation 
that arose in Neighbourhood Textiles, it would s-eem to have been 
necessary to have some means of taking action against inefficient 
workers. Needless to say, without any clear record of who was 
doing how much work, it would have been very difficult to 
instigate a just and effective discipline system. A 
frequent complaint made by the Production Manager was that he 
did not have authority to discipline (and ultimately to dismiss) 
workers. And, indeed, his job description and employment 
contract did not contain any explicit reference to responsibility 
for discipline. On the other hand the secretary to the steering 
committee claimed that this omission was at the Production 
Manager's own request. And the Terms of Employment for -all 
workers, agreed at the Co-op meeting 25.2.80, gave the 'manager 
or supervisor' power to give verbal and written warnings in 
accordance with legally accepted practice. Dismissal, however, 
would be a 'collective decision of members'. So the Production 
Manager did have the power of discipline up to the point of the 
• final written warning. But, he did not use it: none of the
people interviewed recalled any instance of a formal oral 
warning being given, certainly no written warnings or summons 
to discipline committees. The Supervisor recalled one worker 
being asked to leave, as her work was poor, and she agreed to 
do so. She recalled another machinist having a 'stand up' 
row with her. The Production Manager brought the machinist into 
the office on his own (on the Supervisor's suggestion, so as 
not to humiliate the machinist). The Production Manager told
the Supervisor that he threatened the machinist with the sack -
but without recording the warning'in any way: 'She was a good
machinist anyway.' The Office Manager said that the Supervisor 
had trouble getting people to do what she wanted them to do -
she was abused when she brought garments back to be redone.
The second Supervisor was much firmer - she seemed to get 
results by threatening people with the 'managers' office'.
The Office Manager also recalled one worker ('X') saying of a 
fellow worker ('Y') to the Production Manager: 'unless she
goes I will.' The Production Manager, she alleged, replied that 
he could not get rid of her even though she was a poor worker -
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but he would 'give her enough rope to hang herself.' In 
the Production Manager's view, Y was not a poor worker.
In short, disciplinary procedure was rather haphazard. In 
order to tackle this type of problem, the Co-op meeting (9.5.80) 
set up a 'decision making committee' consisting of the 
Production Manager, Supervisor, Treasurer/book-keeper, cutter 
and two machinists 'with authority vested in it to hire and 
fire at short notice.' But the result of this decision was that;
a. workers performance would be judged by a committee of 
fellow workers (admittedly, more senior workers)
b. without a clear record of their work performance
c. without, presumably, any clear warnings being given 
before being summoned to this committee.
Not surprisingly, various people expressed dissatisfaction with 
this arrangement, and pointed out that workers would be unwilling 
to judge their colleagues in this way. No worker was actually 
summoned before this group, but the performance of various 
workers was discussed by them. It did seem like a recipe for 
creating ill feeling between workers.
However, neither the Production Manager nor anyone else 
(including the steering committee members present) effectively 
opposed this proposal at the May meeting, or tried to point out 
consequences likely (such as a, b, and c above). The Production 
Manager and others criticised these arrangements when they found 
them unworkable and authority to fire was given to the Production 
Manager at the Co-operative Management Committee (1.7.80) 'for a 
3 month trial period'. In fact this arrangement only operated 
for two weeks, before the Production Manager went on sick leave. 
The results are discussed in relation to morale and motivation 
later; in any event, it seems fair to conclude that such 
^disciplinary procedures that existed seem to have been arbitrary 
and erratic - and of doubtful effectiveness.
2.1.6 Payment System
The steering committee (7.1.80) set up a sub-group to consider 
alternatives. A questionnaire was produced and circulated 
among workers. The sub-group analysed the completed forms and 
presented their findings to the Co-op meeting on February 2 
which accepted that (a) attendance and punctuality bonuses be 
paid to all individuals ( - a scheme advocated by the Production 
Manager during the training week), and (b) a shared production 
bonus (if turnover topped a certain figure). According to the 
Supervisor the punctuality bonuses were paid up till July or 
thereabouts, but arguments resulted about exact time of arrival. 
In addition, there was a £5 raffle draw for all who came early 
as an extra bonus, but she and the cutter disagreed with this 
system. In the event the production bonus was never paid and 
the machinist said it was not an adequate incentive to prevent 
people taking time off sick (for which they were paid).
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So it seems that the payment system did not provide sufficient 
work incentive. This issue was brought up at the co-op (9.5.80), 
as already referred to (see 2.1.3) and the result, ultimately, 
was the rather arbitrary '£5-in-the-pay-packet-on-the-quiet' 
system (- though no more than about £25 in total was paid out in 
this way). Whether an individual bonus scheme would have been 
necessary to achieve improved performance is a matter for debate. 
The Consultant concluded that if a rescue operation were to be 
attempted 'it may be necessary to introduce piece work.... at 
least in the short term' (my emphasis). What is essential is 
some means of giving workers feedback on their individual 
performance. A bonus scheme would have made that feedback more 
forceful - but it might also have created pressures preventing" 
co-operation among workers.
2.1.7 Working Methods and Production Control
The Consultant (verbally to Council officers) said he was not 
very impressed by the type of machinery chosen, the lay-out of 
machines, the flow of work through the factory etc. How 
important a factor this was, is hard to say. The Consultant 
on the steering committee considered that they spent a lot of 
time doing (free) sampling work on inappropriate orders - e.g. 
heavy coats, bullet proof vests - for which they did not have 
the right skills or machinery. He thought the product mix 
was poor and that workers were being shifted from one order to 
another according to which customer was shouting loudest - thus 
creating a rather unplanned, discontinuous work pattern.
It was proposed at one stage that section work be tried (Co-op 
meeting 9.5.80) "and accepted that those who wish may make a 
group agreement to work this way". According to the Supervisor 
only a couple of women did attempt section work - but one was 
absent for a week or so - so it did not work out and was abandoned.(2)
Arguably collective working methods would have been in accord : 
with the traditions of many of the workers - particularly of 
the West Indian women (-you help your sister if she is slow or 
having trouble' was one comment made when discussing this idea). 
However, the machinist interviewed, of West Indian origin, felt 
that most workers would not have liked it, although willing to 
try it herself. But she believed much more use should have been 
made of experienced machinists in helping the less experienced.
2.1.8 Morale and Motivation
The Consultant's Report concluded that: morale in the factory was 
'the lowest of any he had visited' and that the 'self-motivation 
which might be expected in a co-operative' was not apparent, 
that machinists were 'lacking motivation, not taking on a personal 
responsibility for their work'. This was certainly a very 
different impression to that gained by those who visited the 
factory in the first few weeks of operation: what went wrong?
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The decline in morale and motivation can be explained, largely, 
in terms of the factors just listed - e.g. unsatisfactory 
payment and disciplinary systems, people not knowing what was 
expected of them or how well they were doing, hearing 
allegations that some (unspecified) people were not pulling 
their weight, and so on. However, some further specific 
factors may well have contributed to the collapse of morale 
and motivation (broader explanations - e.g. the Production 
Managers claim made to Council Officers in July that the 
participative nature of co-operative decision-making was the 
cause of the decline, - are considered in chapter 4). In the 
first place friction between two of the more senior staff (who 
helped manage in the Production Manager's absence) was obvious 
enough to draw comments from the machinist, the Secretary and 
t e Management Consultant on the steering committee. Secondly, 
both the machinist and the Supervisor recalled workers saying 
that there was money from 'the (Borough) Council' to pay them - 
and so they were not really worried. Thirdly, there were 
divisions among the workforce: that between the original and
later recruits has already been mentioned (see 2.1.3 above).
A division may also have existed between those who were and 
those who were not concerned about the co-operative. The
getting^their child-minding fees paid by the factory. This 
issue of child-minding fees seems to have been a source of 
points to what is perhaps the most important 
the the decline in motivation and morale: -
The machinist interviewed remembered a very bitter reaction 
from some of the mothers when she suggested that the child- 
minding fees be held back until the creche opened. And
another experienced machinist sat in the middle of the floor 
where they could see everyone - and therefore note who was or
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The Secretary to the steering committee thought that the outcome 
of the Friday meetings was that the workers felt 'put down' by 
the Production Manager: that he gave false promdses regarding
orders (a feeling shared by the machinist), and that he 'ranted' 
on about poor production, lecturing good and bad alike regarding 
puncutality, low productivity, unnecessary talk and chat. As 
regards the formal co-op meetings, he felt that (a) the large 
size of the group, (b) the lack of motivation of management to 
make them work, resulted in these meetings being more destructive 
than encouraging. Moreover, workers came to him on two occasions 
with complaints over payment entitlement - they felt they were 
not getting satisfaction from the Production Manager. He 
arbitrated with the Production Manager but he felt there should 
have been someone in an advocate or arbitrator role - but that 
he was not appropriate (even though the workers seemed to want 
to use him so) because of his role with the steering committee. 
Finally the Office Manager claimed that people were continually 
complaining about the Production Manager and that she had tried 
unsuccessfully to get people to take their grievances to meetings 
(anonymously if necessary).
So it seems that meetings did not serve one of their basic 
functions: to discuss grievances or propositions members may
have had, leading to decisions on action to be taken; but rather 
they contributed to the problems of demoralisation and demotivation.
2.1.9 Conclusion and Further Comment (re productivity)
The Consultant in his report concluded that Neighbourhood 
Textiles was one of the least efficient factories he had come 
across. After recommending bringing in a consulting firm to 
carry out a complete re-organisation and top-to-bottom retraining 
exercise , he said that his firm although looking for work, would 
not want to take on this project. It is hard to assess which of 
the factors were most crucial in contributing to low productivity, 
and in any case they tended to feed on each other. Many of them 
were encapsulated in the different responses to the Production 
Manager's assumption of complete disciplinary power, following 
the decision of the Co-op Management Committee (see 2.1.5 above).
We discussed whether the changes were working at the next 
steering committee meeting: the Production and Office Managers
said they were, the Supervisor said they were making things 
worse. No clear information on performance was available - so 
people believed what they wanted to believe. When interviewed, 
the Office Manager said there had been a feeling "now things 
should go O.K" - people seemed a bit brighter. But according to 
the Supervisor: "From the week he took over till he went sick
(2 weeks later) there was tension. He kept threatening 
"....going to be changes around here, now that I have full 
control" without specifying what. He also asked me into office 
and told me that my wages were going up to £110 a week - 'but 
keep quiet about it'. He also gave rises 'on the quiet' to 
the two checkers and the cutter - but not to the assistant 
cutter - facts I only found out about at the liquidators meeting 
after the closure." She felt that this type of thing made 
the atmosphere worse.
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2.2 Inadequate Cost Control
The last section considered the more immediate rms ons for 
• low productivity among the machinists and taken together they 
probably provide a sufficient explanation for Neighbourhood 
Textiles'demise. However, the failure to control costs, 
particularly administrative overheads, was suggested as 
seriously accentuating the financial problems, and this section 
examines the extent to which this happened, and how.
2.2.1 Too Many 'Non-Productive* Staff
Out of a staff of 26, at the maximum, the following could be 
classed as 'non-productive': Production Manager, Office Manager,
Treasurer/Book-keeper, 2 Supervisors, 3 'checkers' (for short 
time only), canteen lady (part time), cleaner (part time).
The Consultant's Report suggested that there were "too many 
managers/supervisors/checkers etc compared to productive 
machinists. in a conventional clothing factory, management 
supervision is probably done by two/three people."
That they were 'top-heavy' was eventually felt by the members 
themselves. In the 'last ditch' submission (to the Council for 
more funds, 9.9.80), the steering committee and the Co-op claimed 
they could operate without the Production Manager and the cutter, 
under the combined management of Supervisor, Office Manager and 
Treasurer/Book-keeper. Doubtless other combinations would also 
have been possible - but they were not considered until it 
was too late.
So how did so many 'non-productive' staff come to be employed? 
Were they recommended in the feasibility study? Or did they 
just 'creep in' later?
The next section records how the.Treasurer/Book-keeper post 
grew in status and cost as against the feasibility study's: 
'wages and book-keeping clerk'.
Another departure from the feasibility study plan was the employ­
ment of the second Supervisor. According to the Secretary to 
the steering committee, she was appointed as an Assistant 
Supervisor about July 1 when the Supervisor was saying that work 
was too much for her. During a short illness the Assistants 
Supervisor took over, and on her return, it was agreed that the 
Assistant Supervisor continue as a Supervisor (with extra 
payment). The way one of the 'checkers' (quality controllers) 
came to be appointed has already been mentioned (see section 2.1.1) 
but it can be argued that the excess of'checkers' was compensated 
for by not employing c e r t a i n w o r k e r s :  they did not employ 
the van driver/storeman nor the maintenance person, allowed for 
in the feasibility study. On this basis, the 1-evel of non­
productive staff did not stray far from that proposed in the 
feasibility study - an extra Supervisor for two months, and an 
'elevated' book-keeper. But if one questions the staffing level
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proposed in the feasibility study - at least, in the light of 
the project as it developed - then arguably it was not necessary 
to have the Production Manager and the Office Manager and 
the Treasurer/Book-keeper. The wisdom of paying a cleaner and 
a canteen lady might also be queried - although these costs 
were small.
In passing we can note that the proliferation of Supervisors and 
checkers suggests that when problems arose the response was to 
appoint someone new to deal with them. This is easier than 
analysing systematically how the problems arose, asking questions 
about the organisation of work and how people are performing 
- a threatening process.
2.2.2 Salary Drift
The Production Manager was engaged on a salary of £8,000 p.a. 
plus car, from August 1979 - i.e. almost 6 months before the 
factory opened. His contract specified that his salary should 
be subject to a review every 6 months and the steering committee 
reviewed his salary on 4 February 1980 (less than a month after 
production started). The Production Manager requested a rise 
to £10,000 p.a., the current market rate, he claimed. The 
steering committee agreed it was policy to pay market rates for 
all jobs, and agreed to recommend this salary increase to the 
next co-op meeting. (The Management Consultant to the steering 
committee, when interviewed, claimed he had checked out the 
original salary level with 'head hunting' firms and with adverts 
in trade journals.) The Co-op on February 25 discussed this 
recommendation. One observer from the steering committee suggested 
it would be more appropriate if the Production Manager left 
the meeting for this decision - but the Production Manager felt 
this was not necessary and the matter was not pursued. Another 
steering committee member advocated the increase, commenting 'the 
trouble with British industry is that it does not pay its 
managers enough'. The recommendation was agreed. The same 
February meeting of the steering committee noted that the 
Treasurer/Book-keeper "wants a job description as he has been 
promoted from book-keeper to Treasurer" and agreed to draw up 
a job description. The feasibility study had recommended a 
wages and book-keeping clerk on about £3,000 p.a. but a month 
later the steering committee "agreed to recommend to the Co-op 
that his salary be increased to £5,000 with a further review 
after 6 months. It is understood that the increase is possible 
with the savings from.the staff supervisors post." So for the 
April meeting of the co-operative. Item 6 read: "Salary increase
for Treasurer who has been employed on scale for wages clerk 
only. Treasurer proposes that his salary be increased to 
£6,000 per year"; and the minutes record "It has been agreed to 
raise.... (Treasurer/Book-keeper's salary).... to £6,000, 
backdated to April l."(sic) Again, The Treasurer/Book-keeper 
was present at all these meetings. The careful reader will have 
noticed an unexplained jump in. ‘ the proposed increased salary 
- from £5,000 to £6,000.
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The salary increase stopped here. The Office Manager's 
request for a salary review (at the April and May meetings) fell 
on deaf ears. The wage review for all staff (promised for 
June at the Co-op meeting 25.2.80) never took place, as they 
agreed there was no money. They even decided (Co-op 9.5.80) not 
to pay the Supervisor the rate initially proposed for a 
Supervisor- but to continue paying her at the basic machinists 
rate.
The overall cost of this upward drift was not very large — 
perhaps up to £2,000 could have been saved by bargaining with 
the Production Manager and the Treasurer/Book-keeper. But 
these increases may have created unfulfilled expectations 
among other staff - thus adding to the demoralisation problem 
referred to previously.
2.2.3 Miscellaneous Items
Management Consultant on the steering committee said that staff 
were taken on aheacf of the modified feasibility study plan 
(on which financial planning was based), in March, April and 
May they averaged 19 machinists, as against a budgeted plan 
for 15. But they still kept close to the expenditure budget, 
according to him, because of the other staff they did not take 
on (van driver etc. - see 2.2.1).
The machinists interviewed felt they should not haVe taken on 
the extra machinists around March as the only work they had for 
them was a very unprofitable order on bags and the Supervisor 
felt that although there was work for them initially there 
were no firm offers to follow up when that order was finished.
So why were they taken on? The Secretary to the steering 
committee recalled the Production Manager saying at one stage 
that he must take on more staff in order to impress a potential 
customer that they could produce the quantity of bullet-proof 
vests he required - but this explanation strains credibility, 
since this 'potential order' was never a serious possibility (see 
section 3.3.3). in any event, it is possible that by expanding 
ahead of schedule the financial problems were aggravated 
(-and quite likely that the problems of production management 
were aggravated).
Another 'non-essential' expenditure was on child-minding: 
a minimum of two and a maximum of eight children had fees of 
between £10 and £15 per week paid for them, totalling about 
£2,500 over the life of the co-operative. A significant sum 
- but not the major factor it was claimed to be (see chapter 3). 
Finally, there is the question of business expenses. The 
Secretary of the steering committee felt that these were high 
at times - e.g. £40 for a meal for three. But they were always 
accurately recorded with receipts submitted to the Treasurer and 
he felt that (rather than be 'penny pinching') the Production 
Manger should be given all the resources he needed as he had 
promised to resign after a year if he was not succeeding.
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The Office Manager felt expenses were minimal - and could only 
recall "one dinner for a very, significant customer, and the trip 
to Paris (see following section) which was done on the cheap.
So although these expenses may have been high they were not 
significant factor.
2.3 Poor Marketing
The last major area of weakness that may / have contributed 
fairly directly to the collapse was the Neighbourhood Textiles 
marketing. According to the Supervisor they always had enough 
work - except for a brief period about the beginning of June 
(when they madeichildrens dresses for direct sale to consumers). 
But would they have had enough orders if they were getting 
through work quickly and efficiently? And were they attracting 
the right sort of orders at the right price?
2.3.1 Insufficient and Inappropriate Orders?
The Management Consultant on the steering committee made the 
following criticisms of the co-operatives approach to marketing.
the Production Manager did not follow up the more appropriate 
leads (as indicated in the feasibility study) but spent a lot 
of time - and committed Neighbourhood Textiles to a lot of free 
sampling work - on inappropriate orders (e.g. heavy coats, 
bullet-proof vests) for which they did not have the appropriate 
skills or machinery;
- he did not advertise in the appropriate trade journals for work;
- he should have gone more often to successful manufacturers 
or designers, directly;
- he should not have bothered going to Paris fashions
(-more appropriate for retail and design firms rather than cut, 
make and trim).
In fact, the Management Consultant claimed that he himself or 
the Office Manager or other.people, but not the Production 
Manager, actually obtained most of the orders. He thought the 
Production Manager did not seem to be able to distinguish 
between firm orders and speculative orders (this was also noted by 
the machinist; she felt the Production Manager was constantly 
telling them about the fantastic orders he had obtained, in 
order to re-assure the workers and also to make them feel he 
was doing his job). And finally, he emphasised the damage done 
by Neighbourhood Textile's reputation for unreliability. For 
example, one major client, whom he introduced to Neighbourhood 
Textiles, told him that she had enough work to fill the factory 
for a considerable period: she would like to have given more
work to Neighbourhood Textiles but could not rely on them 
after the first month or so. Indeed he cited the fact that this 
client offered to buy out the firm when she guessed it was about 
to fold as evidence that there was scope for a cmt firm in this 
sector of the market. This point was endorsed by others; the 
Office Manager claimed to recall one incident of a customer 
ringing up about his order and being told by the Production 
Manager it was ready, when it was not; and the machinist claimed to 
recall the Production Manager telling a customer that they 
could do 50 garments of a particularly complex type per week - 
whereas she estimated they could only do about a third of that 
number. (Evidence of orders lost or ruined through bad 
workmanship was given in 2.1.1.)
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2.3.2 Pricing
It was alleged that the orders Neighbourhood Textiles had 
were underpriced and did notcover costs. The Management 
Consultant on the steering committee claimed that the Production 
Manager was using totally inappropriate methods - viz a type 
of handbook giving standard times to make certain garments, used 
by a large firm in mass production - rather tha timing their own 
machinists on the garments in question and making an allowance 
for overheads. The Office Manager also felt that the Production 
Manager was underpricing. She timed one potential order which 
the Production Manager had priced at £9 per garment, and after 
making allowance for overheads estimated it at £16 to £19 per 
garment. She n ^er had any information on the costing of 
garments until the Production Manager left for holidays (and 
then sick leave) in July. When asked how it was done, he 
replied ".— just comes with experience - you look at the seams, 
etc."
Of course, given that their costs were too high to be competitive 
they would probably not have received enough ■ orders if they 
had used a pricing system that reflected their actual costs.
So in this sense a measure of 'under-pricing' was inevitable.
But were the prices lower than they need have been, in relation 
to the market? One cannot be at all sure but it is interesting 
to note that Neighbourhood Textiles contracted out one order to 
a smaller firm - with profit both to that firm and to themselves. 
So that particular order can hardly have been underpriced in 
relation to the market.
In conclusion, it is very likely that the marketing effort in 
Neighbourhood Textiles was seriously inadequate in a number 
of respects. However, the most damaging of these weaknesses 
-reliability and under-pricing - really reflect the gross 
failures in production management that have already been 
detailed. The other marketing weaknesses cannot have helped, 
and might have been important in other circumstances;
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CHAPTER 5
f
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND THE FAILURE OF MONITORING
The management of the co-operative was accountable both to the 
members and to the steering committee, and in each case meetings 
were held regularly. So why was remedial action not taken?
This chapter recounts the failure to provide clear and basic 
information on Neighbourhood Textile's production and finances, 
or to focus attention on the factors discussed in chapter 2.
I also attempt to show how attention was focused on issues 
which were of marginal relevance to the economic performance of 
Neighbourhood Textiles - in particular :
- the financial effects of the creche and child-minding 
arrangements; this is mentioned intermittently throughout the 
chapter but separate sections are devoted to two other issues, 
namely :
- the arrangements for the management of the site as a whole 
(including the workshops which were financially independent 
of Neighbourhood Textiles co-operative);
the contract being negotiated for bullet-proof vests.
Before proceeding it is worth drawing attention to a methodological 
problem: in trying to assess the information that actually
reached people and therefore effected their behaviour, I have 
to rely largely on the recorded accounts of the more formal 
meetings - Co-op, steering committee and Co-operative"Management 
Committee. Except for the recollections of the interviewees 
(up to a year after the events) I have no way of assessing 
the information that was transmitted informally about the 
workplace.
3.1 The Pattern of Meetings
Table 2 lists the principal formal, meetings of, or concerning. 
Neighbourhood Textiles. In addition, informal 'production 
meetings' were held in the Co-operative on Fridays - but no 
minutes were recorded; and, in accordance with ICOM Model Rules, 
a Co-operative Management Committee was formed. - but not 
until about May, and in the event it met very rarely, perhaps 
because the impending crisis meant that the sorts of matters 
it might have discussed would have needed to go to full meetings 
of the Co-operative, anyway.
The co-op meetings were well attended, with the exception of the 
April meeting which took place outside working hours. However, 
both the Secretary to the steering committee and the machinist 
referred to their unease about the way the meetings were run.
The office Manager, although suggesting they were'no better, 
no worse than most meetings' did think that some of those who 
took turns as chairperson - the post rotated - were not competent 
(e.g. at stopping chatter, at bringing people into discussion 
or at stopping people rambling on). My own recollections are 
of meetings that werp frequently unsatisfactory. For example, 
my notes of the meeting on July 18 record that:
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- minutes of previous meetings presented at the start of the 
meeting(rather than in advance of meeting);
- chairperson elected at start of meeting (rather than at the 
end of previous meeting, thereby giving her time to prepare)
- start delayed for half an hour - for little apparent reason 
(quite possibly no one felt responsible for getting things moving)
Table 2
Attendance at Meetings
Co-op Management Co-op Workers Steering
Committee
7 January 
18 January
Steering Committee 
Co-op
2^ 2
No information
10
4 February Steering Committee l"" 7 7
25 February Co-op 4 15 9
10 March Steering Committee 3 0 11
16 April Co-op 4 1 8
23 April Steering Committee 2 0 8
9 May Co-op 4 17 6
21 May Steering Committee No information
23 May Co-op 4 19 3
9 June Co-op A.G.M. 4 ■ 10 8
18 June Steering Committee 3 0 8
18 July Co-op 3 17 4
15 August 
Notes :
Co-op 3 13 4
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
All co-op workers were entitled to attend steering committee meetings 
Production Manager, Office Manager, Supervisor, Treasurer/Book-keeper 
Office Manager, Treasurer/Book-keeper, not yet in post 
The figures given for this meeting are estimates.
Maximum possible attendance would have ranged from about 10 at the 
Start to about 22 at the end.
Maximum attendance was 11 (including two non voting members whose 
role was to service the SC).
It is worth mentioning in this context that the 'training in 
co-operative decision-making' which had been planned by the 
steering group did not continue after the first, 'induction', week. 
One member of the steering committee, in particular, put consider­
able effort into this but apart from another showing of the film 
on meetings, nothing happened. The management of the co-operative 
were unwilling to take this further (see 4.1.2).
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As regards the documents for the meetings, these were not 
without merit: minutes and reports were clearly written in
simple language with sub-headings and short paragraphs, that 
should have been easily understood. But, and clearly this is 
an enormous reservation, the amount of basic financial information 
presented was extremely limited - and frequently inaccurate.
Table 3 lists the total of the financial data presented to 
the Co-operative's Meetings - along with the correct figures 
that should have been presented.
Table 3
Figures Given to Co-op Meetings
PRESENTED OFFICIAL RECORD
Actual Deficit Budgeted Deficit Actual Deficit Budgeted Deficit
25 February 8,317 13,147 Unknown
16 April 29,079 33,040 35,037 21,521
9 May 44,537 37,150 44,577 27,031
9 June (AGM) 52,387 40,489 52,543 30,370
18 July "Very poor-paying ourselves more 60,509 31,027
than we earned"
Even allowing for some variation as to the particular dates up to 
which the figures were cumulated, this cursory glance demonstrates 
that the figures presented consistently gave an impression that 
the enterprise was performing much nearer to target than it was. 
But even this comparison understates the extent of the failure.
The most striking discrepancy in the figures on Table 1 (in 
chapter 1) was that between actual sales and budgeted sales:
Actual sales never even reached 40% of target - save for the 
first 3 weeks in August. For some months they were only in the 
10% to 20% range. There is no record of attention being drawn 
to these figures : figures which would surely have turned the 
spotlight on the problems in supervision and management.
But even if the extent of the financial difficulties was not set 
out formally, in writing, perhaps members of the co-operative had 
become aware, informally, of the scale of the problems. If 
the recollections of those interviewed are typical, this is unlikely. 
The Supervisor claims she was never told that production was only 
10 to 40% of target - just 'you have got to work harder'.
However, she recalled once querying the £5 per hour productivity 
estimate (apparently, the Production Manager's response was to 
appeal to his expertise at costing to defend it) so presumably she 
was aware that there were problems. Towards the end - about late 
July - she remembered some financial information going on the 
noticeboard. But people did not understand it according to her,
- 'just a load of figures' - except the cutter, who claimed that 
one figure was about £4,000 out. The Supervisor felt that only i 
in the last 4 or 5 weeks did they get information they understood
- on how many garments they needed to produce, how many garments 
actually produced, etc. - and then it came from the Office 
Manager.
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The machinist reported that she had not understood the figures in. 
provided by the Treasurer/Book-keeper but she had not thought 
therè was a problem provided the orders kept coming in- until 
July when the Production Manager told them they were applying 
to the Council for another grant. (In the end she said she 
would have been prepared to cut her own wages to help the 
factory survive.) The Office Manager had apparently been aware 
from early on that the factory was below target - but she 
attributed this to starting in the wrong season, and later, to 
poor production. But apparently by July she thought it was 
'not.redeemable'.
The Office Manager also claims to know of another incident 
which, if it has not grown too much in the telling, may throw 
some light on what was happening; early in the summer 
the Treasurer/Book-keeper prepared detailed figures for a 
financial report to the Council but the Production Manager 
took them away to adjust them to give a more favourable 
impression, saying to the Treasurer/Book-keeper that they could 
not give those to the Council. There is no way of telling, at 
this distance, whether any such 'adjustments’ amounted to 
falsifications or were within the bounds of what, in the City, 
is known as 'creative accounting'. In any event the implication 
of such an incident if it occurred is that the Production 
Manager was trying actively (and in a sense understandably) 
to manage the impressions others held of the state of the 
business - and, in particular, to obscure the extent of the 
financial difficulties. If such a conclusion is sound, then 
it might also help to account for the steering committee and 
members-of the co-operative not realising what was happening.
With this possibility in mind, I turn to the chronological 
record of meetings and the reports and issues they considered.
3*2 Chronological Account of the Information Presented at Meetings
This section is made up of extracts from the minutes of the 
various meetings, along with explanations and comments on the 
information. The aim is to detail how it came about that 
so many well-attended meetings, comprised of people with a great 
deal at stake and no particular grounds for trusting the manage­
ment of the co-operative, still failed, so conspicuously, 
to raise crucial issues, in an effective way, for so long.
3.2.1 The Hopeful Months
Steering Committee. February 4 : "....Firm A bags order successful,
Firm X - an order from this co-operative for electronically-
wired sheets, a potentially large order from DHSS  Firm B
bags - good order for training and fill in.  Firm Y - good
order for dresses.... There is enough production for over ten 
machinists for four months. In the next few weeks there is the 
possibility of overtime and flexitime working". The impression 
given is clearly; "no problems". Some of these orders did 
actually materialise. Firm X, however, was in no position to 
give orders to anyone. At that time they were an MSC enterprise 
workshop which had run out of its money, awaiting a decision by 
the Council to bail them out. Perhaps another example of the 
inability of the Production Manager to distinguish between a 
firm and a speculative order (see 3.1). This should have been 
picked up by the Council representatives including myself: we
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should have known that this 'order' was no more than wishful 
thinking as we were dealing with Firm X at that time. (But we 
could not have said anything about Firm X because of the 
confidential nature of the relationship between the Council 
and the firm.) Reference was made to three other potential 
orders, and the only indication of any problem was: Firm Z -
initial samples not approved therefore no orders at present".
It was also reported that the "quality control systems almost 
set up" and (by Treasurer/Book-keeper) that "the accounting system 
is functioning and installed in the factory. It is not producing 
information as fast as necessary but it should be soon."
Meeting of the Co-operative, February 25: It was requested that
financial information be presented in a graphical or visual form. 
The budgeted vs actual deficit (Table 3) was the only financial 
information given, and "it was agreed that detailed figures 
would be circulated to members as soon as possible". A draft 
job description for the Treasurer/Book-keeper "was approved with 
the addition of a new paragraph 'preparing and maintaining 
appropriate financial information for the co-operative meetings'." 
This was added a month after the Treasurer/Book-keeper was in 
post. He was not chosen for his ability to communicate 
financial information, and although an excellent accountant, 
would probably not have been selected if that criterion was used. 
The opinion of all the workers I spoke to was that they could 
not understand him. According to Secretary to the steering 
committee he may have regarded himself as 'custodian of figure's'. 
It was also reported that they "had secured orders with one 
supplier which guarantees production for the immediate future" 
and there were two other potential long term orders.
Steering Committee, March 10: The Production Manager "reported
on increased orders and the forecast of production over the next 
few months." But there is no record of any detail, of discussion, 
of questions asked. The meeting concentrated on capital spending 
(on building and workshops), on the creche, on site management 
and other matters - apparently the steering committee was 
prepared to leave questions of commercial management to the 
co-op.
Meeting of.the Co-operative, April 16: Only one non-managerial
worker was present. "We have overspent on child-minding fees
to double the projected amount-  at the next meeting,
members of the co-op to be reminded that when the nursery opens 
they will have to pay approximately towards it the amount they 
now receive for child-minders. They are to be asked if they 
are prepared to begin making a contribution towards the fees in 
order to relieve the co-op of part of this financial burden." 
The creche and child-minding issue was important from a number 
of aspects - e.g. it was an important point of principle for 
many of those involved, it created tensions between mothers 
and non-mothers - but it was not a major factor affecting the 
financial situation (see 2.2.3). Nevertheless it was included 
as a major item under 'financial report' - where it provided 
an emotive red herring distracting from economically more 
significant issues.
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Even more serious, however, may have been the next passage of 
the report: Our running costs are still lower than budget
costs and sales are very much lower than budget sales. However, 
on balance our deficit is £29,079 compared to budget deficit of 
£33,040 that means we are £3,961 better off", in fact (see 3.1) 
actual deficit was nearly £14,000 worse than budgeted deficit. 
The report was grossly misleading and, again, conveyed the 
impression of 'no problem'. The only indications of difficulty 
came further down the report: "....production bonus could be
achieved if productivity rises to a more realistic level" and 
under P^o<3uction report ' ; '-some time has been lost on bags for 
Firm A and coats for Firm C due to poor quality" - again at the 
end of the report.
A decision whether to raise machinists wages was deferred (as 
no machinists present). It was decided to introduce a docket 
system to keep up to date on production figures and to encourage 
people to maintain high standards" — again a phrasing which 
underplays the real difficulties in production: "keep up to
date and Maintain high standards....' can be taken as to 
imply a fairly satisfactory situation. The report also referred 
to an order totalling 1800 garments in hand, and samples being 
made for another order for 1500 skirts.
Steering Committee, April 23; My notes of this meeting record a 
report from the co-op management of a serious clash of opinion 
among workers over creche financing: the workers with children,
they reported, were saying that creche charges were higher than 
local child-minders' charges; while those without children asked 
why their bonuses (my emphasis) should be lost to subsidise 
those with children. This implies a belief that the firm was 
basically profitable, that it would be paying bonuses but for 
the child-minding costs. There is no evidence that the co-op 
management tried to rectify this false impression, and, indeed 
they were quite prepared to let attention be focussed on this 
problem.
3.2.2 The Problems Emerge
Meeting of the Co-operative May 9: My notes refer to the
Production Manager explaining that each machinist was producing 
two dresses a day on average, whereas 1i dresses per hour was 
required to meet the target. This is the first admission by 
management of the extent of the problem that I am aware of. 
However, the impact and complications may have been lost in the 
heated discussion (as to whose fault it all was - see 2.1.8) 
which followed. Under 'Financial and Production Reports', the 
minutes report the discussion of a number of issues:
(i) "several machinists pointed out that some people are not 
working conscientiously as they might"; and the minutes refer 
to timebeing lost due to "poor workmanship"; to the desirability 
of an individual bonus scheme; to a mechanism for 'hire and fire' 
at short notice; and to the Office Manager's role and whether she 
was doing her job properly;
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(ii) a query as to whether they could consider laying off 
staff; and deferring wage increases to the Supervisor and 
machinists because of the financial situation:
(iii) "It was asked again that more information be put up for 
production staff to see"
(iv) a discussion on 'ways of improving productivity and of 
reducing costs'.
So it seems that discussion is at last taking place about 
fundamental issues - but is hampered by
- inadequate and inaccurate information
- heated, defensive, 'fixed position' discussion 
Perspectives on the problems impoverished by the emphasis
on individual, rather organisational/managerial failings 
. (especially individual effort).
” felse optimism (prom, ses re the bullet proof vest order 
were again held out at the meeting).
Steering Committee, May 21: "The Production Manager said the
factory would now have to work overtime to complete present 
orders, and there was a full order book until the end of July". 
This sounds excellent - but actually describes a dire situation 
arising from low productivity (rather than high productivity 
attracting many orders).
Meeting of the Co-operative, May 21; Corrections to the minutes 
of the previous meeting are recorded: the production loss to
May 2 was revised downwards(!) to £10,491 (from £13,355, which 
was an understatement to begin with); and the estimated start 
time on bullet proof vests was amended to two months, from 
two weeks. The first main item was the nursery report:
"Minimum cost to the co-operative for the remainder of this 
financial year will be in the region of £6,221.14." No financial 
or production report is minuted, but reference is made to an 
order for .22,000 garments being gained from the promotional 
opening". The Office Manager, when interviewed a year later, 
said this order was from a customer they had already done 
business with. It was based on so many garments per month for 
so many months. But it was later withdrawn because a previous 
order was not satisfactory (so the customer said to the Office 
Manager personally).
Annual General Meeeting of the Co-operative, June 9: Under
Financial Report'"The actual deficit on running expenditure 
was £52,387 compared to the budgeted deficit of £40,489 which 
means £11,898 worse off. This was largely due to about two months 
delay in starting up production, missing the seasonal peak 
in the rag trade." In fact the budgeted deficit should have 
been £30,370 - not £40,489 - which meant they were £22,000 worse 
off than planned (not £11,898 as reported). And the superficially 
plausible explanation given for the shiortfall is clearly a gross 
exaggeration because the problems were mainly on the production 
side, rather than sales. Apart from reporting 'A quality control 
system will begin next week' (the steering committee was told in
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February that one had been set up), the minutes of the Production 
Report are notable mainly for the optimistic order situation 
presented: £21,000 of confirmed cut, make and trim work, plus
£11,000 'pending', plus the likely Ministry of Defence contract, 
(i.e. bullet proof vests worth £14,000) plus an enquiry for a 
'highly lucrative' order for 'direct manufacture f@r export', 
arising from the visit to Paris - indeed the report and the 
discussion ehd with talk of accommodating 50 machinists on the 
top floor of the building! In fact, total sales for June,
July and August were only about £14,000, in the event,-a lot 
of which was negotiated later - so even the 'confirmed' figure 
was seriously over-optimistic, let alone the others.
With hindsight, the unreality of these figures may be obvious 
but the success of the co-op management in disguising : the 
situation is indicated by a report of this.meeting made by the 
Council officer representative, to various senior officers of 
the Council. His note records the over-optimistic way 
people were talking about orders and production - , .
e.g. "productivity still lagged and they had not yet reached the 
figure of £5 per machinist hour on which the December projection 
was based." (my emphasis). This statement implies a belief 
that Neighbourhood Textiles was not too far short of its 
target - in fact, the co-operative was achieving only 20%-30% 
of target.
At this stage the Co-op was asking the Council to guarantee'a 
bank overdraft which they estimated necessary.to cover their 
peak deficit. The Co-op had supplied the Council with some 
financial information and projections. The reply from the 
Council Corporate Planning Officer (12.6.80) contains the 
following: .
"We are concerned from the limited information we have seen that 
your financial position may deteriorate for some time after 
July before it gets better and we need to be able to advise 
Members on the likely extent of their financial commitment. We 
wish to see a cash forecast for each month to.... March 1981 
rather than simply to the end of July this year. Also a more 
detailed breakdown.... (as) we cannot understand how the overheads 
figure is made up or how the sales forecast relates to the 
number of machinists and their productivity...." (my emphasis)
Either this necessary financial information was not being computed 
- or someone was not revealing it. This type of information had 
been asked for on previous occasions - but the Co-op management 
had not provided it. This time, however, co-op management had 
to provide the information if they wanted the Council's 
financial guarantee. But probably it came too late for anyone 
to take remedial action.
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Co-operative Management Committee, July 1; This committee, set 
up in accordance with the co-op's constitution (ICOM Model Rules), 
produced a report (written by its chairperson, a steering committee 
member, not a worker) containing the following:
"It was recognised by the financial position of the factory 
that production must be kept as high as possible — otherwise 
everyone's jobs may be in jeopardy" (my emphasis). Again the 
phrasing 'kept as high' implies a belief that the situation 
was not far off target. The findings of an exercise in monitoring 
the progress of an order through the factory included:
confusion as to who took responsibility for the sample and at 
what point orders were confirmed;
insufficient information being given as to deadline dates 
for orders;
individual machinists targets not specified; 
poor quality work being done.
So the impression being conveyed is that there are serious 
problems with production - but no indication that people 
realised how serious these problems are. But the meeting 
agreed to give more authority to the Production Manager (as he 
had requested) - over:
a. hiring and firing
b. rates of pay
c. production methods
d. deciding who should deputise for him.
Steering Committee, June 18: It was reported that the Production
Manager, Office Manager and the Treasurer/Book-keeper "drew 
attention to the serious matter of poor productivity.... It 
was suggested that there might be a conflict between the style 
of co-operative management and the duties set down as those of 
the Production Manager in his contract, and that this conflict 
is relative to the poor productivity position". So poor 
Productivity is now more openly admitted, but not quantified, 
and it is explained in terms of difficulties caused by the 
co-operative management structure. In fact, this argument was 
put forward at various meetings, both internal and external to 
the co-operative and the fact that the Co-operative Management 
Committee gave the Production Manager more authority indicated 
that this explanation was accepted by many. It is examined in 
the next chapter.
3.2.3 The Collapse
Steering Committee, July 16: A letter was read out from the
Corporate Planning Officer stating the Council's concern over 
the financial position. It noted that output for each-of the ' 
two previous months had come nowhere near the output forecast 
those two months, in advance, by the Co-op: and implied that
the Council no longer regarded the Co-op management as very 
credible: Nevertheless, the Council had agreed to give a small
additional subsidy to tide the Co-op over till the end of August.
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The outcome of the Co-operative Management Committee meeting of 
July 1 was also reported. It looked "very closely at the stark 
reality of the financial position and the way it related to 
production". This may be deceptive in that, although the 
Co-operative Management Committee discussed financial and 
production problems, there is no sign that clear information on 
'the stark reality' of the financial position was presented there, 
But at any rate by now steering committee members - but not 
necessarily co-op workers - have a:clear indication of the 
gravity of the situation.
Meeting of the Co-operative, July 18; "Targets have been set 
at 6 dresses minimum on present order.... should be aiming at 
40 per week each.... so far, we are keeping up with targets 
agreed with the Council" (my emphasis). This last, apparently 
untrue but reassuring statement must have served to divert 
attention from the indications of serious problems which followed:
"Our financial situation is very.poor when compared to budget.... 
we need £5,000 just to get through August and they (the Council) 
agreed to give that amount if the new figures the Treasurer/ 
Book-keeper and Production Manager have produced prove to be
more accurate  At the end of August the Council will decide
whether to give us further help (which we need up to June 1981)".
The Council backing was said to be dependent on keeping up 
production, not opening the nursery at present, and "....that 
figures be provided each week for the workforce showing our 
financial situation." On this last point, both the cutter and 
the Secretary to the steering committee offered help in devising 
ways of showing figures that the workers would understand. But 
the Treasurer/Boek-keeper "explained that he cannot take on this 
work without an assistant" (my emphasis) and the Office Manager, 
while willing to help, "was not prepared to do anything to 
increase the Treasurer/Book-keeper's workload since he already 
works many extra hours." Again, this reflects the lack of 
priority given (by the Treasurer/Book-keeper and Office Manager 
at any rate) to keeping members informed; also, possibly a lack 
of skill at communicating financial information simply - and/or 
a degree of defensiveness, perhaps feeling they were being 
scapegoated.
The report, also referred (in a rather confused manner) to a 
discussion on the holiday pay conflict, the background to which 
is as follows :
Originally workers could take all their holidays with full pay 
before they had worked a full year; in July the Treasurer/ 
Book-keeper (according to the Office Manager) was very concerned 
to save money, and with the Office Manager's agreement, they 
put up a notice to the effect that holiday pay would only be 
paid pro rata for the proportion of the year a person had worked 
i.e. people who had only worked, say, 3 months could only take 
a quarter of their holiday with pay. They then simply informed 
the workers individually, as they were about to go on holiday, 
of this decision (as well as displaying the notice). Some 
workers, not surprisingly, objected rather forcefully. The 
matter was discussed fairly heatedly as the Office Manager and 
Treasurer/Book-keeper had already conceded that workers who had
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booked holidays would be paid up to two weeks holidays. "The 
Office Manager apologised that information on holiday pay was 
not passed on by calling a special meeting rather than by 
displaying a notice." This implies a belief that she had the 
right to decide this change, rather than just to recommend it. 
In any case, workers suddenly found themselves being docked 
most of their expected holiday pay without consultation - while 
they were still receiving some reassuring reports about the 
financial situation.
Meeting of the Co-operative, August 15i The production report 
referred to .problems with orders in the immediate future - one 
potential large order had been cancelled. However : "Firm B 
order progressing well and on time" - an attempt perhaps to keep 
up an illusion of productive efficiency? But under financial 
report; "Council are very disappointed with our figures but 
are prepared to give us £10,000 for next month only pending a 
report from management consultants. Our situation is very
serious the management consultant may suggest that we close...."
(The Council had again found that the July output figures were 
way below the Co-ops own forecast, made only a month before.)
The report went on to refer to a number of evening meetings 
planned to try to find a solution to the problems.
This was the last, minuted, meeting of the Co-operative. In 
September a Council representative came to a meeting at the 
factory to say that they would not give Neighbourhood Textiles 
any more money - and therefore that closure was inevitable. 
Indeed, it followed almost immediately.
3.3 Distractions
The inordinate time and energy devoted to the emotive issue of 
the creche has already been indicated. In this section two 
other issues are summarised, both of which featured prominently 
in a number of meetings. One cannot say that, had they not 
arisen, the meetings would have immediately focussed on the 
fundamental problems of production; but it,seems undeniable that 
these issues made it more difficult to do so. It may be 
significant that both were particular concerns of the Production 
Manager
3.3.1 The February meeting of the steering committee asked two of the 
members to work out options for a site management committee that 
would resolve problems between the factory (including the 
canteen and the creche) and the financially independent, small, 
craft workshops, and undertake any other work associated with 
running the shared site. The options for site management, 
prepared in discussion with all the interested parties and put 
to the steering committee on 23 April, were essentially;
(i) a site management committee with.representatives from the 
co-operative and the workshops in equal.numbers, an independent' 
chairman, ^ d  the Co-op acting as the agents of this committee to 
implement its management decisions; or
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(ii) the workshops becoming "tenants of the Co-op with the Co-op 
bearing expenses and assuming responsibility"
At this meeting the Production Manager produced a petition written 
by himself and signed by a number of co-op workers arguing for 
the second option (i.e. Co-op become landlord of the workshops).
His main argument was: that he had too many meetings already, and
the first option would have meant more meetings. The steering 
committee however decided in favour of the first option, 
arguing that this reflected the original aims of the project (in 
fact, it confirmed a policy decided with the Production 
Manager's support in July 1979). They agreed that meetings 
should only be held quarterly, and that site administration cost 
would be met from service charges paid by the workshops. It
was also reported verbally that some of the workshop tenants
had very much objected to the second option. But the 
co-operative had still to agree and its next meeting (9.5.80) 
postponed a decision as "some people said they still did not 
understand all the issues involved". At the steering committee 
two weeks later the Production Manager "now thought that the 
Co-op understood better what was envisaged, and would agree to 
the plan as proposed to them". But the next steering committee 
meeting was told that the arrangements had still to be agreed 
by the Co-op. Meanwhile no arrangement for collecting rent 
from the workshops had been agreed. Eventually, the Co-op 
did agree to the recommended structure.
Apparently for the Production Manager, this issue was part of 
an on-going power battle with the steering committee and he 
devoted time and energy to it.
3.3.2 The Bullet Proof Vest Order
This was first mentioned at the steering committee meeting on 
February 4.... "if accepted, special machinery and cutting 
equipment will be supplied by Arms Service". My own recollection 
is that the Production Manager claimed that he himself had 
special expertise in the textile technology required. The 
Mangement Consultant on the steering committee, when interviewed, 
recollected the Production Manager claiming a substantial and 
profitable potential order: that they could fill the factroy
for a considerable period, that the mark-up would be 100% (£6 
sale price, £3 to produce). But he also emphasised that the 
Production Manager was dealing with a very small contractor to 
the Ministry of Defence - contrary to the impression given by 
phrases like 'arms service' in minutes,(taken by many as meaning 
that he was dealing with Someone in the Ministry of Defence in 
a position to commission an order).
Minutes for May 9 meeting of the Co-operative record:
"ballistic tests.... take place next Tuesday and we hope to know 
our position regarding orders by the end of that week. The 
Production Manager estimates that manufacture can begin in two 
weeks time" (amended, co-op minutes 23.5 to 'two months time'). 
And a month later at the Annual General Meeting : "Bullet proof
vests test now completed. We should know the expected rate of 
manufacture next week." The contract it seemed, was sealed.
— 37 —
However, it had not emerged by July, and in a letter to the Co-op 
(10.7.80) the Council Corporate Planning Officer was asking:
"I would appreciate some enlightenment on the position.... I 
understand you hope to enter into a contract which gives you a 
generous margin of profit. If this is so, I cannot understand 
why (a) you are not being undercut by other manufacturers, or 
(b) you have not secured the contract by submitting a revised, 
quotation at a more competitive level. "
At the meeting with Council chairmen and officers on July 15, 
the Production Manager was pressed on this point. He pointed to 
the difficulty of getting a firm commitment from "Arms Service" 
and I recall, in the discussion,"that the Planning Committee 
Chairman (himself a salesman) acknowledged the difficulty of 
getting the Ministry of Defence to commit themselves to an order 
in writing. The Production Manager did nothing to dispel the 
impression that he was negotiating directly with the Ministry 
of Defence.but promised to get something in writing in the next 
few weeks. He estimated at this stage that the contract would 
start in November, and that it should raise productivity to 
£7 per machinist hour in the factory as a whole (as against 
£2.70 reached in July and £5 breakeven target). The July and 
August co-op meetings contained no reference to this order (the 
Production Manager was not present at either meeting) and 
the Council Officers' report to their Committee Chairman on 
August 11 concludes that the bullet proof vests contract "is 
no more committed than'it was ....on 15 July". Nevertheless, 
when the Council Officers came to the factory in September, to 
say that they would not support it further, the Production 
Manager responded by saying that the contract was about to be 
signed - if only the Council could give them a little more time. 
He tried to organise a 'rescue' attempt based on this order. In 
fact, according to a Council Officer who later chanced to meet 
a person from the firm concerned, they were a long way from 
signing a contract with Neighbourhood Textiles.
This chapter started by posing the question : why was remedial
action not taken on the production and other problems that were 
the direct cause of failure? The answer should now be clear - 
neither the members nor the steering committee appreciated the 
seriousness of the problems because basic and essential 
information was not provided, or not provided accurately; they 
did not insist on having that information; and in meetings the 
management of the co-operative consistently put a positive 
gloss on the state of the business, allowing, perhaps even 
encouraging, the discussion of peripheral and emotive issues.
At least 3 members of the Steering Committee - the Management 
Consultant, Council Officer and one other - tried to insist on 
detailed figures. But they came up against the problem of the 
role of the Steering Committee : it was not clear whether it 
had the power to demand information. Without such clarification, 
the Production Manager was going to reveal as little as possible, 
keeping to the businessman's norm of always telling 'outsiders' 
that things are going well.
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CHAPIERJl 
EXPLANATIONS OF FAILURE
The events described in the previous chapters are open to several 
different interpretations; in this chapter I consider two ways 
in which the dismal outcome can be accounted for. There are 
others, of course, such as 'adverse market conditions' and 
'poor management'. The former is simply inadequate, not 
withstanding the serious recession in the trade and the delàys 
in opening which meant missing the seasonal peak. The scale 
of the losses that were accumulating cannot be attributed 
simply to this factor since other firms did stay in business.
One can claim that market conditions - or undercapitalisation, 
or any other economic factor (2) - contributed tof the failure 
but this sort of explanation can never be adequate on its own.
As for 'poor management', this is not so much wrong, as rather 
empty: any business failure can be interpreted as a management
failure, and, especially in the organisational context of a 
co-operative one wants to know how it came about. Even if one 
saw many of the problems as due to the limitations of 
the Production Manager, this would scill not be the whole story; 
and the issue of whether the co-operative structure helped or 
hindered that situation would still be a real one. In fact, 
some of those involved blamed the co-operative framework for a 
number of the difficulties; while for proponents of co-operatives 
the failure demanded an explanation of why it did not work. So 
these two viewpoints are the ones considered. The first points 
to the co-operative framework of the business as disposing the 
enterprise to failure - either because managements' motivation 
was sapped, or because its authority was undermined, or because 
it failed to cope with the sorts of problems and stresses that 
a co-operative generates. The second explanation suggests that 
the co-operative failed, not because of co-operation, but for 
want of co-operation. In their different ways both explanations 
suggest difficulties associated withthe 'top-down' approach to 
setting up a co-operative.
4.1 The Co-operative Structure as a Liability
4.1.1 Motivations for Managers
Many small firms are probably not much more efficient, 
operationally, that Neighbourhood Textiles was in its better 
phases. But the owner/manager will want to maximise the trading 
surplus, and consequently will hold down wages and think very 
carefully before adding extra indirect costs. He or she would 
probably work very long hours, to compensate for his inefficiency, 
as well as trimming overheads. The Consultants Report suggested 
that a conventional small firm of the same size as Neighbourhood 
Textiles would have only 2 or 3 managerial or supervisory staff 
(as against 5 in Neighbourhood Textiles). In addition, such 
an owner/manager would have his or her own capital at risk in 
the business - a definite incentive to the difficult decisions 
when a business is in jeopardy. In contrast, management incomes 
in Neighbourhood Textileswere basically fixed. So, unless they 
saw the enterprise was in danger, but not yet doomed, they would 
have a certain interest in reducing their workloads and increasing
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their.salaries. Arguably, this is precisely what the Production 
Manager achieved at Neighbourhood Textiles. To be sure, human 
motivation is generally more complex than simple, fairly short 
term, economic self-interest. Nevertheless, setting up any small 
business is likely to be pretty exacting, and it seems 
reasonable to suggest that there could often be circumstances in 
which these economic factors might provide a definite edge to 
a manager s motivation. To what extent the different structure 
of incentives in this particular case explains some of the 
management failures, one cannot say, but clearly it is a 
possible contributing factor.
4.1.2 The Undermining of Managerial Authority
A rather more substantial connection between poor management 
and the co-operative structure is suggested in the claim that the 
participative nature of co-operative decision-making undermined 
the authority of management. The Production Manager, in 
particular put forward this argument, to the steering committee, 
the Co-operative Management Committee and to Council Officers, 
claiming he lacked the necessary authority. Assessing this 
explanation requires a review of the relevant incidents and 
conflicts in which managements authority was challenged, as 
far as they are known.
Not surprisingly, the record is clearer concerning relations 
with the steering committee, than with the workforce, and 
the following is probably a complete list:
(i) the management's unwillingness to continue with training 
in co-operative decision-making has already been mentioned 
(section 3.1). The steering committee member concerned 
persisted in her efforts despite the lack of co-operation and 
in order (in her words) 'to force the Production Manager's
hand she brought a paper to the May meeting of the co-operative. 
It was discussed and accepted, but implementation was overtaken 
by the worsening financial situation.
(ii) When the bullet proof vest order was first mentioned 
at the steering committee in February, reservations about such
an order were expressed by some members of the steering committee 
- not by any of the workers present. A rather confused discussion 
took place, with the Production Manager asserting that he had to 
assess what orders to take and that the Co-op could not afford 
to be choosy, and steering committee members asserting the 
need to consider social and moral questions and also to involve 
the co-op as a whole in such decision. The next meeting of the 
co-operative discussed the question again, at length - I 
overheard comments from workers such as 'this is going on all 
night' and 'there she (a particular steering committee member) 
goes again and in the end the Production Manager got permission 
to pursue the order, clearly, the steering committee did not 
handle this issue well and by bringing it up in the way they 
did, appeared impractical and self-righteous.
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(iii) The site management issue which has already been discussed 
(section 3.3.1).
(iv) In addition to these overt clashes the management 
apparently believed that members of the steering committee 
undermined their authority in other ways. This was clearly the 
Office Manager's view, when interviewed, though she could only 
recall two specific incidents - first the secretary to the 
steering committee influencing members,against management's 
advice, on arrangements for the site opening party (so that among 
other things guests including potential customers were expected 
to pay); second, she claimed to have overheard another 
steering committee member advising workers to be on their guard
- that if they did not have more people on a particular committee, 
management would outvote them.
It is clear from these points that relations between the 
steering committee and the management were strained, and that  ^
the formal relationship between the two was never very clear. 
Although the steering committee ' s policy was to phase itself out 
it never gave itself a definite transition period, and even 
after deciding in April that its role was simply to monitor the 
spending of the Urban Programme money it still found itself 
intervening on a social question - training - in May. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that 'a lack of authority' 
explains the poor management and business failure. In the first 
place item (i) can just as well be seen as the management 
undermining a legitimate and longstanding policy of the 
steering committee (to which the Production Manager had been 
party) and item (iii) was an attempt to extend the authority of 
the management beyond that required to run the business so 
cannot be seen as an encroachment on their authority. But 
more significantly, steering committee members did not interfere 
all in the areas of production and financial management 
that were identified as direct and major causes of failure in 
chapter 2. Not just on a day—to—day basis, but from one month 
to the next the management was simply left to get on with it 
in line with their job descriptions which were unambiguous.
Hence, as regards management 's authority being undermined by 
the steering committee, it appears that relations were strained, 
and roles unclear; that the presence and contributions of 
steering committee members as independent, influential people 
at meetings were resented on occasions; but that such problems, 
though real, can hardly be seen as a significant erosion of 
managements authority in actually running the factory.
So much for the steering committee - but what of the members?
Did workers refuse to accept the authority of management? It
is possible that the instance about which the Production
Manager complained at the steering committee in June - the 
workers decided not to do an order themselves but to pass it 
out to home workers, against his advice — is a case in point; 
but it is not clear at what type of meeting this occurred and 
how it came to be seen as a matter for the workforce to determine 
Otherwise, the Productions Manager's feeling of lacking authority 
seems to have arisen from the sorts of problems referred to in 
the earlier discussion of discipline (section 2:1.5).
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The Management Consultant on the steering committee, recalled the Production
Manager complaining to him that people would not do what he
told them, specifically referring to an incident of a worker
coming into the office, shouting at him and refusing to leave
when he told her to. On two occasions, he claimed, the Production
Manager approached him for support in gaining more control for
managment.
He also recalled the Production Manager asking at the July 
Co-operative Management Committee for a clocking-in card system. 
(Apparently this was not adopted initially at the Production 
Manager's own insistence.) If these sorts of problems are 
to be seen as demonstrating the erosion of authority by the 
co-operative structure considerable emphasis must be given to 
the fact that dismissal could only occur with the approval of 
members. Even so, the explanation is not entirely convincing 
since the Production Manager appears not to have usedleven 
what disciplinary powers were open to him, quite apart from the 
fact that some of the disputes may well have been legitimate 
grievances of the workforce, arising from inadequacies in 
production management.
Two points seem to stand out from this discussion:
(i) formally, the Production Manager's authority was very 
extensive and there is no record of meetings of the co-operative 
interfering with or over-turning his decisions; in this sense, blaming 
the co-operative structure for a 'lack of authority' would
be quite mistaken.
(ii) nevertheless, the Production Manager clearly had some 
difficulties in exercising the authority of his position.
Such difficulties could have arisen in a number of ways, some 
of which might well be associated with the fact that the firm 
was a co-operative. The Production Manager may simply have 
felt unsure of his position; or he may have wished to avoid 
conflicts out of an inappropriate Reference to co-operative 
ideals. But quite possibly just because it was a co-operative 
(however imperfect), the workforce did feel entitled to question 
and comment on decisions, especially when they felt unhappy 
about events and management competence - which they did right 
from the beginning, according to the machinist. Such questioning 
would be a positive, advantage for a firm if the management 
were able to accept such criticism. But it is quite clear that 
in this case they were not. They believed most of the criticism 
from the workers - whether delivered overtly or covertly - 
to be unwarranted and according to the Office Manager, largely 
instigated by members of the steering committee.
So the situation may have been as depicted in figure 1; management 
failings would bave led to problems anyway; the co-operative 
structure produced a greater willingness to criticise the 
apparent failings of management; but since the managers could 
not cope with this, the resulting ill-feeling and demoralisation 
simply aggravated the other problems.
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In this sense one can argue that the co-operative structure 
contributed to the failure.
Indeed, the events at Neighbourhood Textiles seem to exemplify 
the saying that 'Co-operative organisation makes- a good manager's 
life easier and a bad manager*.s life more difficult'. (3) But 
if this is the case, it is a point that is still; open to 
different interpretations: one could point to the inability to
take criticism as the real cause of the failure, and consider that 
the co-operative structure (and idea) is not implicated in any 
significant way. Alternatively, one could say that to succeed, 
a co-operative requires a standard of management that it may 
be very difficult to attract - and therefore a co-operative 
structure will often aggravate management problems and accelerate 
failure.
The implications of this discussion seem to be that an inter­
pretation of the events at Neighbourhood Textiles in terms of 
management being 'undermined' by the co-operative structure is 
a one-sided and somewhat misleading way of describing the 
fact that a co-operative structure presents management with 
additional problems and opportunities. The additional problems 
are the subject of the next section.
4.1.3 The Co-operative Structure as a Source of Problems
In this version of the argument a co-operative structure is 
liable to generate a considerable degree of conflict and 
confusion; this happened at Neighbourhood Textiles and those 
involved were not able to cope with it constructively. The 
explanation hinges on three points (4):
(i) a co-operative, by extending worker participation to a 
much greater range of decisions, provides more opportunities 
for disagreement;
(ii) a co-operative, characteristically, espouses social as 
well as economic objectives, and the more it does so, the more 
scope there: is for disagreement over priorities;
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(iii) the co-existence of managerial and democratic decision­
making systems means there can easily be confusion over who is 
responsible for particular decisions.
This raises a number of questions about Neighbourhood Textiles :
(i) Was there participation which led to conflict?
(ii) Had it, or its participants other than purely 
commercial objectives?
(iii) Was there confusion over who was responsible for what 
decision?
(iv) If there was conflict and confusion, were people 
able to cope constructively with it?
These questions can be answered as follows:
(i) The answer is probably 'yes': people were invited to
participate and yet did not feel they got very far, or that 
meetings just led to bad feeling (see 2.1.8 and 3,1) ;
(ii) Difficult to assess after the event: some of the workers
had expectations of a good working atmosphere as well as good 
wages and conditions, but very little more. However, the 
original group of workers probably expected to 'have a say',
as they were encouraged to during the training week.
(iii) Yes; the decision to send out work (section 4.1.2) the 
holiday pay issue (section 3.2.2) and the question of disciplinary 
procedure (section 2.1) are all cases - quite apart from 
confusions in relation to the steering committee.
(iv) No, all the people interviewed referred to disillusion 
with what was happening, with the conflict and bad feeling, not 
expecting this to occur in a co-op.
These points expand the conclusion of the last section and 
so it seems clear that in some ways the co-operative structure 
was a source of complications and problems. Quite how 
significant these were compared to others one cannot tell - but 
in some respects, being a co-operative seems to have made 
things worse.
4.2 The Co-operative Structure as an Unused Asset
This section examines the view that Neighbourhood Textiles 
failed not because it was a Co-operative-, but because it was not 
enough of a co-operative. This way of reconciling the outcome 
with the aspirations turns on the fact that the project failed 
to ensure some of the elementary, preconditions for effective 
co-operation. Just as the introduction of, say, project teams, 
into an organisation, requires much more than simply appointing 
project leaders and calling meetings, so the creation of a 
viable co-operative structure requires associated organisational 
changes. In either case, if such associated changes are
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overlooked the structure is so likely to be ineffective, that 
it cannot be said to have been seriously tried. On the other 
hand, the argument that 'co-operation did not fail, it was not 
really tried'; must not be over-used by setting such strict 
conditions for a 'real' test that success is pretty well 
guaranteed. The argument in this case is that certain basic 
requirements were lacking and that as a result the potential 
advantages of co-operation were not realised. The requirements 
I suggest are:
(i) a fair measure of psychological ownership by members;
(ii) an appropriate decision-making sürueture;
( m )  ^ suitable information system;
(iv) some programme to develop the decision-making and 
related skills of members
(v) sufficient trust and respect to ensure conflicts are 
not immediately destructive.
An examination of Neighbourhood Textiles in relation to these 
five points suggest the extent to which the practice of 
co-operation was still-born.
With one or two exceptions the worker-members never psychologic­
ally 'owned' the enterprise: the steering committee set it up,
the managers took over some of the resonsibilities from the 
steering committee, and the steering committee held on to others. 
They (the workers) were not asked to put money.in - just to 
turn up at meetings which other people seemed to control. 
Reference has already been made (2.1.8) to workers thinking 
that the co-operative was funded by 'the Council' and the 
Supervisor recounted the folioiwng incident: when her wages,
as Supervisor, went up to £80 a week, she queried this with the 
Production Manager thinking the figure should be £100 to £110.
He replied that the latter figure included National Insurance 
and tax. She discussed this with her husband that evening, who 
responded: 'if £100 is being claimed from the Council and
you are only getting £80, what's happening to the difference.' 
Apparently the Supervisor who was one of the most involved and 
informed did not realise that 'the Council' (i.e. DoE) .7 
only paying an initial capital grant and revenue subsidy ;(a 
considerable distrust of management is also clear). So 
notwithstanding the good start that was made in the first week 
it seems that only to a.very limited extent did members 
understand and identify with the project. Towards the end the 
crisis seems to have affected attitudes - as, indeed, it 
affected productivity - and some members worked unpaid overtime. 
But for the most part, and when it really mattered, it was not 
experienced as 'their project'.
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The second requirement was an appropriate decision-making 
structure, and following Paton (5) and Thomas (6) 'appropriate' 
can be judged in terms of:
(i) involvement of members in decision, especially where 
members perceived interests were involved, and where 
urgency, technical complexity or other factors did 
not make it impractical or undesirable;
(ii) clarity in the decision-making system, so that everyone 
knew who was involved and to what degree in what type 
of decision (e.g. whether people were making joint 
decisions, being consulted or just being informed).
Three issues will illustrate the way the decision-making 
structure deviated from what wouldbe considered appropriate.
Recruitment of additional machinists: Apparently the Production
Manager decided how many should be recruited and when - then 
he decided on particular applicants after consulting the 
Office Manager and Supervisor (who had interviewed them)
Arguably, the decision as to how many to recruit, and when, 
should have been a .steering committee decision, as it affected 
the spending of the Urban Programme subsidy. What seemed to 
have happened was that the Production Manager, after consulting 
the Management Consultant on the steering committee, about 
axing the van driver post, decided to recruit extra machinists 
in lieu of this and other personnel allowed for in the Urban 
Programme budget. One could make a strong argument that this 
was a decision for a meeting of the co-operative. It was not 
urgent, not particularly technical and it affected the interests 
of all members : the type of decision that would enable
members to feel they were sharing responsibility, and that 
would introduce them to some business problems.
According to procedure agreed during the training week in 
January 1980 the decision as to who to recruit should have 
been a decision of a working group, including the Production 
Manager and the Supervisor. The implementation of this 
procedure by the Production Manager, as indicated above, was 
very different. Again, arguably, this decision was appropriate 
for member involvement: not too technical or urgent, a matter
which affected their interests and gave them experience of 
responsibility (but not too many members at a time, for reasons 
of good interviewing practice). Lastly, it seems that the 
decision-making system was not clear - practice differed from 
the initial plan.
Holiday Pay: this issue and the way it was actually resolved
was summarised in section 3.2.3. The issue could have been 
regarded in either of two ways: first, as a management decision,
viewed as implementing an agreed general policy of tight 
financial control in a time of serious difficulties. But it is 
very doubtful whether even implicitly, such an agreed policy 
existed even in July, and the original arrangement on holiday 
pay had been recommended to the co-operative by the manager. 
Alternatively, it could be regarded as a member's decision
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(for the same reasons as mentioned.for the previous example) 
- indeed it was one for which it turned out the members 
possessed some of the relevant information.
Disciplinary Procedure : the strangely constituted 'decision-
making committee' set up as an agency to exert discipline was 
discussed in section 2.1.5. It must have left members even 
less clear over who had authority on what. Arguably discipline 
in such a co-operative is a management responsibility but 
with members meeting agreeing any general policy and acting as 
court of appeal, especially in the event of dismissal. The 
committee, as it was composed, was so managerially dominated 
that it could not act as an appeal court, nor even appear as a 
vehicle for joint decision-making. So even if the attempt to 
involve the members in the discipline problem was sound, the 
means chosen were completely inappropriate.
These three examples are sufficient to call in question the 
appropriateness of the decision-making structure,which seems to 
have been arbitrary, inconsistent and unclear.
The third and fourth requirements for co-operaion have already 
been dealt with. The information failures i
discussed in chapter 3. demonstrate the spectacular
inadequacy of the information system of the co-operative; and 
the failure to continue, beyond the first week, a programme 
to develop understanding and skills relevant to member involvement, 
has also been anentioned (31. and 4 .1.2) . Indeed, one can argue 
that subsequent events demonstrated the scope and importance 
of such a programme in relation to
- running and taking ipart in meetings
- asking probing questions of managenaent
- confronting difficult issues without generating a lot of
bad feeling '
- presenting financial information
- analysing (and changing) their own decision-making structure.
The final requirement was a degree of mutual respect and trust 
among those involved such that disagreements need not be 
threatening or automatically turn into confrontation. The 
point here is that some measure of conflict is inevitable and 
how such conflict is handled will be important, not just for 
the cohesion and commitment of the participants, but also 
(especially in a new enterprise) in terms of improved organisation 
and working methods. Dealing with criticism is seldom easy 
and the process need not always be smooth, swift, painless, 
and productive. But if the atmosphere is so frosty and defensive 
that nothing productive is likely to emerge, this is as 
effective a block to co-operation as structural inadequacies.
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Distrust and idefensiveness: in Neighbourhood:Textiles, apparently 
conflict and criticism were not just very unpleasant but 
unproductive as well. Obviously at this distance explanations 
of how this came about can only be plausible 
speculations, but in very general terms it may help to think 
of a number of factors contributing to the rapid development 
of à 'defensive' climate in the organisation, one marked by 
diffuse feelings of anxiety, resentment and recrimination.
Among the more obvious and important of the contributing factors 
must be the personal qualities of senior staff ' those who may 
well be subject to criticism and whose conduct and interpersonal 
style inevitably set standards for others. And indeed there are 
grounds for believing that key staff at Neighbourhood Textiles 
were yery/defensive, reacting with hostility to criticism.
For example, the Office Manager recalled an angry response 
from the Production Manager when she jokingly criticised his 
interviewing technique; my own and the Secretary to the steering 
committee's efforts to prompt the Production Manager to reconsider 
his approach to particular problems were singularly unsuccessful; 
and the Office Manager's defensiveness showed plainly through the 
minutes she wrote at two meetings, when her own actions had 
been questioned (e.g. the holiday pay issues).
However the trouble with such Evidence' of personal defensiveness, is 
that it may simply reflect the defensive organisatonal climate 
it is supposed to explain. Perhaps in another context, these i 
managers would have responded very differently. There is no 
need to choose between these two possibilities - they can both 
be true, in which case the situation was one in which the 
qualities and behaviour of key individuals, among other things, 
helped to generate an atmosphere of antagonisms and unwillingness 
to share responsibility - which then 'brought out the worst' in 
the individuals concerned. However it must be emphasised that 
other factors contributed to the deterioration in the organ­
isational climate: the structural confusions in relation to
the steering committee and the many tensions generated by 
inadequate production management were too much for people who 
had such a small reserve of shared experience to draw on and 
who had not been adequately prepeared for the sort of stresses 
that arose. So the conditions that led to the collapse in 
social cohesion can be represented as in figure 2 .
Behaviour No ' reservoir '
of key s t a f f   of shared
' y
' D e f e n s i v e e x p e r i e n c e
climate
Structural confusion 
in relation to 
steering committee
Tensions arising
from production problems
Figure 2
•Insufficient training 
or preparation
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In summary, the argument of this section is that five basic 
requirements for developing an effective co-operative organ­
isation were seriously lacking. However, even accepting this, 
one may still question whether, had there been more, and more 
effective, participation by worker-members, this would have 
prevented the collapse. How far and how fast would.the practice 
of co-operation have had to evolve in order to resolve or 
donipertsate for what were difficult and deep-seated problems?
So it may be true ;ithat the co-operative framework was a potential 
asset that might have prevented or resolved some of the problems 
But it is"not easy to ensure that the necessary•conditions 
(psychological ownership etc)' are’met to realise that asset - 
especially in the context of a co-operative set up 'from scratch, 
from above'.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has considered two,apparently opposed,.views of 
the contribution that 'being a co-operative' made - or did not 
make - to the collapse of Neighbourhood Textiles. On examination, 
both have some merit and they are not, in fact, incompatible. 
Indeed, a very simple conclusion would be that one of the 
reasons why the enterprise failed was because the particular 
conditions that emerged produced all the disadvantages of 
co-operation without any of the advantages.
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CHAPTER 5 
NEIGHBOURHOOD TEXTILES IN PERSPECTTVF
The purpose of this final chapter is to set the case of 
Neighbourhood Textiles in a wider perspective. It is not 
concerned with the detailed lessons that can be drawn and that 
are the subject of the Study Guide, but rather with some 
general issues about ventures of this sort. To. this end it is 
instructive to compare Neighbourhood Textiles with two other 
projects. Although it was in a different industry (recycled 
wood products), Milkwood (7) had similar origins. It was set up 
by a community group, who recruited the workers and tried to 
hand it over to them to be run as a co-operative. The Garment 
Co-operative (8) was in the same industry (cut, make and trim 
textile work) but had a different origin, it was initiated 
by its workers.
Milkwood started without adequate funding(in particular to 
pay supervisory staff),had not obtained suitable or safe 
premises, had not planned their market research, costings or 
cash flow adequately, or done detailed production planning. 
Milkwood also started with much more ambitious and diverse aims 
- to do work of a socially useful nature, to provide opportunities 
for unemployed young people, to operate as a self-managed co-op 
as well as being a viable business. The founders saw their role 
as to experiment and monitor, rather than as providing active 
support. Yet they ended up meeting separately, excluding 
workers and supervisors from decisions. The fact that so many 
of their supervisors had problems with sobriety, honesty, basic 
competence,-etc., suggests lack of care in selection. Workers 
and supervisors both perceived the founders negatively - and 
nearly all found the project a totally negative experience.
This IS mentioned, not to pour ' scorn on the hapless
Milkwood, but to show that Neighbourhood Textiles made a valiant 
attempt to do something very difficult: to set up a viable, 
self-managed co-operative 'from above'. The fact that the 
project failed should not obscure the formidable amount of work 
competently undertaken by the steering committee and the fact 
that the staff had many very definite strengths - even if they 
had some critical weaknesses. The steering committee was 
always perceived quite positively by the work force, and it 
always tried to play a practical supportive role - in areas 
such as training, marketing, and obtaining finance. And some 
of the workers went on, after the closure, to work which would 
earlier have been beyond their aspirations (e.g. two into the
area of social or community work, one to setting up a housing 
co-op). ^
Milkwood, not surprisingly, failed. The Garment Co-operative
survived - just about: even though it started with much less
financial support and less access to expertise than Neighbourhood 
Textiles.
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In the Garment Co-op, workers showed great commitment to the 
project. Involvement in meetings was high, the information 
flow was quite good - facilitated, interestingly, by the 'open 
plan' factory layout. (In Neighbourhood Textiles,, by contrast, 
the managers had an office and workers felt decisions were 
being made 'behind closed doors'.) Workers learned to cope with 
conflict also: "always arguments, more than other places....
murderous rows...." but "it's not harmful, it's healthier, 
we have big rows then laugh all afternoon." They also made a 
success of group (i.e. small team) working. But, like 
Neighbourhood Textiles, they had the problem of finding a manager: 
someone who had all the varied skills required for running a 
small business - financial, marketing, production planning, 
supervision, etc., as well as the skills and attitudes 
required to promote co-operative working - e.g. encouraging 
meetings, organising training in decision-making, a willingness 
to reveal information, encouraging workers to share responsibility, 
ability to live with conflict, and so on. Workers expectations 
of management at the Garment Co-op compunded this management 
problem. It was expected that he spend his time on the shop 
floor - rather than away doing marketing work; that he should not 
be paid so much more than them t leading to recruitment 
problems; that he should only make routine decisions, leaving 
major decisions to co-op meetings - but decisions made at 
meetings were sometimes not implemented, often not monitored, 
sometimes reversed later.
So it should be clear that many of the problems that arose in 
Neighbourhood Textiles occur, in one form o r .another, in 
other co-operatives. Particularly for those aiming to promote 
a co-operative 'from above', the problems associated with 
recruiting suitable staff must be taken very seriously - 
as must be the management problems of the steering committtee 
itself. It is not enough l3©)hope one has found a manager to 
satisfy the exacting requirements of a co-operative, and then 
leave him or her to get on with it. A number of strategies 
could be considered:
- one might look, first and foremost, for people with the skills 
of facilitating co-operative working and decision-making, 
rather than the practical business skills (accepting that
it's highly unlikely to find all the skills in one person).
These practical skills - marketing, production planning, craft 
training, etc. - would then be brought in on a part-time or 
consultancy basis.
- one might take account of the management problem in planning 
the enterprise, for example by avoiding an early or rapid 
expansion and by tailoring the growth of the enterprise to its 
'co-operative capacity'.
- one might plan for the introduction of a co-operative 
framework after the commercial basis was clearly established; 
at which point, too, there would be corresponding changes in 
management personnel.
- rather than recruiting a manager,part of the preparation for 
the project might include arranging for a suitable one to be 
available; so someone with a 'people' background (community work, 
trade union organising etc.) might study for a management 
diploma; or take a related job in the same line of business.
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I do not want to advocate any of these in particular, or even 
to suggest that they are the only options. The point is simply 
that some explicit strategy be worked out - the problems 
associated with management in newly created co-operatives are 
too critical to be dealt with on the basis of 'see—how—we—got—on' 
and 'let's-hope-it-works-out'.
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Appendix
My Role in the Project
I was not part of the initiating group (i.e. the Resources Group 
of the Neighbourhood Council), and therefore did not fully share 
in the ownership' of the initial idea. I was first invited in, 
as an interested individual Borough Council member, in July 1978, 
while the feasibility study was in progress. At this stage, I 
was quite enthusiastic about the idea of a community-initiated 
industrial venture; I shared the generally felt reservation 
that no potential workers were involved; I also had some anxieties 
about the economics of the textile industry (but was reassured 
by the consultants carrying out the feasibility study that 
the right specialist niche in the market could be profitable).
I was nominated (by the leader of the Borough Council) as the 
Council member representative on the steering committee, when it 
was set up - October 1978. I consequently felt a political 
commitment to the project - my reputation, and the reputation 
of the Council, would be at stake. I decided to concentrate on 
those aspects of enterprise development in which I felt most 
competent - helping work out a decision-making system, the 
staff selection process, and training of staff for participation 
in decision-making. The role of financial monitoring, etc., I 
left largely to the Council officer representative on the 
steering committee.
I felt my involvement to be very time consuming - more than 
50 meetings (formal and informal) spread out over two years.
At many stages I felt I did not have the energy to put much 
commitment into it - I felt myself just 'wishing,problems away', 
wishing the project to be set up and running smoothly as 
soon as possible, regarding myself as just playing a 'helpful' 
role rather than fully sharing in responsibility; and I was 
happy to leave real responsibility to those willing to take it 
on mainly those from the initiating group and those who were 
paid for their work (Borough Council and Neighbourhood Council 
employees, and, later on, the co-op management).
How might all this affect this report? To answer this I should 
highlight a number of key events:
I was on the selection panel that appointed the Production 
Manager (and I voted for him in a three to two decision 
against another candidate).
- I suggested to the Office Manager initially that she apply 
for the job.
- Initially, after their appointment, I was willing to seek 
out favourable evidence to justify their appointments - and 
more than once requested other steering committee members to 
show patience and understanding towards them.
- When things appeared to me to be going wrong (in May 1980 I 
tried to intervene privately with bothithe Production Manager and 
the Office Manager asking them to reflect on their situations 
and what they were learning, suggesting they seek outside 
support/counselling, offering to put them in touch with appropriate 
people. In neither case did I make any headway, and I felt rather 
frustrated with both myself and them.
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- I was very unhappy about training for participating in 
co-operative decision-making not being continued after the first 
week - apparently because the co-op management showed no 
enthusiasm for it.
- I became very annoyed when the co-op managment continually 
blamed the co-operative decision-making system for the projects 
failings - I felt increasingly that the problems were their skill 
limitations, and that they were scapegoating or externalising.
- I became aware that the selection process (for staff other 
than the Production Manager)was not as thorough as I had 
recommended at.discussion meetings for the steering committee 
and through.written notes' - but was not fully aware at the 
time of the problems I now identify in the section on selection;
I also felt somewhat guilty that I had not followed through my 
ideas more.
- I was over-ruled on the steering committee (Autumn 1979) when 
I had advocated that the enterprise should not be a 'pure 
workers co-op' but that it should have a management structure 
with outside representation. The main advocates who argued, 
and won, the case for a 'pure workers co-op' were the Production 
Manager and one . steering committee member - one of the
initiating group, who later became a most strident critic
of the co-op management.
I would, therefore, suggest that the following may be among the 
main biases in this study :
(i) almost to expurge my own guilt feeling, at not taking 
enough responsiblity for the selection process, to find evidence 
that we made poor selection decisions;
(ii) to demonstrate the skill limitations of the co-op managers, 
with whom I felt quite frustrated, and who I felt were external­
ising rather than looking at their own roles and weaknesses;
(iii) to demonstrate the importance of interpersonal communication 
and participative decision-making' skills, and the need for 
training in these - out of a feeling, partly, of 'I told you so'.
(iv) to show that the 'pure workers co-op' management structure 
was unwise in that it gave too much power, in effect, to an 
untried management, again, partly out of 'I told you so'.
54 -
1. The focus is on commercial failure, as we emphasise
in Section 1.4. For a useful discussion of the more general issues, see 
Thomas, A. "What is Meant by 'success' for Workers'
Co-operatives?" Papers for Seventh Co-operative Seminar,
Plunkett Foundation, Oxford, 1982
2. See the discussion of this point in Oakeshott, R.
"The Case for Workers' Co-ops"
3. Quoted in Paton, R. "Fairblow Dynamics" C.R.U.
Monograph No. 2 1978
4. See Paton, R. "Some Problems of Co-operative Organisation"
C.R.U. Monograph No. 3 1978
5. ibid
5. Thomas, A. "Decision-Making in a Building/Plant Hire 
Co-operative: An Application of Checkland's 'Conceptual
Model'Idea" in 'Progress in Cybernetics and Systems 
Research' ed Trappl R., Hanika, F., and Tomlinson, R.,
Hemisphere Publishing Corp. Washington D.C. 1982
7. Rhoades, R. "Milkwood Co-operative Ltd."
Co-operatives Research Unit, The Open University 1980
8. Cornforth, C. "The Garment Co-operative: An experiment
in Industrial Democracy and Business Creation"
Co-operatives Research Unit, The Open University 1981.
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APPENDIX 2
Intervention Styles
One classification of intervention styles is proposed by Heron 
(see Table 1). A skilled development worker would be able to 
use all of these authoritative or facilitative styles of inter­
vention. (Catharsis to a lesser extent that the other styles - 
only to the extent of reducing tension between self and clients 
and thereby getting a more open energetic interaction. No doubt 
an understanding development worker will find clients 'opening 
up' on very personal issues: I feel it is important to clarify
that this is a business relationship, and to refer him or her 
elsewhere if s/he needs personal counselling or therapy support).
I would add another category of intervention: direct help, which
can sometimes be appropriate, as I suggest below.
In the first instance, the development worker needs the catalytic 
skills of listening and probing to identify, and get the clients 
to identify, the basic needs of the client group. I suggest the 
following:
Categorisation of Possible Needs of a Client Group:
A. Resources - capital, subsidy, buildings, equipment, etc;
B. Sufficient people to work in proposed project ;
C . Required craft or trade skills for the proposed enterprise;
D. Business management skills, for setting out the sequence 
and priorities of the steps to be undertaken;
E. Interpersonal communication skills and the attitudes required 
for teamwork, sharing responsibility, collective decision­
making, handling conflict etc, particularly in a co-operative;
F. Confidence.
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Table 1.
INTERVENTION STYLES
AUTHORITATIVE
Prescriptive ^ive advice, be judgemental/critical/evaluative 
Informative Be didactic, instruct/inform, interpret 
Confronting Be challenging, give direct feedback
FACILITATIVE
Cathartic Release tensions in, encourage laughter/crying/
trembling
Catalytic Be reflective, encourage seIf-directed problem­
solving, elicit information from (includes 
ability to ask probing questions)
Supportive Be approving/confirming/validating
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Table 2.
Client Group Needs Intervention
A (more people) and/or Catalytic:
B (required skills) Informative :
Direct help:
C (planning skills plus)Informative :
D (business management) Prescriptive
Supportive:
followed by
Catalytic :
Informative/ 
Direct help:
E (Interpersonal skills,Confronting: 
attitudes)
F (Confidence) Supportive :
Where Client Group 
Fails to Keep to 
Specific Agreement 
Made :
Confronting:
how would you go about 
recruiting.
you can find other people 
by advertising... 
we will advertise for more 
people for you in...
these are the basic steps 
in setting up a co-op
you will need to draw up 
a plan with a timetable by.. 
that'sa thoroughly well- 
thought out plan... 
you agree the need to learn 
more about marketing and 
collective decision-making 
and to appreciate financial 
decision-making - but you 
want someone to do the books 
for you...
I will find out about suit­
able training courses and 
someone to provide a cheap 
book-keeping service...
I find the way you talk to 
your colleagues... and to 
secretary at reception, 
objectionable and unco­
operative; I want an agree­
ment to change this before 
we go any further...
all of us at the agency are 
really impressed by...
(specific features, 
achievements)... you can anc 
will succeed...
I feel I cannot work with 
you on this basis.
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APPENDIX 3
A Model for the Development Worker as Process Consultant
This model was developed by Burgoyne and Cunningham in the 
context of the 'set advisor' - the management consultant 
working non-directively with a workplace group of managers 
tackling real life management problems (it arose from the 
work of Reuen on 'Action Learning').
The model is shown in Figure 4 below, and I attempt to adapt 
it to the context of the development worker working with the 
client co-operative group.
The development worker as 'expert consultant* simply provides 
solutions to tasks; as 'expert teacher' s/he provides task 
solution finding procedures (e.g. how to do market research 
analyses) or procedures for handling interpersonal processes 
(e.g. for avoiding meetings 'going round in circles'); as 
'learning process manager', - 'the advisor can attempt to 
structure and manage a learning process or situation in which 
participants can discover for themselves ways of dealing with 
both the task and interpersonal aspects of their situations' - 
'in which they invent, try out, and evaluate some task solving 
processes for themselves, or review their own group working, 
propose new conventions and norms and try them out'.
The development worker as 'therapist' tries to 'manage a "learning 
to learn" process by encouraging the group to try out different 
learning/discovery procedures for themselves', both in relation 
to tasks and interpersonal processes.
Figure 4 .
Adviser
Behaviour
Group
facilitator
(process
consultant)
Task
/  I/  /T ask  Process
/ /  I
/  /  /  Learning Process--------------
Inter* , 
personal /  
process ^
Personal Change Process 
(including leanng to 
learn) .
Adviser
Behaviour
*Expcrt
consultant
Expert
teacher
Learning 
; process 
manager
-  'Therapist' (?)
(including 
I sell develo()ment 
iacilitator)
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This model and the role it incorporates for the development 
worker, is obviously radically at variance with expectations 
of client groups from CSOs and their workers: assistance
with basic bus iness skills and resources is all the evaluation 
studies found.
But, the 'professional-client' contract negotiation model 
implies that the professional has to do more than respond to 
expectations. Just as Hardy and others, referring to management 
training and development generally, point out the importance of 
going beyond 'presenting needs' and identifying underlying needs, 
if the trainer/developer is to perform a competent job.
But also, the 'professional' cannot go beyond what the client 
agrees, using the contract negotiation model. As Burgoyne and 
Cunningham point out, the advisor can only go as deep (in terms 
of process levels) as client members will allow - i.e. as is 
negotiated. Negotiating with the client group the depth or 
level at which to operate and intervene is an essential aspect 
of the skill of the development worker.
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